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COMMODIFYING CONSUMER DATA IN 
THE ERA OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
STACY-ANN ELVY* 
Abstract: Internet of Things (“IoT”) products generate a wealth of data about 
consumers that was never before widely and easily accessible to companies. 
Examples include biometric and health-related data, such as fingerprint pat-
terns, heart rates, and calories burned. This Article explores the connection be-
tween the types of data generated by the IoT and the financial frameworks of 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code. It cri-
tiques these regimes, which enable the commodification of consumer data, as 
well as laws aimed at protecting consumer data, such as the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, various state biometric data statutes, 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. This Article con-
tends that in addition to privacy policies, financial frameworks can also play a 
critical role in facilitating the transfer and disclosure of consumer data in a 
manner that is opaque and potentially harmful to consumers. Furthermore, ex-
isting privacy frameworks that rely heavily on a notice and choice model and 
the provisions of a company’s privacy policy to determine the level of protec-
tion given to consumers, and which may not always apply to IoT companies, 
do not effectively safeguard consumers in the IoT setting. This Article propos-
es several solutions to engender movement away from an overreliance on the 
notice and choice model and the terms of privacy policies, and to reduce the 
various moments of data disclosure authorized by financial frameworks. It al-
so offers ways to preserve the value of IoT data as a source of financing for 
companies while simultaneously protecting the privacy of consumers. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) has been described as “the next evolu-
tion of the Internet” and it is expected to usher in a new economic age with 
“changes rivaling the industrial revolution.”1 However, the rapid “digitali-
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 * Professor of Law, New York Law School (J.D., Harvard Law School; B.S., Cornell Univer-
sity). For helpful feedback, comments or insights, I am grateful to Paul Schwartz, Xuan-Thao 
Nguyen, Pamela Foohey, Edward Janger, Sharona Hoffman, Stephen Sepinuck, Heather Hughes, 
Juliet Moringiello, Jim Hawkins, Lucy Thomson, Cedric Powell, Sudha Setty, Audrey McFarlane, 
Nordia Elvy, Euklyn Elvy, Richard Chused, Gerald Korngold, Robert Blecker, and participants at 
the 2017 Property Implications of the Sharing Economy Conference at Penn State Law School. 
 1 DAVE EVANS, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: HOW THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET IS 
CHANGING EVERYTHING 2 (Apr. 2011), https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/ac79/docs/in 
nov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMR6-5KS7]; Kenie Ho, Protecting the Revo-
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zation of our physical world” raises significant concerns for consumers.2 In 
2016, researchers at the University of California, Berkeley Center for Long-
Term Cybersecurity (“Berkeley Center”) published a report that evaluated 
five cybersecurity scenarios that could potentially occur in 2020.3 Two of 
the most alarming scenarios involve: (1) a financial crisis in which compa-
nies sell their customer “data assets” to third parties (including unwittingly 
selling to parties that would use consumer data for perverse purposes), 
while companies become increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks, and (2) 
the ubiquitous use of wearable devices that collect and monitor “real-time” 
biometric and health-related data, including emotional state and hormone 
levels, and the widespread use of these data to control and manipulate con-
sumers.4 
Consumers are already experiencing the effects of the “new normal” of 
2020 identified by the Berkeley Center, in which companies routinely suffer 
from cyberattacks.5 In 2016, Dyn, a business that “manages crucial parts of 
the [I]nternet’s infrastructure,” reported a serious attack on its systems that 
disrupted access to various websites, such as Twitter, Netflix, and the New 
York Times.6 The hackers manipulated vulnerable IoT devices to initiate the 
                                                                                                                           
lution: Internet of Things Trade Secrets, LAW.COM: INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 6, 2016, 6:04 AM), 
http://www.law.com/insidecounsel/2016/10/06/protecting-the-revolution-internet-of-things-trade/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180103172900/https://www.law.com/insidecounsel/2016/10/06/p 
rotecting-the-revolution-internet-of-things-trade/?slreturn=20180003122859]. The Internet of Things 
(“IoT”) has been described as a network of connected products that accumulate and transfer data over 
the Internet. AIG, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION? 6–7 (2015), http://
www.aig.com/content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/business/casualty/aigiot-english-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7X-Y9VV]. 
 2 JESSICA GROOPMAN & SUSAN ETLINGER, CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS: WHAT BRANDS CAN LEARN FROM A CONCERNED CITIZENRY, ALTIMETER 
2 (June 2015), http://www.altimetergroup.com/pdf/reports/Consumer-Perceptions-Privacy-IoT-
Altimeter-Group.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP7V-H9LF]. Business Insider reports that “[n]early $6 
trillion will be spent on IoT solutions over the next five years.” John Greenough & Jonathan Cam-
hi, Here Are IoT Trends That Will Change the Way Businesses, Governments, and Consumers 
Interact with the World, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2016, 10:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/top-internet-of-things-trends-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/73LE-LQY3]. 
 3 U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LONG-TERM CYBERSECURITY, CYBERSECURITY FUTURES 2020, 
at 1 (2016), https://cltc.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/cltcReport_04-27-04a_pages.
pdf [https://perma.cc/M523-YEZE]. 
 4 Id. at 6–7. As used in this Article, the term “health-related data” refers to data associated 
with the mental, emotional, or physical well-being and health of individuals, such as calories 
burned, sleep patterns, glucose levels, and the like. As used in this Article, the term “biometric 
data” refers to biometric identifiers, such as voice and face prints; scans and images of biometrics, 
such as fingerprint scans; other data related to and that can be transformed into biometric identifi-
ers, such as a recording of an individual’s voice or a photograph of an individual; and the authen-
tication codes, templates, text, or mathematical representations associated with any such data. 
 5 Id. at 9–10. 
 6 Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites Across U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/business/internet-problems-attack.
html [https://perma.cc/N95B-H2FX]. 
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attack.7 Similarly, in 2017, Equifax reported that a breach of its servers re-
vealed the sensitive data, including “social security numbers and birth 
dates,” of millions of consumers.8 
Customer information generated from consumer purchase and use of 
goods and services is a prized asset.9 Companies’ “use of customer data-
bases has become a critical strategy to successful business.”10 The brisk 
expansion of the IoT will increase the consumer data contained in existing 
customer databases exponentially. The vulnerabilities associated with IoT 
devices and the speed at which companies can collect, analyze, and distrib-
ute consumer data in the IoT setting exacerbates concerns about privacy and 
security.11 In the IoT context, data generation and collection does not end 
after the consumer purchases a device online or in a store, but instead in-
creases once the consumer begins to use the IoT device, as well as the web-
sites and mobile applications that are frequently required to access and op-
erate the device. Not only will consumers’ use of IoT devices and related 
services generate information, such as credit card numbers, names, dates of 
birth, and physical and email addresses, but also a wealth of new infor-
mation. IoT devices can collect biometric and health-related data, such as 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id.; see also Samuel Burke, Massive Cyberattack Turned Ordinary Devices into Weapons, 
CNN: TECH (Oct. 22, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/22/technology/cyberattack-
dyn-ddos/ [https://perma.cc/2YA9-KYCZ] (noting that the hackers used malware to control the 
IoT devices of consumers). 
 8 Paresh Dave, Credit Giant Equifax Says Social Security Numbers, Birth Dates of 143 Mil-
lion Consumers May Have Been Exposed, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017, 5:25 PM), http://www.
latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-equifax-data-breach-20170907-story.html [https://perma.
cc/VP54-BBCF]. 
 9 Julia Alpert Gladstone, Data Mines and Battlefields: Looking at Financial Aggregators to 
Understand the Legal Boundaries and Ownership Rights in the Use of Personal Data, 19 J. MAR-
SHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 329 (2001) (“[C]onsumer profiles are a valuable intangible 
asset.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 
2056–57 (2004) (“The monetary value of personal data is large and still growing, and corporate 
America is moving quickly to profit from this trend. Companies view this information as a corpo-
rate asset and have invested heavily in software that facilitates the collection of consumer infor-
mation.”). 
 10 Gladstone, supra note 9, at 329; see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides 
with Cyberspace: The Trouble with Perfection—Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset, 
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37, 41 (2002) (noting that “due to the cyberspace nature” of Internet 
companies, their most important assets are intangibles); Privacy, E-COMMERCE L. REP., Aug. 
2000, at 33, 33 (“For many dot coms, one of their most valuable assets, if not their most valuable 
asset, is their customer database.”). 
 11 Commentators frequently note the differences between the concepts of privacy and securi-
ty. JOANNA LYN GRAMA, LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION SECURITY 37 (2011) (“Information 
security and privacy are closely related. However, they’re not the same.”). Other commentators 
note that privacy scholars have varying definitions of the concept of privacy. Alan Rubel, Claims 
to Privacy and the Distributed Value View, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 921, 923 (2007) (discussing 
“what is privacy”); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1092 
(2002) (delineating six different “conceptions” of privacy). 
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fingerprint scans, facial scans, heart rates, fitness levels, temperature, and 
blood sugar levels, among other things.12 In fact, because of the IoT, “90 
percent of the world’s data has been generated over the past two years. Eve-
ry second, over 205,000 new gigabytes are created, which is the equivalent 
of 150 million books.”13 
Prior to the technological advancements of the IoT, access to a con-
sumer’s health-related data was typically limited to healthcare and insur-
ance providers. Similarly, biometric data, such as fingerprint scans, could 
previously be regularly accessed only by governmental entities or perhaps 
some employers and the banking and payments industry.14 Today, compa-
nies, such as Apple, use biometrics in connection with their products.15 In 
the IoT setting, biometric and health-related data are no longer being held 
primarily by a select group of traditional entities and providers. Instead, 
these types of data are now more ubiquitously dispersed and available to 
various entities—including retailers, manufacturers, and software and 
online companies—because of consumers’ use of IoT devices, fitness appli-
cations, and other mobile applications.16 Unlike financial information, bio-
metric and health-related data are “more vulnerable in general as a data set 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrim-
ination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 88, 98–99 (2014); Sharon Roberg-
Perez, The Future Is Now: Biometric Information and Data Privacy, ANTITRUST, Summer 2017, 
at 60, 60. 
 13 See AIG, supra note 1, at 2. 
 14 Business Wire, With Voice Biometrics from Nuance, Banco Santander México Customers Say 
“Goodbye” to PINs and Passwords, and “Hello” to a Better Banking Experience, THESTREET (May 
14, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12708042/2/with-voice-biometrics-from-
nuance-banco-santander-m233xico-customers-say-8220goodbye8221-to-pins-and-passwords-and-
8220hello8221-to-a-better-banking-experience.html [https://perma.cc/8B34-N7AJ]; Michele Mas-
terson, Barclays Deploys Nuance Voice Biometrics Solution, SPEECH TECH. (May 8, 2013), http://
www.speechtechmag.com/Articles/News/Speech-Technology-News-Features/Barclays-Deploys-
Nuance-Voice-Biometrics-Solution-89506.aspx [https://perma.cc/RVG7-EZB6]; Fingerprints and 
Other Biometrics, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-
and-other-biometrics [https://perma.cc/3CYP-3LKZ] (“The FBI has long been a leader in biomet-
rics. It has used various forms of biometric identification since our earliest days, including assum-
ing responsibility for managing the national fingerprint collection in 1924.”); Street Level Surveil-
lance, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/my/sls [https://web.archive.org/web/2017
0313045046/https://www.eff.org/my/sls] [hereinafter Street Level Surveillance] (“Fingerprints are 
the most commonly known biometric, and they have been used regularly by criminal justice agen-
cies . . . .”). 
 15 Street Level Surveillance, supra note 14. 
 16 Helen Nissenbaum & Heather Patterson, Biosensing in Context: Health Privacy in a Con-
nected World, in QUANTIFIED: BIOSENSING TECHNOLOGIES IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 79, 83–84 (Dawn 
Nafus ed., 2016) (discussing examples of health-related data in the employment setting and con-
tending that “[l]eading fitness tracking companies may cultivate new markets not only by selling 
their products and services directly to the public via retailers, but also by embedding them into 
existing health and wellness infrastructural ecosystems”). 
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[because you can’t] replace [them] like you can a credit card.”17 For data 
miners, advertisers, and hackers, health-related and biometric data are the 
“missing piece in consumer profiles.”18 
In light of the nature of Internet commerce, the most treasured asset of 
many businesses is “in the form of intangibles [and] [w]hen in need of capi-
tal, these companies must turn to these intangible assets, including consum-
er databases, to serve as collateral in secured transactions.”19 A significant 
source of financing for IoT start-ups comes from venture capital deals.20 
Rather than primarily obtaining equity financing, IoT companies may in-
creasingly need to depend on traditional secured financing transactions in 
order to meet demands for their products and avoid potential delays associ-
ated with obtaining equity financing.21 Traditional lenders may also insist 
on secured financing schemes when providing financing to new and estab-
lished IoT companies. Jawbone, an IoT maker of wearable devices, raised 
$50 million in secured financing deals in 2013 and $300 million in 2015.22 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath You Take: Data Privacy and Your Wearable Fitness Device, 
72 J. MO. B. 76, 76 (2016). 
 18 See id. at 76–77. 
 19 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Collateralizing Privacy, 78 TUL. L. REV. 553, 576–77 (2004) 
[hereinafter Nguyen, Collateralizing]. 
 20 Lindsey O’Donnell, The 10 Most Active VC Investors in the Internet of Things, CRN (July 30, 
2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.crn.com/slide-shows/networking/300081526/the-10-most-active-vc-
investors-in-the-internet-of-things.htm [https://perma.cc/BWX7-89CB] (“Hype around the Inter-
net of Things is growing, and venture capital investors are increasingly getting into the game as 
more IoT-based startups emerge with innovative technology.”); Funding to IoT Startups Has 
More Than Doubled in Six Years, CB INSIGHTS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/
research/internet-of-things-startup-funding/ [https://perma.cc/GEG5-SFUT] [hereinafter Funding 
to IoT Start-ups] (describing investments in IoT start-ups and noting the most “active” venture 
capital investors); VERSIZON, STATE OF THE MARKET: INTERNET OF THINGS 2016, at 5 (Apr. 
2016), https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/state-of-the-internet-of-things-market-
report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KL-ZLL8] (“According to analysis conducted by our venture 
capital (VC) arm, Verizon Ventures, we estimate that consumer IoT startups raised 15% more VC 
funding than enterprise-focused startups in 2014.”). 
 21 Dan Primack, Exclusive: Jawbone Raises More Than $100 Million, FORTUNE (Sept. 12, 
2013), http://fortune.com/2013/09/12/exclusive-jawbone-raises-more-than-100-million/ [https://
perma.cc/8AG2-LKWB] (discussing one IoT company’s issues with meeting consumer demands 
for its products and concerns about the length of time needed to acquire equity financing); see also 
Andrew M. Kaufman, Counseling the Financially Distressed Technology Company: Finding and 
Preserving Value in E-Commerce Assets, in UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING 2002: 
THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS, NEW LAWS & NEW AGREEMENTS 697 (PLI Intellectual Property 
Course Handbook Series No. G-697, 2002) (discussing technology companies’ reliance on equity 
financing); Funding to IoT Start-ups, supra note 20 (discussing IoT funding). 
 22 Katie Benner, Jawbone Gets a Loan and a Leash, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2015, 7:46 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-05-18/jawbone-s-latest-partner-is-a-lender-not-an-
equity-investor [https://perma.cc/9A7X-L3VZ] (noting that the $300 million debt financing obtained 
by Jawbone “is secured by Jawbone’s current and future licenses, intellectual property, royalties, 
accounts receivable and revenue from IP or licenses”); Rachel Metz, Jawbone’s New Wristband Adds 
You to the Internet of Things, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.
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IoT companies, such as I.D. Systems, have used their customer lists as col-
lateral in asset based financing deals.23 As IoT companies begin to discover 
the value of IoT data as an asset, it is only a matter of time before they 
begin to further exploit their customer databases, particularly when subse-
quent rounds of financing are needed beyond the start-up phase. However, 
any potential commodification of consumer generated data under Article 9 
(“Article 9”) of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) may have signifi-
cant consequences for consumers. 
Consider an IoT company with a customer database that consists of 
names, phone numbers, addresses, fingerprint and retina scans, blood pres-
sure levels, and other types of biometric and health-related data obtained 
from consumers’ use of IoT devices, services, and related mobile applica-
tions. If the company uses its database as collateral to obtain financing from 
a lender, the secured financing rules contained in Article 9 permit the se-
cured lender to sell the collateral to satisfy the company’s debt in the event 
of a default.24 Thus, consumers may find that with a simple purchase of an 
IoT device and use of the accompanying services and software, such as 
websites and mobile applications, their immutable biometric and health-
related data, along with their names and addresses, will be offered for sale 
by a secured lender if the manufacturer of the device fails to pay back the 
loan. Of course, companies may also disclose the biometric data of con-
sumers to third parties in non-Article 9 transactions.25 For instance, Take-
Two Interactive Software, a company that collects “facial scans of gamers,” 
has been accused of distributing the facial data of its users.26 
To date, three states have adopted statutes that broadly and definitively 
address companies’ collection, transfer, and use of biometric data.27 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
com/s/521606/jawbones-new-wristband-adds-you-to-the-internet-of-things/ [https://perma.cc/774K-
YPDK] (discussing Jawbone’s production of a wearable IoT device that, along with the “associated 
smartphone software,” can track “exercise, sleep patterns, and other activity”); Primack, supra note 
21 (noting that the $50 million of funding raised by Jawbone “is an asset-based loan provided by J.P. 
Morgan and Wells Fargo, which is secured against assets like inventory”). 
 23 I.D. Sys., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) § 3.3.1 (Dec. 18, 2015) (“To secure the full 
payment and performance of all of the Obligations, each Loan Party Obligor hereby assigns to 
Lender and grants to Lender a continuing security interest in all property of each Loan Party Obli-
gor, . . . all . . . General Intangibles (including [intellectual property rights and] customer lists 
. . . .”). 
 24 U.C.C. §§ 9-601, 9-610 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 25 Dune Lawrence, Do You Own Your Own Fingerprints?, BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2016, 7:00 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-07/do-you-own-your-own-fingerprints 
[https://perma.cc/7PKP-RTHK] (discussing companies’ various uses of biometric data). 
 26 William Gorta, Face Scan Storage Not Actual Injury, Video Game Maker Says, LAW360 
(Jan. 20, 2017, 8:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/883480/face-scan-storage-not-actual-
injury-video-game-maker-says [https://perma.cc/XA5D-MNDQ]. 
 27 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 (West 2018); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 
(West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010 (West 2017); Roberg-Perez, supra note 12, at 
430 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:423 
hough some types of biometric data monetizations may be restricted under 
these statutes, it is not entirely clear whether the creation of a security inter-
est encumbering a database containing biometric information would violate 
the terms of these statutes. If the laws of these states do not apply to a trans-
action or if other state privacy laws do not clearly cover biometric data, 
with the possible exception of federal and state unfair and deceptive prac-
tices statutes, companies may face few, if any, restrictions on their ability to 
monetize biometric data. This is particularly concerning for consumers giv-
en the generally permanent nature of biometric data. 
In addition to potentially using their customer databases that contain 
IoT consumer data in secured financing transactions, companies may also 
transfer their databases to third parties during a bankruptcy proceeding. 
When Pay by Touch, “a biometric provider,” filed for bankruptcy, the com-
pany’s assets included its customer database which held the “biometric 
templates of over two million” consumers who supplied “their fingerprints 
to pay for gas and groceries.”28 Further, in what may be one of the first 
bankruptcy proceedings involving a business that focuses exclusively on the 
production and sale of IoT devices and services, FiLIP Technologies, Inc. 
(“FiLIP”)—the manufacturer of wearable IoT devices that help parents “lo-
cate and track their children”—initiated bankruptcy proceedings in 2016.29 
The sale of the company’s assets to a third party was eventually approved 
                                                                                                                           
61–63 (noting that in some instances, state data breach and privacy laws that generally address per-
sonal information could apply to the collection of biometric data, but in contrast the Illinois, Texas, 
and Washington statutes clearly address companies’ use of biometric data); Justin Kay & Brendan 
McHugh, The Next Steps for Biometrics Legislation Across the US, LAW360 (May 25, 2017, 11:55 
AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/928056/the-next-steps-for-biometrics-legislation-across-
the-us [https://perma.cc/NK83-HSBD] (“Washington became just the third state [after Illinois and 
Texas] to enact its own legislation generally governing the collection, use and retention of bio-
metric data.”); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2017) (defining personal information to 
include non-biometric data and biometric data and imposing notice requirements for the “unau-
thorized acquisition of personal information”). This Article does not address various state laws 
that may apply to genetic information, but rather focuses on statutes that comprehensively, exclu-
sively, and clearly regulate the collection, transfer, and use of biometric data by “private compa-
nies.” 1-3 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY K. TOWLE, DATA PRIVACY, PROTECTION, AND SECU-
RITY LAW § 3.09 Lexis (2017) (discussing various state and federal statutes regulating genetic 
information); Street Level Surveillance, supra note 14 (discussing laws that address “the use of 
biometrics by private companies”). 
 28 Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at 
the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 250 (2007); Report of Consumer Priva-
cy Ombudsman at 5, In re Solidus Networks, Inc., No. 2:07-bk-20027-TD (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 
26, 2008) [hereinafter Pay by Touch CPO Report] (discussing that the company held biometric 
data during bankruptcy proceedings). 
 29 In re FiLIP Techs., Inc., No. 16-12192 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 5, 2016); Matt Chiappardi, 
Child Tracking Device Maker Hits Ch. 11 Seeking a Buyer, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2016, 8:49 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/848760/child-tracking-device-maker-hits-ch-11-seeking-a-buyer 
[https://perma.cc/WL6E-8Y7N]. 
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by the bankruptcy court.30 FiLIP’s assets included data about the children 
and parents that used the company’s products.31 Consider the fact that retail 
toy giant Toys “R” Us recently filed for bankruptcy.32 As of the date of writ-
ing, it is not yet entirely clear whether the data of millions of consumers 
will be disclosed or transferred. 
In another example, in 2015 RadioShack filed for bankruptcy and 
among the company’s assets were “117 million customer records” that in-
cluded personally identifiable information, such as dates of birth, credit and 
debit card numbers, names, and physical and email addresses.33 Standard 
General eventually acquired the company and its customer database.34 Simi-
larly, in 2016 Sports Authority filed for bankruptcy and sold its customer 
database for a winning bid of $15 million.35 
                                                                                                                           
 30 FiLIP Techs., No. 16-12192 (KG); Jeff Montgomery, Sale of Bankrupt Kid-Tracking Firm 
to Smartcom OK’d, LAW360 (Nov. 8, 2016, 7:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
860757/sale-of-bankrupt-kid-tracking-firm-to-smartcom-ok-d [https://perma.cc/JWZ6-8UQ2]; Vince 
Sullivan, Kid-Tracker Co.’s Ch. 11 Liquidation Plan Gets Court Approval, LAW360 (Jan. 12, 
2017, 6:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/880342/kid-tracker-co-s-ch-11-liquidation-
plan-gets-court-approval [https://perma.cc/EL9E-FHK2]; Terms of Service, FILIP, http://www.
myfilip.com/terms-of-service/ [https://perma.cc/K35G-TPVM]. 
 31 Order (I) Approving Asset Purchase Agreement; (II) Authorizing and Approving Sale of 
Acquired Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims and Encumbrances; (III) Authorizing the As-
sumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts; and (IV) Granting Related Relief, In re 
FiLIP Technologies, Inc., No. 16-12192 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 9, 2016) [hereinafter FiLIP 
Sale Order]; Exhibit A to Sale Approval Order at 41, In re FiLIP Technologies, Inc., No. 16-
12192 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 9, 2016) [hereinafter FiLIP Sale Exhibit A] (“[u]ser data of 
existing current and past customers”). 
 32 Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, Toys “R” Us, Inc., No. 17-
34665-KLP (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2017); Michael Corkery, Toys ‘R’ Us Files for Bankruptcy, Crip-
pled by Competition and Debt, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/09/19/business/dealbook/toys-r-us-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/3CMA-TCHH]. 
 33 Chris Isidore, RadioShack Sale Protects Most Customer Data, CNN: MONEY (June 10, 2015, 
4:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/10/news/companies/radioshack-customer-data-sale/index.
html [https://perma.cc/6PC9-DVC3]; Brian Schaller, RadioShack Bankruptcy Case Highlights Value 
of Consumer Data, INFOLAWGROUP LLP (June 8, 2015), http://www.infolawgroup.com/2015/
06/articles/privacy-law/radioshack-bankruptcy-case-highlights-value-of-consumer-data/ [https://
perma.cc/X2VW-599G]. 
 34 Michael Hiltzik, The RadioShack Bankruptcy Shows You Can’t Trust a Company’s Privacy 
Pledge, L.A. TIMES (May 19, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mh-
radioshack-you-have-no-privacy-left-20150519-column.html [https://perma.cc/7D4N-PPLF] (dis-
cussing the potential acquisition of RadioShack’s customer database by Standard General for 
$26.2 million). 
 35 Kathryn Rattigan, Sports Authority Sells Its Customer Database to Dick’s Sporting Goods 
for $15 Million, DATA PRIV. & SECURITY INSIDER (July 7, 2016), https://www.dataprivacyand
securityinsider.com/2016/07/sports-authority-sells-it-customer-database-to-dicks-sporting-goods-
for-15-million/ [https://perma.cc/W7Z8-2GS9]; Alex Schiffer, In Sports Authority Bankruptcy, 
Customer E-mail Data Commands Hefty Sum, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2016, 3:05 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-sports-authority-auction-20160629-snap-story.html [https://perma.
cc/94Q3-XQ5K]; see In re Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., No. 16-10527 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 2, 
2016). 
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Whether a consumer’s information can be easily disclosed or trans-
ferred to a third party in connection with a monetization scheme, secured 
financing transaction, or bankruptcy proceeding depends significantly on 
the terms of a company’s privacy policy. Thus, privacy policies, as well as 
financial frameworks, can play a critical role in obscurely commodifying 
consumer data in ways that are potentially detrimental to consumers. This 
Article demonstrates the prevalence of “data propertizations” and transfers 
by companies in the bankruptcy context and offers predictive arguments 
regarding the potential role of Article 9 in facilitating IoT data trade and 
disclosures.36 Consider that prior to the company’s bankruptcy, Pay by 
Touch’s privacy policy provided that its “database of biometric identifiers . . . 
associated with consumer fingerprints” would not be transferred to unaffiliat-
ed parties without consumer consent.37 A consumer privacy ombudsman was 
appointed to evaluate privacy concerns associated with the sale of consumer 
data during the bankruptcy proceeding.38 Similarly, RadioShack’s privacy 
policy did not include a carve out covering the sale or bankruptcy of the 
company, and the company’s ability to sell much of the information con-
                                                                                                                           
 36 One scholar has previously addressed the assignment of consumer data in transactions 
governed by Article 9 (“Article 9”) of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), and others have 
evaluated the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy proceedings. Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen 
A. O’Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. 
REV. 777, 807–33 (2001); Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 576–81. This Article builds 
on and expands the work of these scholars, but is distinct from previous scholarship in the follow-
ing ways: (1) this Article analyzes consumer data disclosures and transfers in the IoT context in 
light of the new types of data being generated by consumer use of IoT products; (2) unlike previ-
ous scholarship that conducted separate and distinct evaluations of consumer data disclosures and 
transfers under Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code, this Article conducts a simultaneous explora-
tion of both commercial frameworks; (3) this Article highlights the inadequacies of existing priva-
cy frameworks in remedying consumer harms that may occur as a result of data disclosures and 
transfers sanctioned by Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, this Article considers not only 
the privacy concerns raised by the creation of a security interest in IoT consumer data but also 
issues related to the monetization of biometric, health-related, and highly sensitive data in the IoT 
setting as well as the sale and transfer of such intimate data to third parties in bankruptcy. 
 37 Pay by Touch CPO Report, supra note 28, at 3–4 (describing the company’s privacy policy 
and noting that section 363(b)(1) of the U.S. Code applied in part because the company’s privacy 
policy provided that it would “not rent, sell, license, or lend [personally identifiable information] 
to third parties for advertising or marketing without” obtaining consumer consent and would not 
share this information “with any third parties without” the consent of consumers); TRUSTe Rec-
ommends Destruction of More Than 3.7 Million Fingerprint Records, TRUSTARC BLOG (Apr. 2, 
2008), http://www.truste.com/blog/2008/04/02/truste-recommends-destruction-of-more-than-37-
million-fingerprint-records/ [https://perma.cc/87JS-NFVC] (describing Pay by Touch’s privacy 
policy, which limited the sale of biometric identifiers, recommendations to the consumer privacy 
ombudsman (“CPO”), and the subsequent decision “to destroy all of the biometric identifiers and 
personally identifiable information associated with those identifiers”). 
 38 Order Appointing Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, In re Solidus Networks, Inc., No. 2:07-
20027-TD (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). 
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tained in its customer database was restricted.39 In contrast, Sports Authori-
ty’s privacy policy authorized the transfer of consumer data in the event of a 
bankruptcy or the sale of the company.40 
As will be shown below, IoT companies routinely make statements in 
their privacy policies that they will not transfer or disclose consumer data, 
and then subsequently retract that promise by including clauses that permit 
the monetization of consumer data and authorize the transfer of the data to 
unaffiliated parties in the event of bankruptcy or sale of the company or its 
assets.41 
This Article takes the position that the vast types of highly sensitive 
data that will be easily accessible to companies because of consumers’ use 
of IoT devices and related services, and the potential value of IoT data as a 
source of financing, combined with the recent slate of bankruptcy proceed-
ings involving consumer data, and the potential resulting harms to consum-
ers warrants changes to existing financial frameworks that permit compa-
nies to opaquely monetize, assign, and transfer consumer data to third par-
ties.42 
The Article further contends that various privacy frameworks that rely 
heavily on a notice and choice model and the provisions of a company’s 
privacy policy to determine the level of protection given to consumers, and 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 747, 783 (2016) (noting that “RadioShack’s privacy policy . . . [provided] that con-
sumers’ data would not be sold, or, alternatively, that RadioShack would obtain consumers’ af-
firmative consent before transferring their personal data,” and that, ultimately, RadioShack 
“agree[d] to destroy most of the data, including Social Security numbers, telephone numbers, and 
dates of birth, and to reduce the number of data points per customer available for sale from 170 to 
7”); Allison Grande, RadioShack Bankruptcy to Test Shelf Life of Privacy Vows, LAW360 (Apr. 3, 
2015, 8:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/639460/radioshack-bankruptcy-to-test-shelf-
life-of-privacy-vows [https://perma.cc/6F4C-P4KC]; Laura Northrup, RadioShack Will Not Be 
Selling Your Phone Number to New Owners, CONSUMERIST (May 20, 2015, 5:25 PM), https://
consumerist.com/2015/05/20/radioshack-will-not-be-selling-your-phone-number-to-new-owners/ 
[https://perma.cc/W6RZ-XBYH]. 
 40 Kate Cox, Sports Authority Bankruptcy Means Now Dick’s Sporting Goods Owns 114M 
Customer Records, CONSUMERIST (July 1, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://consumerist.com/2016/07/
01/sports-authority-bankruptcy-means-now-dicks-sporting-goods-owns-114m-customer-records/ 
[https://perma.cc/76ZW-228S] (“Sports Authority’s privacy policy was a little more forward-
looking than RadioShack’s, from an industry perspective. Their policy stated that any data they 
had could be sold along with other company assets, and so it has been.”). 
 41 See infra notes 77–129 and accompanying text. 
 42 There are various financial frameworks and other transactions, such as mergers and acquisi-
tions, in which consumer data may be transferred and disclosed to unaffiliated third parties. For 
instance, Verizon’s acquisition of Yahoo could include a transfer of consumer data to Verizon. 
David Lazarus, Your Privacy: Verizon’s Takeover of Yahoo Is All About User Data, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 24, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-verizon-yahoo-
privacy-20170224-story.html [https://perma.cc/U8BS-S3S7]. However, this Article focuses only 
on a specific set of data transfers and disclosures permitted by privacy policies, Article 9 and the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
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which may not always apply to IoT companies or transactions, do not con-
sistently and effectively safeguard the data of consumers in the IoT setting. 
The Article proposes different solutions that can be used to reduce the ex-
cessive dependency on the notice and choice model and the terms of priva-
cy policies, as well as decrease moments of data disclosure and ameliorate 
potential concerns related to the assignment and transfer of consumer data 
as part of a bankruptcy proceeding or Article 9 transaction. 
These solutions include: (a) limiting the transferability and assignabil-
ity of biometric and health-related data by companies in Article 9 transac-
tions and bankruptcy proceedings. By focusing on biometric and health-
related data—some of the most highly sensitive data of consumers—this 
solution attempts to strike an effective balance between protecting consum-
er privacy and permitting companies to use other types of data for secured 
financing transactions (such as customer names and addresses), and (b) re-
quiring the appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman (“CPO”) in all 
Article 9 transactions in which the secured party seeks to enforce its rights 
after default when the collateral concerns consumer data, and in bankruptcy 
proceedings involving the transfer of consumer data to third parties. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I documents the 
proliferation of biometric, health-related, and other types of highly sensitive 
consumer data in the IoT setting, and emphasizes the importance of these 
data to IoT companies and other entities. This Part also highlights the cen-
tral role of privacy policies in authorizing the monetization and transfer of 
consumer IoT data to third parties. Additionally, it exposes the dangers of 
relying primarily on consumer consent to privacy policies to validate data 
collection and transfer practices. Lastly, this Part forecasts potential harms 
to consumers, such as exclusion, once privacy policies sanction the collec-
tion, disclosure and transfer of highly sensitive consumer IoT data in vari-
ous settings, including business transactions.43 
Part II then argues that privacy policies are not alone in enabling the 
disclosure and transfer of consumer IoT data, as financial frameworks can 
also play an instrumental role in facilitating this process. This Part examines 
the provisions of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code that permit the assign-
ment and transfer of biometric, health-related, and other types of highly 
sensitive data. It demonstrates that these frameworks provide numerous op-
portunities for consumer IoT data to be commodified and subsequently dis-
closed or transferred after the initial data collection. 44 
Part III critiques state and federal legislation that may be used to regu-
late the collection, disclosure, and transfer of consumer data, such as the 
                                                                                                                           
  43 See infra notes 47–162 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 163–262 and accompanying text. 
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Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, state biometric data protection statutes, and the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. This Part contends that 
these existing frameworks do not always effectively protect health-related, 
biometric, and highly sensitive consumer IoT data because they rely exces-
sively on a notice and choice model and the terms of privacy policies, and 
in some instances these laws may not be applicable to IoT companies or 
transactions. 45 
Lastly, Part IV counsels movement away from the excessive overreli-
ance on the terms of privacy policies and the notice and choice model. This 
Part proposes a framework that includes significant revisions to Article 9 
and the Bankruptcy Code to reduce the transfer and disclosure of highly-
sensitive consumer IoT data by companies. This Part also evaluates poten-
tial critiques of these proposals, including, but not limited to, competition, 
innovation and funding concerns and demonstrates the soundness of the 
proposed solutions.46 
I. THE IOT DATA GOLD RUSH 
It is estimated that by 2020 companies will be able to earn more profits 
transferring and disclosing IoT data than by selling IoT devices to consum-
ers.47 Biometric, health-related, and highly sensitive data are increasingly 
important in the IoT setting, and are frequently generated from consumers’ 
use of IoT devices, and accompanying mobile applications and services. 
Privacy policies are the primary vehicle through which consumer data are 
disclosed and transferred. Consumer consent to privacy policies should not 
be used to vindicate data collection and disclosure practices that are harmful 
to consumers. The collection, use, and disclosure of biometric and health-
related consumer data by companies can be detrimental to consumers’ inter-
ests in several ways, which will be explored in detail below.48 
A. Biometric, Health, and Highly Sensitive Data 
The IoT has drastically increased “the volume, velocity, variety and val-
ue of data.”49 Companies can process and compile at record speeds data ob-
                                                                                                                           
 45 See infra notes 263–390 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 391–461 and accompanying text. 
 47 Matt McFarland, Your Car’s Data May Soon Be More Valuable Than the Car Itself, CNN: 
TECH (Feb. 7, 2017 9:05 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/07/technology/car-data-value/index.
html [https://perma.cc/HM82-LPQR]. 
 48 See infra notes 131–162 and accompanying text. 
 49 Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at TecNation 2016 (Sept. 20, 
2016) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/985773/
mcsweeny_-_tecnation_2016_9-20-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3V5-QPUX]). 
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tained from IoT devices and services, such as Wi-Fi enabled washing ma-
chines, refrigerators, cars, and other household appliances.50 Fog computing 
allows companies to evaluate “time-sensitive . . . IoT data in milliseconds.”51 
It is estimated that about thirty percent of companies “use biometric 
authentication for mobile devices.”52 Biometrics, such as fingerprints and 
voice prints, are increasingly being used for identification purposes in the 
banking and payments industry.53 With the rise of the IoT, however, the use 
of biometrics will not be limited to the payments industry, governmental 
entities, and smartphones. Biometric sensors and identifiers are expected to 
play a central role in Internet-connected devices in various industries.54 In 
fact, by 2018 biometric sensors in IoT devices are projected to “total at least 
500 million.”55 
Biometric data can be stored in various ways, including in central or 
decentralized systems or on a device in the possession of the consumer.56 
Some companies that currently use biometrics contend that they “do not 
store actual” biometric scans but rather the authentication codes or mathe-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. 
 51 CISCO, FOG COMPUTING AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS: EXTEND THE CLOUD TO WHERE 
THE THINGS ARE 1 (2015), https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/trends/iot/docs/comp 
uting-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z59Z-MY2C] (noting that fog computing allows companies 
to analyze IoT data “at the network edge” while “send[ing] selected data to the cloud for historical 
analysis and longer-term storage”). 
 52 See Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 30 Percent of Organizations Will Use Biometric 
Authentication for Mobile Devices by 2016 (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/
2661115 [https://perma.cc/2XUL-38AC]. 
 53 Jaime Toplin, Biometrics in the Payment Industry: Why Biologically Based Authentication 
Is Becoming the Go-to Security Feature for Enabling Digital Commerce, BUS. INSIDER (July 21, 
2016, 1:42 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-biometrics-report-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/
3ZZ9-CEY6]; Survey: Consumers Embrace Biometric Authentication, MOBILE PAYMENTS TODAY 
(May 8, 2017), www.mobilepaymentstoday.com/news/survey-consumers-embrace-biometric-
authentication/?utm_source=Email_marketing&utm_campaign=reviewMPT05132017144522&
cmp=1&utm_medium=HTMLEmail [https://perma.cc/ZM32-QJSU] (discussing a study that sug-
gests that consumers “would like to have more biometrics options for mobile banking”). 
 54 Narsimhmaswamy Badugu, Biometrics in Internet of Things (IoT) Security, LINKEDIN (Sept. 
26, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/biometrics-internet-things-iot-security-narsimhmaswamy-
badugu/ [https://perma.cc/DQ5N-T4TX] (noting that biometrics will be used in the following 
areas: “Smart security[;] . . . Healthcare & Hospitals[;] Financials services[;] Automotive Indus-
try[;] Endless applications wherever Identification and confirmation is required”). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Tim De Chant, The Boring and Exciting World of Biometrics, PBS (June 18, 2013), http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/biometrics-and-the-future-of-identification [https://perma.cc/
3EK7-Y5K2]; see also Andrew Patrick & Sabrina Mu, Biometric Security Template Storage, in 
USABILITY & ACCEPTABILITY OF BIOMETRIC SEC. DEVICES, http://www.andrewpatrick.ca/
biometrics/templates/template.shtml [https://perma.cc/YM96-P8KG] (describing the storage of 
biometric data in a “central database,” “individual workstation[],” “sensing device,” or “portable 
token”). 
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matical representations of the biometric identifiers.57 As each individual’s 
biometrics and the resulting authentication codes or templates are unique, 
biometric identifiers can be used to identify users and authenticate access to 
devices.58 Biometric data may also be used for non-authentication purpos-
es.59 One commentator predicts that biometrics will “become the most 
widespread user interface for customers to interact with their various digital 
devices . . . .”60 Consider that real estate developers are currently building 
“smart apartments” that utilize IoT devices and other “digital amenities, 
which are controlled by voice commands and smartphone apps . . . .”61 
A report on IoT devices found that approximately 16% of consumers 
have smartwatches or fitness trackers, and between 8% to 12% of consum-
ers indicated that they would be willing to purchase such devices.62 Mobile 
applications, such as Runkeeper and Fitnet, that enable consumers to track 
their health and fitness goals are projected to generate more than $26 billion 
in revenues.63 The health monitors and fitness device market is expected to 
“grow eight-fold from $5.1 billion in 2013 to $41.8 billion in 2023.”64 By 
2020, companies will manufacture “[n]early 100 million wearable remote 
patient monitoring (RPM) devices,” including blood pressure and glucose 
monitors.65 It is estimated that “[b]y 2020, 40% of IoT-related technology 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Anna Myers, Can the U.S. Legal System Adapt to Biometric Technology?, INT’L ASS’N 
PRIVACY PROF’LS (Aug. 12, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/can-the-u-s-legal-system-can-adapt-to-
biometric-technology/ [https://perma.cc/W4NK-4S35] (noting that companies use “authentication 
codes or templates” for biometric identifiers and “[t]he templates are coded as long, hard-to-
predict numerical sequences”); Claire Gartland, Biometrics Are a Grave Threat to Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2016, 3:21 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/05/biometrics-
and-banking/biometrics-are-a-grave-threat-to-privacy [https://perma.cc/R26T-2VDR]; see also 
About Touch ID Advanced Security Technology, APPLE SUPPORT (Sept. 11, 2017), https://support.
apple.com/en-us/HT204587 [https://perma.cc/PZH4-J3BZ] (noting that Apple’s Touch ID does 
not store scans of a user’s fingerprint but rather a “mathematical representation” of the finger-
print). 
 58 Gartland, supra note 57. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Paul Schaus, Biometric Deployments Must Consider the ‘Internet of Things,’ PAYMENTS
SOURCE (Aug. 9, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.paymentssource.com/news/paythink/biometric-
deployments-must-consider-the-internet-of-things-3024711-1.html [https://perma.cc/9674-84BL]. 
 61 C.J. Hughes, The Latest in Apartment Technology: Fridge Cams and Robotic Valets, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/realestate/apartment-technology-
fridge-cams-robotic-valets.html [https://perma.cc/NKU6-AVTT]. 
 62 Marketwired, Kantar: Nearly 16% of US Consumers and 9% in EU4 Now Own Wearables, 
YAHOO!: FINANCE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/kantar-nearly-16-us-consumers-
125500338.html [https://perma.cc/6B6H-GFFD]. 
 63 Kellogg, supra note 17, at 77. 
 64 Michael Essery, Mobile Health Devices Market to Grow 8-fold to $41.8 Billion in 2023, 
LUXRESEARCH (July 1, 2014), http://www.luxresearchinc.com/news-and-events/press-releases/
read/mobile-health-devices-market-grow-8-fold-418-billion-2023 [https://perma.cc/5GDF-U9X9]. 
 65 Kellogg, supra note 17, at 78. Commentators contend that remote patient monitoring de-
vices may be subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Id. 
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will be health-related, more than any other category, making up a $117 bil-
lion market.”66 
IoT devices collect large amounts of health-related data about adults 
and children. For instance, a Fitbit device or app can track and collect data 
about a user’s heart rate, calories burned, sleep patterns, and location.67 Wi-
Fi enabled blood sugar monitors can record blood sugar levels and alert 
consumers to changes in their levels.68 The Apple Watch observes users’ 
heart rates and daily health-related activities.69 Mimo manufactures “a bio-
metric-tracking onesie” for babies that monitors sleep patterns, among other 
things, and can connect to a parent’s IoT thermostat and camera.70 Pacif-i 
offers an IoT pacifier than can track an infant’s temperature.71 
IoT devices are frequently supported by mobile applications and web-
sites that also collect additional data about consumers. The Propeller Health 
Inhaler uses “built-in sensors” that connect to a user’s smartphone to 
“measur[e] where and when [users] have symptoms” of asthma attacks.72 
Of course, in some instances, mobile applications, such as Runkeeper, can 
be used as standalone items that allow users to monitor their health activi-
ties through their smartphones.73 Health-related data garnered from IoT de-
vices may also be useful for research purposes.74 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Dimiter V. Dimitrov, Medical Internet of Things and Big Data in Healthcare, 22 
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS RES. 156, 156 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC4981575/ [https://perma.cc/54YR-8BMZ]. 
 67 The Fitness App for Everyone, FITBIT, https://www.Fitbit.com/app [https://perma.cc/
DX5Z-L3W8]. 
 68 Emily Field, Blood Sugar Monitor Maker Hit with Suit Over Car Crash, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 
2016, 4:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/834866/blood-sugar-monitor-maker-hit-with-
suit-over-car-crash [https://perma.cc/SD63-4ZA8]. 
 69 Apple Watch Series 3, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apple-watch-series-3/ [https://perma.
cc/6CXN-6AAS]. 
 70 Jacqueline Howard, There Are Health-Tracking Wearables for Babies, Too, CNN (Nov. 6, 
2017, 7:11 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/06/health/baby-technology-products-teching/index.
html [https://perma.cc/MW8S-E5BY]; Mimo Works with Nest, MIMO, http://mimobaby.com/nest 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170107143735/https://www.mimobaby.com/nest] (describing how 
the product connects to Nest IoT devices); MIMO, http://mimobaby.com/ [https://perma.cc/TV2L-
E6AJ] (describing the company’s product as “[s]leep trackers for little ones”). 
 71 PACIF-I, https://www.pacif-i.io [https://perma.cc/7JT5-X47D] (discussing the capabilities 
of the company’s connected Smart Pacifier). 
 72 Kellogg, supra note 17, at 78 (“Propeller Health’s inhaler, which has built-in sensors, con-
nects through Bluetooth to smartphones, and lets individuals respond to asthma attacks while also 
tracking where those attacks occur.”); PROPELLER, https://www.propellerhealth.com [https://perma.
cc/3QDT-3CBB] (“Small sensor[,] Big difference”). 
 73 Kellogg, supra note 17, at 77. 
 74 Id. (discussing research on asthma attacks); Alex Hutchinson, The Power of Big (Fitness) 
Data, RUNNER’S WORLD (Mar. 22, 2016, 9:32 AM), http://www.runnersworld.com/sweat-
science/the-power-of-big-fitness-data [https://perma.cc/XHZ2-WQZK] (contending that “[i]t may 
be hard to extract meaning from any one individual’s data—but collectively, the millions of peo-
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In addition to simply collecting information about consumers, weara-
ble IoT fitness devices can also “share their data with a multitude of appli-
cations and devices, with few if any restrictions.”75 Furthermore, in the fu-
ture a device, such as a remote patient cardiac monitor, may be able to 
communicate and share data with a Fitbit wristband or potentially a Nest 
thermostat or security camera. 
IoT devices may also collect potentially embarrassing and intimate in-
formation about consumers. An IoT sex-toy controlled by a mobile applica-
tion collects and records real time data about how consumers use the de-
vice, including “the date and time of each use” and the selected “vibration 
intensity and pattern.”76 
B. IoT Privacy Policies 
The provisions of a company’s privacy policy primarily determine the 
extent to which a consumer’s health-related, biometric, or highly sensitive 
data are disclosed to third parties. However, not all companies have privacy 
policies. It is estimated that approximately 26% of companies offering free 
mobile applications and 40% of businesses providing paid mobile applica-
tions or devices that monitor consumer health do not have privacy poli-
cies.77 Mobile health devices and applications may also transmit consumer 
data, including “personally identifiable information,” to third parties.78 If an 
IoT company does not have a privacy policy, it is likely free to monetize 
consumer data without concern for potential privacy policy violation 
claims. Of course, in some instances, state law may require certain compa-
nies to post privacy policies.79 
                                                                                                                           
ple wearing self-monitoring devices amount to ‘the largest and most comprehensive observational 
health trial ever conducted’”). 
 75 Kellogg, supra note 17, at 76. 
 76 Shayna Posses, Vibrator Gets Too Intimate by Tracking Usage Info, Suit Says, LAW360 
(Sept. 15, 2016, 3:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/840299/vibrator-gets-too-intimate-by-
tracking-usage-info-suit-says [https://perma.cc/R8JJ-TLCB]. 
 77 LINDA ACKERMAN, MOBILE HEALTH AND FITNESS APPLICATIONS AND INFORMATION PRI-
VACY, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE 1, 5 (July 15, 2013), https://www.privacyrights.org/sites/
default/files/mobile-medical-apps-privacy-consumer-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU3B-XW8E]. 
 78 Id. at 20. 
 79 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (West 2017) (“An operator of a commercial Web site 
or online service that collects personally identifiable information through the Internet about indi-
vidual consumers residing in California who use or visit its commercial Web site or online service 
shall conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 1205C(a) (West 2017) (“An operator of a commercial internet website, online or cloud compu-
ting service, online application, or mobile application that collects personally identifiable infor-
mation through the Internet about individual users residing in Delaware who use or visit the opera-
tor’s commercial internet website, online or cloud computing service, online application, or mo-
bile application shall make its privacy policy conspicuously available on its internet website, 
online or cloud computing service, online application, or mobile application.”); State Laws Relat-
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Privacy policies routinely authorize companies to disclose, sell, and 
transfer consumer data to third parties. Consider that the privacy policy of 
Clear, a company that provides a paid service that collects and uses con-
sumers’ biometric data (“digital images of fingerprints and irises”) to allow 
them to authenticate their identity and by-pass airport and events security, 
provides that biometric data can be transferred to third parties in the event 
of a sale of the company or its assets.80 
Not surprisingly, a report on privacy policies found that eighty-five of 
the “top 100 websites in the United States” had “terms of service or privacy 
policies” that authorize the sale of consumer data in the event of “a merger, 
acquisition, bankruptcy, asset sale or other [business] transaction.”81 In 
some instances, companies’ privacy policies may expressly note that they 
“cannot guarantee the security of information provided over the Internet or 
stored in [their] databases.”82 Privacy and security can be drafted out of pri-
vacy policies. In the report on privacy policies mentioned above, only sev-
enteen of these top websites had policies requiring the company to notify 
consumers of the transfer or sale of their information.83 At least one non-
IoT company’s privacy policy includes a carve out for a “financing . . . of 
                                                                                                                           
ed to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (June 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.
aspx [https://perma.cc/K492-XE9T] (noting that Nevada enacted a bill similar to the California 
statute in 2017). Such state law requirements may in some instances be preempted by federal leg-
islation. People ex rel. Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 395 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2016) (finding that a lawsuit brought by the State of California alleging violations of its 
Online Privacy Protection Act was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act). 
 80 Privacy Policy, CLEAR, https://www.clearme.com/privacy_policy [https://perma.cc/
U9N8-LBL5] (“We reserve the right to transfer personal information we have about consumers in 
the event we sell or transfer all or a portion of our business or assets . . . .”). 
 81 Natasha Singer & Jeremy B. Merrill, When a Company Is Put Up for Sale, in Many Cases, 
Your Personal Data Is, Too, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
29/technology/when-a-company-goes-up-for-sale-in-many-cases-so-does-your-personal-data.html 
[https://perma.cc/7GKU-QQRF]; Kate Cox, Your Personal Information Is Probably Going to Be 
for Sale When the Company You Gave It to Is, CONSUMERIST (June 29, 2015, 9:54 AM), https://
consumerist.com/2015/06/29/your-personal-information-is-probably-going-to-be-for-sale-when-
the-company-you-gave-it-to-is/ [https://consumerist.com/2015/06/29/your-personal-information-
is-probably-going-to-be-for-sale-when-the-company-you-gave-it-to-is/] (discussing the New York 
Times report on the provisions of privacy policies). 
 82 Consumer Privacy Ombudsman Report to the Court at 25, In re Gander Mountain Co. 
Overton’s Inc., No. 17-30673 (Bankr. D. Minn. May 3, 2017) [hereinafter Gander CPO Report]; 
Privacy Policy, FILIP, http://www.myfilip.com/privacy-policy/ [https://perma.cc/XR8L-ZJL8] 
[hereinafter FiLIP Privacy Policy] (“[D]ue to the inherent open nature of the Internet and wireless 
communications, we cannot guarantee that your personal information will be completely free from 
unauthorized access by third parties . . . . Your use of our FiLIP Service demonstrates your as-
sumption of this risk.”). 
 83 Singer & Merrill, supra note 81. 
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all or a portion of [the] business.”84 This may include secured financing 
transactions. 
The privacy policy of Nest, a manufacturer of various IoT devices, in-
cluding thermostats and smart security systems, provides that the company 
“do[es] not rent or sell [its] customer lists.”85 The privacy policy goes on to 
provide, however, that the company may sell or transfer consumer data in 
connection with a “business transition.”86 In the event of such a transition, 
the company promises to request that the buyer of its assets comply with 
whatever privacy policy is in place when the data is collected.87 Amazon’s 
privacy policy also authorizes the transfer of consumer data upon a “busi-
ness transfer.”88 Amazon manufactures various IoT devices that utilize some 
degree of artificial intelligence, such as the Amazon Echo.89 Apple’s priva-
cy policy states that “in the event of a reorganization, merger, or sale we 
may transfer any and all personal information we collect to the relevant 
third party.”90 
Privacy policies may also provide that consumers consent to the terms 
of the policy simply by using the IoT device.91 Moreover, privacy policies 
change frequently and companies revise their privacy statements unilateral-
ly in accordance with unilateral amendment provisions contained in their 
conditions of use or privacy policies. If a company’s privacy policy in effect 
at the time of the sale or when the data was originally collected does not 
contain provisions that adequately protect consumer data, the purchaser of 
the company’s assets may be free to use the data as it pleases. Even if a 
company promises to request that a buyer of the company’s assets (includ-
ing consumer data) complies with the company’s existing privacy policy, 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Nextio—Privacy Policy, NEXTIO, https://www.nextio.com/n/privacy [https://perma.cc/
NW38-ZLML] (“We may share information about you as follows or as otherwise described in this 
Privacy Policy: . . . In connection with, or during negotiations of, any merger, sale of company 
assets, financing or acquisition of all or a portion of our business by another company . . . .”). 
 85 Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Services, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/privacy-
statement-for-nest-products-and-services [https://perma.cc/UZ2E-P98K] [hereinafter Nest Product 
Privacy Policy]. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html?nodeId=468496 [https://perma.cc/5KNB3RRM] [hereinafter Amazon Privacy Policy]. 
 89 Arjun Kharpal, Amazon’s Alexa Stole the Show at CES in a Bid to Become the Internet of 
Things Operating System, CNBC (Jan. 6, 2017, 6:54 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/06/ces-
2017-amazon-alexa-stole-the-show-a-bid-to-become-the-iot-operating-system.html [https://perma.
cc/24AK-7QQF]. 
 90 Privacy Policy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/ [https://perma.cc/
8ZFX-NFA6] [hereinafter Apple Privacy Policy]. 
 91 Nest Product Privacy Policy, supra note 85 (“By using Nest Products, you agree to allow 
us to collect and process information as described in this Privacy Statement.”). 
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non-compliance with the privacy policy could be permissible if consumer 
consent is obtained. 
The American Law Institute’s proposed Restatement of the Law of 
Consumer Contracts, if finalized and adopted, could provide explicit guid-
ance on whether privacy policies should be viewed as contracts.92 Histori-
cally, however, there has been some dispute about whether privacy policies 
are indeed contracts or simply “broad statements of company policy.”93 Re-
lying on consumer consent to authorize data use and collection practices is 
problematic for several reasons. 
First, consumers frequently fail to read and understand contract terms 
and their implications.94 Consumers may freely consent to the disclosure and 
transfer of their data without truly understanding the ramifications of this de-
cision and may not always be aware that they are entering into data-trade 
agreements. Even after some consumers conduct detailed reviews of privacy 
policies, many “regard even highly ambiguous privacy policy language as 
authorizing controversial company practices that implicate their personal pri-
vacy.”95 Additionally, although some consumers may review privacy policies, 
consumer consent to privacy policies is “driven by social norms.”96 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/
show/consumer-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/HTW8-NZT9] (proposing a restatement that “will 
focus on aspects of the law unique to consumer contracts and on regulatory techniques . . . in con-
sumer-protection law”); see Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1458 (2017) (discussing the proposed restatement); Project Feature: 
Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts, ALI ADVISOR, http://www.thealiadviser.org/
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 93 In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (N.D. Tex. 2005); Warren 
E. Agin, The New Regime for Treatment of Customer Data in Bankruptcy Cases, 10 J. BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. 365 (contending that privacy statements may be “executory or non-executory” contracts 
depending primarily on “whether it places continuing material obligations on each party” but a 
“privacy policy might not even qualify as an enforceable contract”); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow 
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 595–96, 628 
(2014) (discussing whether privacy policies are contracts). 
 94 Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-Governmental Actors and 
the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 732 (2015), (contending that “due to their 
size and market dominance . . . companies [such as, Google, Facebook and Yahoo] exercise quasi-
governmental authority and monopoly power that makes consumer consent to data collection 
meaningless”); Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy Now, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. 315, 320 (2017) (“The overwhelming majority of online shoppers ignore license 
terms.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design 2 (July 25, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with the Federal Trade Commission) (contending that privacy policies are “difficult 
to understand” and are insufficient at providing notice). 
95 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to 
Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S69, S87 (2016). Strahilevitz & Kugler further contend that many 
e-mail and social network users view “the vague and imprecise policy language as authorizing 
Facebook, Yahoo, and Google to engage in [disturbing privacy] practices.” Id. at S92–S93. 
96 Id. at S87. 
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Admittedly, the level of consumers’ awareness and understanding of 
data-trade agreements may to some extent be context dependent. For in-
stance, a consumer that uses a health mobile application is likely aware that 
the application is collecting some types of health-related data even if the 
consumer may not thoroughly grasp the implications of this type of data 
collection. In contrast, a consumer that uses an IoT refrigerator or toaster 
may not be aware of the types of, and extent to which, data are being col-
lected and what can subsequently be done with such data. For example, the 
Roomba robotic vacuum not only self-cleans a consumer’s home, but also 
collects “home layout data” including “the location of everything from 
[walls and] lamps to home security cameras and thermostats.”97 The com-
pany has suggested that it may sell this data to third parties.98 
Second, consumers may consent to terms and conditions that do not 
adequately describe a company’s biometric data collection and storage poli-
cies. Thus, even if all consumers were inclined to routinely attempt to re-
view and understand a company’s data collection policies and practices, 
consumers may not be provided with the information necessary to make 
informed decisions about data collection and disclosure before being re-
quired to consent (or deemed to have consented) to a company’s conditions 
of use or privacy policy. In Vigil v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., a 
2017 case involving a company that collects biometric data, the plaintiffs 
contended that the company collected and shared their biometric data with-
out supplying them with sufficient information about the company’s data 
collection, retention, and destruction policies.99 The district court reasoned 
that although the company failed to disclose how long the data would be 
stored, at a minimum the plaintiffs understood that in order to use the com-
pany’s products their face scans would be collected and stored “so long as 
those avatars existed.”100 
Third, “security fatigue” may also be exacerbated in the IoT setting 
and may lead consumers to make reckless choices, including consenting to 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Maggie Astor, Your Roomba May Be Mapping Your Home, Collecting Data That Could Be 
Shared, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/technology/roomba-
irobot-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/3W6L-LAAP] (discussing the privacy implications of 
the Roomba vacuum); Natalie O’Neill, Roomba Maker Wants to Sell Your Home’s Floor Plan, 
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Roomba vacuum). 
 98 O’Neill, supra note 97. 
 99 235 F. Supp. 3d 499, 506–07, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (granting defendant’s motion to 
dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint), aff’d in part, vacated in part, Santana v. Take-Two Inter-
active Software, Inc., No. 17-303, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2017). 
 100 Id. at 515. 
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dubious data collection practices.101 Given that consumers have multiple 
IoT devices in their homes, consumers may become exhausted with having 
to implement or comply with numerous measures to ensure their privacy 
and security.102 
Fourth, even when a consumer declines to consent to data collection, 
companies may be able to “draw probabilistic inferences” about non-
consenting consumers from the data generated by consumers that do con-
sent to data collection, once a “representative sample” is reached.103 This 
may then render a consumer’s decision to decline to consent to data collec-
tion meaningless.104 
Fifth, the different companies that may be involved in manufacturing 
and operating the various components of IoT devices, services, and applica-
tions, including “hardware and software developers,” may have contrasting 
privacy policies and data collection practices.105 Even if a single company 
manufactures all components, and operates and provides all services and 
servers, related to the device, the company may have different privacy poli-
cies that govern different aspects of its interactions with consumers. For 
instance, Nest provides a separate privacy statement for its IoT devices and 
services and another for its websites.106 Thus, portions of a consumer’s data, 
collected and shared through IoT devices, services and related websites, 
may be subject to different privacy policies. 
Sixth, both IoT and non-IoT privacy policies permit companies to 
share consumer data with various third parties. For instance, privacy policy 
provisions can authorize consumer data disclosures when consumers accept 
rewards programs or promotional offers provided by third parties that are 
recommended by device manufacturers.107 In such an instance, data that is 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Belton Zeigler, The Next Threat to Cybersecurity: Consumer Fatigue, LAW360 (Nov. 9, 
2016, 2:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/861219/print?section=consumerprotection 
[https://perma.cc/3GJ2-2H2H]. 
 102 Id. See generally Brian Stanton et al., Security Fatigue, IT PROF., Sept./Oct. 2016, at 26 
(discussing the potential impact of security fatigue). 
 103 Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Procedural Privacy 
Protections, COMM. ACM, Nov. 2014, at 31, 32. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Ronald Raether et al., The Technology Lawyer and Connected Things, LAW360 (July 28, 
2016, 3:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/822484/the-technology-lawyer-and-connected-
things [https://perma.cc/ZV7U-QVBH]. 
 106 Compare Privacy Policy for Nest Web Sites, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/privacy-policy-for-
nest-web-sites/ [https://perma.cc/WT85-F2VW], with Privacy Statement for Nest Products and Ser-
vices, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/privacy-statement-for-nest-products-and-services/ [https://perma.
cc/TT6Y-S9RZ]. 
 107 Nest Product Privacy Policy, supra note 85 (authorizing the disclosure of consumer in-
formation with consumer consent when a consumer “enrolls in third party reward programs such 
as rush hour rewards”). 
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provided to the unaffiliated party is subject to that party’s privacy policy.108 
Consider that a consumer may link their Fitbit account to their Facebook 
account to share fitness updates.109 To the extent that a consumer authorizes 
this connection, the health-related data from the IoT device or mobile appli-
cation could be shared with Facebook and the consumer’s Facebook account 
information could be shared with Fitbit.110 How the Fitbit health-related data 
will be used by Facebook depends on Facebook’s privacy policy.111 
Consumer data may also be disclosed to third-party service providers 
that help IoT companies process data and monitor their systems.112 Some 
consumers may be aware that by using a company’s IoT product they are 
authorizing the company to collect their data, but consumers are unlikely to 
obtain information about the third parties that the company contracts with to 
maintain, store, or process their data or be aware of how such third parties 
protect consumer-related data.113 Additionally, as demonstrated in Part II 
below, the use of third-party service contractors provides several opportuni-
ties for consumer data to be disclosed and transferred under Article 9 and 
other state statutes.114 
Aggregated and anonymized consumer data are also frequently sold or 
transferred to third parties. An animated short summary of Fitbit’s privacy 
policy provides “[w]e don’t sell data that could identify you to anyone, an-
ywhere, anytime. Ever. Period. That’s all folks.”115 The language prohibit-
ing the sale of the data refers to data that is not anonymized. This implies 
that anonymized data may be sold. In fact, in the company’s complete pri-
vacy statement, which is accessible only after clicking a separate link, the 
company acknowledges that it may monetize de-identified data.116 Similar-
ly, the privacy policy of FiLIP states that the company may share “non-
personal or de-identified information with any number of parties, including 
data analytics companies, technology providers and other business part-
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. 
 109 Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/legal/privacy-policy#what-data 
[https://perma.cc/6YBV-MV32] [hereinafter Fitbit Privacy Policy]. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 18, 20–22. 
 113 Id. (noting that companies may not always disclose all third parties who may have access 
to consumer data in their privacy policies); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of 
Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 946 (2007) (“One set of difficulties with con-
sumer shopping for data security follows from the frequent lack of any [business-to-customer] 
relationship between the individual whose data are stolen and the entities that play a major role in 
processing her information.”). 
  114 See infra notes 232–237 and accompanying text. 
 115 Let’s Talk About Privacy, Publicly, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/legal/privacy [https://
perma.cc/RX4W-QEJ6]. 
 116 Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 109 (“[Fitbit] may share or sell aggregated, de-identified 
data that does not identify you.”). 
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ners.”117 The term “business partners” could very well mean data brokers 
that the company has entered into cooperative agreements with. IoT compa-
nies, such as Fitbit and Jawbone, have faced scrutiny in other countries for 
allegedly violating relevant laws by collecting more data than was needed 
for their products to function and for failing to disclose to consumers the 
parties with “whom they share consumer data.”118 
Data that has been anonymized could be de-anonymized or re-
identified. 119 Promises by an IoT company to anonymize health-related, 
biometric, or any other type of consumer data before monetizing or provid-
ing third-party access to the data may be meaningless. As one scholar has 
emphasized, companies continue to disclose “information [that can be used 
to re-identify consumers and which is] connected to sensitive data in sup-
posedly anonymized databases, with absolute impunity.”120 Consider that a 
study conducted by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University suggests that 
an individual’s social security number can be predicted from various 
sources of data, including public information and data from social network-
ing profiles.121 Other researchers evaluating the robustness of anonymiza-
tion and metadata conclude that it is possible to re-identify ninety percent of 
consumers from anonymized “credit card transactions for 1.1 million us-
ers.”122 Their study found that “even data sets that provide coarse infor-
                                                                                                                           
 117 FiLIP Privacy Policy, supra note 82. 
 118 Allison Grande, Norwegian Watchdog Hits Fitbit, Others Over Privacy Missteps, LAW360 
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by the Norwegian Consumer Council against Fitbit, Garmin, Jawbone, and Mio for alleged violations 
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mization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703–05 (2010) (discussing how de-identified consumer data 
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 120 Id. at 1705. 
 121 Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public 
Data, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10,975, 10,975 (2009) (The study “observed a correlation 
between individuals’ SSNs and their birth data and found that for younger cohorts the correlation 
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ing sites.”). 
 122 Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability 
of Credit Card Metadata, 347 SCIENCE 536, 537 (2015). But see generally Andrew Chin & Anne 
Klinefelter, Differential Privacy as a Response to the Reidentification Threat: The Facebook Ad-
vertiser Case Study, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1417 (2012) (objecting to criticisms of anonymization and 
contending that new technology may protect anonymity under a “differential privacy standard”); 
David Sánchez et al., Comment on “Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of 
Credit Card Metadata,” 351 SCIENCE 1274-a (2016) (critiquing the Montjoye study and conclud-
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mation at any or all of the dimensions provide little anonymity and that 
women are more reidentifiable than men.”123 
The monetization of children’s biometric or health related-data is also 
concerning even if such data are anonymized. The privacy policy of Owlet, 
the manufacturer of an infant IoT monitoring sock device, provides that the 
company may freely transfer and disclose infants’ anonymized health-related 
data, such as “heart rate and blood-oxygen level[s].”124 The company’s priva-
cy policy also provides that the “personal information” of adults and babies 
may also be disclosed to third parties for marketing purposes and in connec-
tion with business transactions.125 In the IoT setting, before minors come of 
age their immutable biometric or health-related data could be collected, 
stored, transferred, and resold to third parties for years. This may occur de-
spite federal law aimed at protecting the information of children.126 
Companies may also collect personally identifiable data that is mixed in 
with non-personally identifiable data. FiLIP’s privacy policy provides that if 
                                                                                                                           
ing that “data owners and subjects can be reassured that sound anonymization methodologies exist 
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 123 Montjoye et al., supra note 122, at 536. 
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cussing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policy statement authorizing IoT companies “to 
collect audio files from kids without consent” and noting that at least one commentator has stated 
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the brief time necessary for that purpose, the FTC would not take an enforcement action against 
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Rule, including clear notice of its collection and use of audio files and its deletion policy, in its 
privacy policy,” and noting that the operator may not monetize such audio files). 
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it accidentally obtains personal information along with non-personal data, it 
will not intentionally use the personal data as if it had obtained consumer 
consent.127 The use of the word “intentional” suggests than an unintentional 
use of the personally identifiable data may be permissible under the policy. 
Lastly, some IoT companies may allow consumers to delete their da-
ta.128 However, IoT privacy policies can authorize companies to retain and 
store data on company servers even though the consumer may no longer 
have access to the data.129 Thus, IoT companies could continue to monetize 
consumer data even if the data is no longer viewable to the consumer or if 
the consumer has requested that their data be deleted. 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the first few statements of 
a company’s privacy policy may lure consumers into believing that their 
data will be protected. However, there will likely be several exceptions to 
the company’s initial promise not to sell, disclose or transfer consumer data. 
C. Consumer Harms & Risks 
Once a privacy policy authorizes the collection, disclosure, or transfer 
of consumer IoT data, it can be disclosed to third parties, with problematic 
consequences for consumers. Admittedly, there are benefits to the collection 
and use of biometric, health-related, and highly sensitive data, including 
convenience and the facilitation of seamless interactions with IoT devices. 
Although the collection of IoT data may be necessary to allow an owner to 
use certain aspects of IoT devices and services, whether interests in such 
data should be sold or assigned after collection should not depend primarily 
on the language in privacy policies. Given the rapid level at which technol-
                                                                                                                           
 127 FiLIP Privacy Policy, supra note 82 (“It is possible at times when collecting non-personal 
information through automatic means that we may unintentionally collect or receive personal 
information that is mixed in with the non-personal information. While we will make reasonable 
efforts to prevent such incidental data collection, the possibility still exists. If we do inadvertently 
collect personal information, we will not intentionally use such personal information as if we had 
collected it with your consent.”). 
 128 See Nest Product Privacy Policy, supra note 85 (“Nest generally stores your personal 
information on Nest’s servers until you delete or edit it, or for as long as you remain a Nest cus-
tomer . . . . [But, due to] the way we maintain certain Services, after your information is deleted, 
backup copies may linger for some time before they are deleted, and we may retain certain data 
for a longer period of time . . . .”). 
 129 FiLIP Privacy Policy, supra note 82 (“We may retain your information for as long as we 
feel that there is a business need or benefit to do so. This will include retaining location-based 
information.”); Fitbit Privacy Pledge, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/no/legal/privacy [https://
perma.cc/CJ9R-B98B] (“If you remove data from your [Fitbit] Account, it will no longer appear 
to you or others who use the Service. Backups of that data will remain in association with your 
[Fitbit] Account and in our archive servers.”); Nest Product Privacy Policy, supra note 85 (“We 
may retain certain data for a longer period of time . . . .”); Owlet Privacy Policy, supra note 124 
(“We will retain your information for our business purposes, and in connection with our legal 
obligations, and to resolve disputes and enforce our agreements.”). 
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ogy is evolving, there may be risks associated with the collection and dis-
closure of consumer data that consumers may never become aware of or 
fully understand. This concern may remain true even for consumers that 
have some awareness of the value of their data. The harms and risks dis-
cussed below may arise whenever consumer data of any kind is collected. 
However, the uniqueness and highly-sensitive nature of biometric and 
health-related data, as well as the potential for the collection, disclosure or 
transfer of such IoT data under existing privacy policies and the financial 
frameworks discussed in Part II below,130 are troublesome for several rea-
sons, which the remainder of this section will explore. 
1. Consensual Disclosures and Data Analytics 
Privacy policies permit companies to use and analyze the data that they 
collect about consumers. Once consumers authorize data collection, data 
analytics allows businesses “to combine and jointly analyze more previous-
ly disparate sources of data than ever before” to paint a more complete and 
accurate picture of the lives and activities of consumers, individuals in their 
households, and communities.131 Thus, combining existing data about con-
sumers with biometric and health-related data opens new windows into, and 
generates new insights about, consumer preferences, behaviors, and activi-
ties. 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See infra notes 163–262 and accompanying text. 
 131 Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Remarks at the Taiwan Inter-
national Conference on Competition Policy: A U.S. Enforcer’s Perspective: Protecting Competi-
tion and Promoting Innovation 13 (June 29, 2016) (transcript on file with the Federal Trade Com-
mission); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?, at i, 1 
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-
understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PD3-GARZ] [hereinafter FTC, 
BIG DATA] (“The analysis of this data is often valuable . . . as it can guide the development of new 
products and services, predict the preferences of individuals, help tailor services and opportunities, 
and guide individualized marketing.”); Elvy, supra note 92, at 1379 (discussing companies’ use of 
data analytics); Michelle De Mooy et al., Should It Stay, or Should It Go?: The Legal Policy and 
Technical Landscape Around Data Deletion, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 5 (Feb. 2017), 
https://cdt.org/files/2017/02/2017-02-23-Data-Deletion-FNL2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBF2-HT4R] 
(“The ability to conduct broader and deeper analysis of data holdings can help businesses develop 
a multi-faceted view of their customers . . . .”); Marketers Gain Unified View of Customers Across 
All Channels and Devices with BlueConic and Acxiom, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 4, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171004005276/en/Marketers-Gain-Unified-View-
Customers-Channels-Devices [https://perma.cc/6VBX-6G59] (announcing a recent partnership 
between Axciom, one of the largest data brokers, and BlueConic, a “customer data platform” to 
allow companies “to unify and enhance their first-party data in real-time by accessing Acxiom’s 
premium third-party referential database intelligence and data enrichment services to create a 
complete view of their customer across the entire customer lifecycle, through all channels and 
devices”). 
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Insights gleaned from IoT data and data analytics may be used to en-
gender “new justifications [or methods] for exclusion,” such as when bio-
metric or health-related data are used to explain differences in the price of 
products, deny opportunities to certain individuals, and influence consumer 
consent to data collection practices.132 
With respect to the potential for exclusion, Facebook’s advertisement 
practices provide an example of the dangers of data collection and analytics 
even when consumer consent to data collection is received.133 Facebook, a 
company that collects and processes personal data about consumers, includ-
ing biometric data, allowed advertisers to “target users by their interests” 
and exclude certain groups with “Ethnic Affinities” from their advertise-
ments.134 The company assigned consumers to an “Ethnic Affinities” cate-
gory (a demographic category) “based on pages and posts they have liked or 
engaged with on Facebook.”135 Companies could use the “Ethnic Affinities” 
category to exclude users based on their race, by for instance, advertising 
housing options to only specific groups.136 
Today, companies are developing innovative facial “recognition tech-
nology” to correlate a person’s name to their face in public “even if they are 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Peppet, supra note 12, at 117–40 (discussing concerns regarding exclusion, privacy, and 
security in the IoT setting); FTC, BIG DATA, supra note 131, at 9–12. In some instances, some 
organizations may be limited in their ability to discriminate based on, for instance, the health sta-
tus of an individual. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (“[p]rohibiting discrimination against 
individual participants and beneficiaries based on health status”); see also Nondiscrimination and 
Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014 
(Dec. 13, 2006) (describing final rules governing the provisions prohibiting discrimination). 
 133 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/
terms/update [https://perma.cc/BGF5-B28X] [hereinafter Facebook Statement of Rights]. Face-
book’s statement of rights and responsibilities states that: 
[b]y using or accessing the Facebook Services, you agree to this Statement . . . . We 
designed our Data Policy to make important disclosures about how you can use Fa-
cebook to share with others and how we collect and can use your content and infor-
mation. . . . For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos 
and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the following permission, subject to 
your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, 
sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post 
on or in connection with Facebook (IP License). 
Id. 
 134 Julia Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-
exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/P6U3-KP8D]. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id.; see also Sapna Maheshwari & Mike Isaac, Facebook, After ‘Fail’ Over Ads Targeting 
Racists, Makes Changes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/
business/media/facebook-racist-ads.html [https://perma.cc/NCX6-TQBH] (discussing Facebook’s 
use of “ethnic affinities” or “multicultural affinity” category in advertising and the company’s 
attempts to remedy concerns associated with same) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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obscured and identify people by their clothing and posture.”137 It may ulti-
mately be possible for companies to exclude individuals with specific bio-
metric identifiers or health-related markers (such as perceived emotional 
state and hormone levels) from specific offers. Consider that a recent peer 
reviewed study conducted by researchers at Stanford University suggests 
that artificial intelligence can be used to scan facial images and deduce sex-
ual orientation more accurately than humans.138 Unrestricted use of these 
types of data by companies for artificial intelligence and data analytics pur-
poses can lead to the development of new proxy traits that can enable ex-
clusion. By allowing consumer data to be easily transferred from one entity 
to another, financial frameworks can also facilitate exclusion. Commenta-
tors report that “Facebook has filed patents for” facial recognition technolo-
gy that would permit it “to tailor ads based on users’ facial expressions” and 
the company is developing physical IoT products that may utilize its bio-
metric database and facial recognition technology.139 In light of Facebook’s 
previous inconsistent statements about its plans for the use of biometric da-
ta, in the future the company could find new ways to monetize its signifi-
cantly large biometric database, including disclosing or transferring this 
information to other entities, such as IoT companies, thereby providing new 
opportunities for exclusion.140 
                                                                                                                           
 137 FACEBOOK INC: BIOMETRIC DATA CLASS ACTION ONGOING IN ILLINOIS, CLASS AC-
TION REPORTER (Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 15, 2017, at 2 [hereinafter FACE-
BOOK BIOMETRIC DATA]; Kate Baggaley, How Facial Recognition Systems Will Reshape Your 
Daily Life, NBC NEWS: MACH (Sept. 14, 2017, 2:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/
tech/how-facial-recognition-systems-will-reshape-your-daily-life-ncna801336 [https://perma.cc/
6Q4Z-Z8CG] (discussing the expected widespread use of facial recognition technology across 
various industries, including “shopping, banking, travel, and more”). 
 138 See generally Yilun Wang & Michal Kosinski, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate 
Than Humans at Detecting Sexual Orientation from Facial Images, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. (forthcoming 2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/wang_
kosinski.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR2X-ECD8] (finding that human “faces contain more information 
about sexual orientation than can be perceived or interpreted by the human brain” and contending 
that the study “showed that the facial features extracted by a [deep neural network] can be used to 
accurately identify the sexual orientation of both men and women”). But see Advances in AI Are 
Used to Spot Signs of Sexuality, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/
news/science-and-technology/21728614-machines-read-faces-are-coming-advances-ai-are-used-
spot-signs [https://perma.cc/ZWE2-VDAP] (discussing the Wang and Kosinski study and its limi-
tations). 
 139 FACEBOOK BIOMETRIC DATA, supra note 137; Alex Heath, Facebook Is Putting a Top 
Exec in Charge of All Hardware and Readying an ‘Aloha’ Video Chat Device, BUS. INSIDER 
(Aug. 23, 2017, 4:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebooks-andrew-bosworth-to-lead-
oculus-building-8-aloha-video-chat-device-details-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/9VMF-NA7S] (de-
scribing Facebook’s production of a video chat device that will use facial recognition technology 
to rival the Amazon Echo Show). 
 140 See FACEBOOK BIOMETRIC DATA, supra note 137, at 4–5 (noting that “Facebook hasn’t 
been consistent about what it plans to do with its facial data” and that in 2012 Facebook’s privacy 
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2. Non-Consensual Disclosures and Data Breaches 
The risk of data breaches has long been problematic for both consum-
ers and companies. Yet, the unauthorized disclosure of IoT consumer data is 
even more alarming. For consumers, this concern is exacerbated when pri-
vacy policies are drafted to insulate companies from liability for third-party 
hacking and when financial frameworks permit consumer data to be contin-
uously transferred from one party to another. As IoT data are moved from 
one party to another and from one network to another, data storage and 
transfer vulnerabilities may be exposed making unauthorized access much 
easier, particularly when the data are not encrypted. 
Health-related data and biometric identifiers (as well as the source of 
biometric identifiers, such as voice recordings) can be stored on vulnerable 
IoT devices or in a company’s database on a server and potentially “linked 
with [other] personal information about” consumers.141 A company’s serv-
ers or the IoT device storing this information could be easily hacked result-
ing in data exfiltration.142 As one commentator has noted, although “you 
can reset a password . . . you can’t replace your fingertips or eyeballs.”143 
Furthermore, if health-related data are disclosed “there are few good reme-
dies” for victims because “[t]hey are unprotected, and sometimes their 
whole families are unprotected.”144 The harms that consumers may face 
from regular data breaches that expose financial records, names, or address-
es are well documented.145 These consumer harms are likely to be magni-
fied if a hack results in the release of biometric or health-related data. Con-
sider that the database of IoT toy maker CloudPets which stores the “per-
sonal information, photos and recordings of children’s voices” was hacked 
and the data was held for ransom.146 With sufficient computing power, pho-
                                                                                                                           
manager was unwilling to guarantee that “the company wouldn’t share its faceprint database with 
third parties”). 
 141 WAYNE PENNY, SANS INST., BIOMETRICS: A DOUBLE EDGED SWORD—SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY 8 (2002), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/authentication/biometrics-
double-edged-sword-security-privacy-137 [https://perma.cc/LCT9-MRHP]. 
 142 Id. at 6. 
 143 De Chant, supra note 56. 
 144 Kellogg, supra note 17, at 76. 
 145 See generally M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011) 
(discussing various theories of privacy harm: “unwanted observation” and “unanticipated or co-
erced use of information concerning a person against that person”); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle 
Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885638 [https://perma.cc/AC5J-XPHF] 
(discussing consumer harms from data breaches and contending that courts should be willing to 
recognize such harms although they are “intangible, risk-oriented, and diffuse”). 
 146 Selena Larson, Stuffed Toys Leak Millions of Voice Recordings from Kids and Parents, 
CNN: TECH (Feb. 27, 2017, 11:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/27/technology/cloudpets-
data-leak-voices-photos/index.html [https://perma.cc/J83T-X8PM]. 
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tographs and audio voice recordings can be easily transformed into bio-
metric identifiers, such as voice or face prints, and enable facial recognition 
technology “to identify one face from millions in under one second.”147 
Even if biometric data are stored solely on a device, and a company 
promises that its implemented security measures ensure that the company, 
and other applications or software programs and servers do not have access to 
the data, it may be possible to breach the company’s security measures. For 
instance, in connection with Apple’s Touch-Id, which allegedly stores only a 
“mathematical representation” of scanned fingerprints, Apple’s website states 
that “[i]t isn’t possible for someone to reverse engineer your actual fingerprint 
image from” the mathematical representation.148 Nevertheless, the company 
attempts to limit its potential liability for “damage to, compromise, or corrup-
tion of data” in the limited warranty it provides to consumers by expressly 
noting that Apple is not responsible in such instances.149 The company’s end 
user license agreement contains a similar provision.150 There have been pre-
vious reports of Touch-Id hacks that allowed parties to unlock Apple devices 
and potentially gain access to data stored on the device.151 The company’s 
recent decision to use facial recognition technology in connection with its 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Facial Recognition: Why 2018 Will Be a Landmark Year for Artificial Intelligence, THE 
ECONOMIST: FILMS, http://films.economist.com/the-world-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/EPW2-EFJ3] 
(discussing the ease and speed with which software programs and machines can transform photo-
graphs into face prints that are used to identify individuals and the implications of same); Biometrics, 
PRIVACY INT’L, https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/70 [https://perma.cc/ST9K-N69L] (“If 
an individual’s voice—an entirely unique sound—is recorded its frequency pattern and spectrum 
can be used to generate a voiceprint, a voice profile linked to their identity.”); Jeff John Roberts, 
Judge Says Customers Can Sue Over Face Scans, FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2017), http://fortune.
com/2017/09/19/shutterfly-face-scan [https://perma.cc/4U55-Z4C9] (discussing how photographs 
can be used by companies to generate geometrical facial data); James Vincent, Lyrebird Claims It 
Can Recreate Any Voice Using Just One Minute of Sample Audio, THE VERGE (Apr. 24, 2017, 
12:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/24/15406882/ai-voice-synthesis-copy-human-
speech-lyrebird [https://perma.cc/7M3J-BQG2] (discussing the use of artificial intelligence to 
easily transform audio recordings into voice-prints). 
 148 Apple Privacy Policy, supra note 90. 
 149 Apple One (1) Year Limited Warranty, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/warranty/
products/ios-warranty-document-us.html [https://perma.cc/NPA3-BPDV] (warranty for “iPhone, 
iPad, iPod, and Apple TV”); Apple One (1) Year Limited Warranty, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/
legal/warranty/products/warranty-us.html [https://perma.cc/D676-DRZ7] (warranty for “Apple 
Branded Products Only”). 
 150 Apple Inc. iOS Software License Agreement: Single Use License, APPLE, http://images.
apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iOS11.pdf [https://perma.cc/327Q-986T] (“[I]n no event shall Apple . . . 
be liable for . . . corruption or loss of data.”). 
 151 Mathew J. Schwartz, Apple iPhone 6 Touch ID Hacked, BANK INFO. SECURITY (Sept. 23, 
2014), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/apple-iphone-6-touchid-hacked-a-7348 [https://perma.cc/
25US-ETKA]; see also Seth Rosenblatt, Apple’s Touch ID Still Vulnerable to Hack, Security 
Researcher Finds, CNET (Sept. 23, 2014, 6:14 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apples-touch-id-
still-vulnerable-to-hack-security-researcher-finds [https://perma.cc/NWH3-DEAV] (noting that 
the Touch ID security was not significantly improved from the iPhone 5S to the iPhone 6). 
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newer devices evidences the extent to which companies are integrating vari-
ous types of biometrics into their products and widens the breadth of potential 
harms to consumers.152 
A company that stores mathematical representations of biometric im-
ages solely on a consumer’s device could elect in the future to store or pro-
vide access to this information via the cloud. For instance, one commentator 
reports that a patent filing by Apple describes a “biometric sensor data syn-
chronization” system in which biometric data on one device can be trans-
ferred to the cloud and synced with other devices.153 Transferring biometric 
data to the cloud presents security concerns because cloud-based systems 
are not immune from intrusion.154 
Since IoT devices frequently communicate and transmit data amongst 
various devices in a consumer’s home, “the least secure device becomes the 
security level for all [of a consumer’s] devices.”155 The home of the average 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Does Apple’s Facial Recognition Technology Compromise Security for Convenience?, 
CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2017, 12:13 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-apples-facial-
recognition-technology-compromises-security/ [https://perma.cc/EMY6-VV2M] (discussing im-
plications of the iPhone X’s new facial recognition technology “which uses a 3-D scan of the 
user’s face to unlock the phone”). 
 153 U.S. Patent Appl. No. 13/938392 (filed July 10, 2013); Lance Whitney, Apple Eyes Way to 
Leave Fingerprints in the Cloud, CNET (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:04 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/
apple-eyes-way-to-sync-your-touch-id-data-in-the-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/NKZ4-98HM]. 
 154 Thomas Barrabi, Why Hackers Love the Cloud, FOX BUS. (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.
foxbusiness.com/features/2016/12/16/why-hackers-love-cloud.html [https://perma.cc/8HY9-EFQP] 
(“The problem with the cloud is that it simply expands the systemic vulnerabilities that have exist-
ed since the Internet was developed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nina Cunningham & 
Altman Weil, The Myth of the Secure Cloud, LEGAL TECH NEWS (Oct. 4, 2017, 11:18 AM), 
https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/almID/1202799610449/ [https://perma.cc/TN8U-8AWT] (dis-
cussing security issues associated with the cloud). 
 155 Kellogg, supra note 17, at 78. A potentially influential legislative response in this area 
may be forthcoming. See S. 1691, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing the “Internet of Things (IoT) 
Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017” to impose “security requirements” on IoT companies for 
IoT devices provided to the U.S. government); Allison Grande, Senate Bill Would Up Internet of 
Things Device Security, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2017, 8:57 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
950047/senate-bill-would-up-internet-of-things-device-security [https://perma.cc/STF7-V4KW] 
(noting that although the proposed “bill is directed toward only those manufacturers that sell their 
devices to the government, [experts predict] . . . that ‘if they can influence companies to meet 
those standards to win federal business, those companies will likely adopt those same best practic-
es more broadly for developing products for people across the country to buy’”); see also Allison 
Grande, Equifax Fallout Could Boost Consumers’ Shaky Harm Claims, LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2017, 
11:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/972241/equifax-fallout-could-boost-consumers-shaky-
harm-claims [https://perma.cc/63XV-2UMC] (discussing proposals by various U.S. senators and 
representatives to impose on companies “fixed statutory damages” in favor of consumers in the 
event of a data breach and shift the burden “to companies to ensure that consumers are made 
whole, regardless of whether individuals have suffered identity theft or any other actual harm”). 
Lastly, a proposed bill in California would, if adopted, impose reasonable security standards on 
manufacturers that sell IoT devices to consumers. See S.B. 327, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2017) (proposing to require manufacturers of IoT devices “to equip the device with reasonable 
security features appropriate to the nature of the device and the information it may collect, con-
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consumer contains thirteen IoT devices.156 While the manufacturer of one 
IoT device may take steps to build security and privacy into its device, if 
one device in a consumer’s home is susceptible to intrusion, all other devic-
es are rendered vulnerable. Thus, because multiple devices are integrated in 
the IoT setting, foreign and domestic hackers are provided with multiple 
points of entry and chances to obtain highly sensitive consumer data. 
3. Non-Consensual Disclosures and Initial Data Collectors 
IoT companies could also disclose biometric and health-related data 
without obtaining consumer consent or providing notice of data collection 
or transfer. Manufacturers of children IoT toys, such as My Friend Cayla 
and i-Que Robot, have allegedly collected and shared with third parties au-
dio files of children’s voices and their private conversations without obtain-
ing parental consent.157 As noted earlier, companies and hackers can easily 
transform voice recordings into voice prints that can be used to identify 
consumers.158 IoT toys also suffer from significant security vulnerabilities, 
and as a result, hackers may be able to communicate with children through 
the toys.159 While consumer consent should not be used to justify data col-
lection practices that are detrimental to consumers, the intentional unauthor-
ized disclosure of consumer biometric data by IoT companies is particularly 
egregious given the immutable and singular nature of most biometric data. 
Even when biometric and health-related data are not at issue, compa-
nies may also collect and transfer other types of consumer data without first 
obtaining consent. Vizio, Inc., a manufacturer of Internet-enabled televi-
sions, covertly tracked consumers’ viewing habits and disclosed and sold 
this information to unaffiliated parties without obtaining appropriate con-
sumer consent.160 Bose, a manufacturer of wireless headphones, has been 
                                                                                                                           
tain, or transmit, that protect it from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclo-
sure.”). 
 156 Rich Handley, Cuebiq Database Offers IoT Device Usage Data to Marketers, RFID J. 
(Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?16435 [https://perma.cc/9GEW-ERP4]. 
 157 Allison Grande, Groups Say ‘Spy Toys’ Don’t Play Well with Privacy Regs, LAW360 
(Dec. 7, 2016, 6:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/870122 [https://perma.cc/EM5J-88KS] 
[hereinafter Grande, Spy Toys]; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Electronic Toy Maker 
VTech Settles FTC Allegations that It Violated Children’s Privacy Law and the FTC Act (Jan. 8, 2018) 
(on file with the Federal Trade Commission) (discussing the FTC’s settlement agreement with IoT 
toy maker Vtech for allegedly collecting child data without obtaining parental consent and failing 
to implement adequate security measures with respect to such data). 
 158 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 159 Grande, Spy Toys, supra note 157. 
 160 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vizio to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of New Jersey 
to Settle Charges It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without Users’ 
Consent (Feb. 6, 2017) (on file with the Federal Trade Commission); Allison Grande, Vizio’s TV 
Snooping Flouts Privacy Laws, Consumers Say, LAW360 (Nov. 7, 2016, 9:54 PM), https://www.
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accused of surreptitiously collecting and disclosing to unaffiliated entities 
consumers’ “listening habits” without acquiring consumer authorization.161 
Information about a consumer’s audio listening habits “including music, 
radio broadcast, Podcast, and lecture choices—provide an incredible 
amount of insight into his or her personality, behavior, political views, and 
personal identity.”162 These examples suggest that companies are indeed 
willing to collect, transfer and disclose consumer data without obtaining 
consumer consent, and companies could very easily engage in similar prac-
tices with respect to biometric and health-related data despite the highly-
sensitive and irreplaceable nature of such data. 
II. DATA TRANSFERS & COMMERCIAL REGIMES 
As the foregoing Part demonstrates, consumers may face significant 
harms when their IoT data are collected, monetized, and disclosed by com-
panies, and existing privacy policies frequently authorize the collection, 
transfer, and disclosure of consumer data.163 However, privacy policies are 
not alone in enabling this process. Commercial frameworks that permit the 
commodification of consumer data can also play a significant role in facili-
tating the transfer and disclosure of consumer data in ways that are non-
transparent and potentially detrimental to consumer interests. The secured 
transactions rules of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code are examples of 
commercial frameworks that provide various avenues for the subsequent 
transfer, assignment, and disclosure of consumer data to third parties. 
After IoT data are disclosed and transferred to third parties through 
these financial frameworks, many of the resulting harms to consumers fore-
casted in Part I above are likely to follow.164 The databases and servers of 
transferees, debtors, and secured parties are not immune from hacking, and 
transferees may subsequently disclose IoT data to third parties. Transferees 
may also deploy data analytics to mine and monetize their newly acquired 
data assets and use the data in ways that are harmful to consumer interests. 
Transferees could also begin using online “pay-for-privacy” models to fur-
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(Apr. 19, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/19/bose-headphones-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/4P4G-
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 162 Roberts, Headphones, supra note 161. 
 163 See supra notes 77–129 and accompanying text (discussing privacy policies); supra notes 
131–162 and accompanying text (discussing consumer harms). 
 164 See supra notes 131–162 and accompanying text. 
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ther extract value from the data. As I have noted elsewhere, although the 
wealthy may have always had more privacy, use of pay-for-privacy models 
in the IoT and online settings may exacerbate concerns about unequal ac-
cess to privacy for vulnerable consumers.165 Most importantly, the possible 
disclosure and transfer of biometric and health-related data to a third party 
through these financial frameworks is a significant privacy harm given the 
highly sensitive nature of these types of data. 
A. Article 9 of the UCC 
To obtain financing from lenders, companies routinely offer their per-
sonal property as collateral to secure funds. With some exceptions, Article 9 
governs transactions that “create[] a security interest in personal property or 
fixtures by contract.”166 Thus, Article 9 provides detailed rules for creating 
and perfecting a security interest.167 Through the process of “attachment” 
the parties create a security interest that is “enforceable against the debtor 
and third parties,” and through “perfection” a lender notifies third parties of 
its interest in the debtor’s collateral.168 If a lender is the first to file or 
properly perfect its security interest in the collateral using the various meth-
ods provided under Article 9, the lender will generally have priority over 
other third parties claiming a security interest in the same collateral, subject 
to the lender retaining its filing or perfection status and a few other excep-
tions.169 Priority may become a hotly contested issue between competing 
lenders when the debtor files for bankruptcy. 
Article 9 delineates numerous categories for different types of personal 
property that qualify as Article 9 collateral.170 The type of collateral that is 
offered by a company to secure a loan from a lender impacts the specific 
rules that govern the creation and perfection of the lender’s security interest 
in the collateral. For instance, a lender may typically perfect its security 
interest in a debtor’s “inventory” or “equipment” by filing a financing 
statement or by effectuating a “possession” of the collateral.171 On the other 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Elvy, supra note 92, at 1399–1411. 
 166 U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 167 See, e.g., id. §§ 9-201 to -206, 9-301 to -316; LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 49 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that Article 9 
created a “simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of modern secured fi-
nancing transactions involving personal property could occur”). 
 168 U.C.C. §§ 9-203(a), 9-308; RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 223–24 (“[A]ttachment 
is all a secured party needs to have a security interest that is enforceable against the debtor . . . 
[and] a perfection method—is, in many instances, the provision of some form of notice to the 
commercial world of the secured party’s interest in the collateral.”). 
 169 U.C.C. §§ 9-110, 9-322, 9-324, 9-328. 
 170 Id. § 9-102(a) (defining various forms of personal property). 
 171 U.C.C. §§ 9-310, 9-313; RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 249. 
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hand, if the collateral provided to secure the loan is “investment property,” 
the lender can generally perfect either by filing a financing statement or by 
obtaining “control” of the collateral.172 
Under Article 9, a company’s customer database, “the modern version 
of the customer list,” is likely a general intangible.173 Customer databases 
can include very detailed data about consumers.174 Recall that in the IoT 
era, the customer databases of today’s companies could potentially expand 
to include biometric, health-related, and other highly sensitive data about 
consumers.175 Thus, new types of data that were not previously accessible 
to companies on a wide scale or seen in customer databases could become 
part of a company’s assets. Although some companies may store only voice 
recordings or photographs in their databases, businesses can convert these 
data into biometric identifiers, such as voice or face prints, at any time.176 
To the extent that biometric data are stored only on a device and are 
not accessible to IoT companies, the information is unlikely to be part of the 
company’s customer database. However, as noted, IoT manufacturers of 
children’s products have allegedly disclosed audio files of children’s voices 
to third parties that could be used to generate voice prints that can identify 
individuals.177 Consider that the Amazon Echo—an IoT device—records 
and stores consumers’ “voice requests.”178 These recordings are retained on 
the company’s servers (even after consumers delete their voice recordings 
from the IoT device) and can be transformed into voice prints.179 Thus, bi-
                                                                                                                           
 172 U.C.C. §§ 9-310, 9-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); RUSCH & SEPI-
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 175 See supra notes 49–76 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 177 See supra note 147, 157 and accompanying text. 
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That Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-
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 179 Id.; see also Jing Cao & Dina Bass, Why Google, Microsoft and Amazon Love the Sound of 
Your Voice, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-12-13/why-google-microsoft-and-amazon-love-the-sound-of-your-voice [https://perma.cc/
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ometric related data may not always be stored solely on an IoT device, and 
in many instances, may be part of a company’s customer database and sub-
ject to assignment. Moreover, regardless of how or where the data are stored 
or processed, “most of the means of online production (in terms of hard-
ware, software, content or data) are . . . . increasingly owned or at least de 
facto controlled by large companies.”180 
Companies have long offered their customer databases or lists (along 
with other types of assets) as collateral to obtain financing.181 Article 9’s 
framework facilitates this process.182 As these databases and the data be-
come even more valuable in the IoT setting, this practice may continue and 
possibly become more widespread. 
A lender may create an enforceable security interest in a company’s 
customer database or list by having the debtor authenticate a security 
agreement that contains a sufficient “description of the collateral.”183 The 
debtor should also have “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer 
rights in the collateral” to the lender, and value must be exchanged in the 
transaction, which typically occurs through the lender’s provision of 
funds.184 To preserve its priority status and provide notice of its interest in 
the company’s customer list or database the lender may perfect by filing a 
financing statement in the appropriate filing office.185 Lenders and debtors 
are not required to describe in detail in their agreement the type of collateral 
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nute of sample audio.”); Biometrics, supra note 147 (discussing the use of audio recordings to 
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 180 Primavera De Filippi & Smari McCarthy, Cloud Computing: Centralization and Data 
Sovereignty, 3 EUR. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2012). 
 181 Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 577. 
 182 See infra notes 183–249 and accompanying text. 
 183 U.C.C. §§ 9-108, 9-203(b)(3)(A) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (provid-
ing the requirements for “reasonably identify[ing]” collateral). 
 184 Id. § 9-203(b)(2). 
 185 Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 579 (“If a consumer database is not protected 
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that is subject to the security interest.186 With some exceptions, the parties 
can simply use the applicable Article 9 collateral label.187 Further, the fi-
nancing statement may list the collateral as a general intangible or when 
appropriate “all assets or all personal property” of the debtor.188 
As one scholar has noted, because Article 9 does not require the lender 
to clearly specify that it has obtained a security interest in a company’s cus-
tomer database or list, “the public will not know whether ‘general intangi-
ble’ means trademarks, patents, . . . payment intangibles, . . . or consumer 
databases.”189 Thus, consumers will be unable to determine whether their 
biometric, health-related, or other types of highly sensitive data have been 
assigned by a company that has obtained the data as a result of the consum-
er’s use of an IoT device. 
Once the lender creates an effective security interest in a company’s cus-
tomer database or list through the process of attachment, Article 9 provides 
the lender with several rights when the company is in default.190 Article 9 
does not contain a definition of the term “default.”191 As such, the provisions 
of the parties’ security agreement regarding an event of default typically gov-
ern.192 In some instances, state statutes may limit the permissible events of 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Id. at 586 (“[A]rticle 9 does not require the parties to the security agreement to have a 
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 189 Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 586. 
 190 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-601 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); RUSCH & SEPI-
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 191 RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 140 (“Article 9 does not define ‘default.’ Instead, 
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 192 Id.; But see In re Eastep, 562 B.R. 783, 788 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2017) (noting that 
although the “term ‘default’ is not defined in the UCC,” Section 9-201(b) authorizes the use of 
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marks and citations omitted); In re Visnicky, 401 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2009) (“A current 
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default in consumer credit transactions.193 Various events may qualify as a 
default under a security agreement, including the IoT company’s failure to 
make timely payments on the loan provided in connection with the Article 9 
transaction.194 Because not all security agreements are publicly distributed, 
consumers may be unable to determine what events may trigger an event of 
default under the agreement. Further, even if these contracts were routinely 
made public and widely distributed by companies and lenders, it is unlikely 
that consumers would be able to understand the terms of the agreement and 
its data disclosure implications. 
One could contend that consumers simply do not care about privacy or 
security. Yet, recent research suggests that consumers are indeed concerned 
about their lack of control over their data.195 
Another potential critique regarding concerns about security interests in 
customer databases is that much of the data may be anonymized and aggre-
gated or such databases could primarily contain metadata.196 However, as one 
scholar has noted, anonymized electronic health records and data can be re-
identified through various means which could impact “tens of thousands or 
even hundreds of thousands of records.”197 In some instances, “simple 
code[s] could unlock patients’” identifying information.198 Moreover, 
“metadata of all sorts can reveal much about an individual.”199 Consumers 
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can also be re-identified from metadata.200 Thus, even if anonymized data is 
used in secured transactions and even if one contends that consumers have no 
property interest in anonymized data, the risk of re-identification remains. 
If an IoT company is in default the lender has the ability to exercise its 
rights as set forth in its agreement with the IoT company (subject to some 
exceptions) as well as specific rights provided in Article 9.201 Upon default, 
the lender “may sell, lease, license or otherwise dispose” of the collateral.202 
The disposition of the collateral by the lender must be “commercially rea-
sonable.”203 In many instances, the lender may also retain the collateral “in 
full or partial satisfaction” of the debt upon receiving the debtor’s con-
sent.204 Thus, when an IoT company has used its customer database as securi-
ty and has defaulted under the security agreement, the lender can generally do 
what it pleases with the customer database to satisfy the debtor’s obligations. 
Many privacy policies do not specifically address the creation of a se-
curity interest in consumer data but rather contain generic language de-
scribed in Part I.B authorizing the sale or transfer of customer data in cer-
tain business transactions.205 A secured financing transaction under Article 9 
may qualify as a business transaction depending on the specific language of 
the privacy policy. For instance, as discussed above, Nest’s privacy policy 
authorizes the disclosure and transfer of consumer data upon the “sale or 
transfer of the company and/or all or part of its assets.”206 Since customer 
databases or lists could be viewed as company assets, once a security inter-
est is created in the database, it could be sold when the IoT company fails to 
pay the loan, and the sale could arguably be in accordance with the compa-
ny’s privacy policy. Unless the IoT company files for bankruptcy or it pro-
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vides notice (assuming that its privacy policy requires it to do so), consum-
ers may be unaware that their data will be transferred to a third party once 
the IoT company is in default.207 Thus, not only are consumers unaware of 
the various events that may trigger a default under the security agreement 
between the lender and the IoT company, but they may also not be informed 
when the event of default or subsequent data transfer and disclosure occurs. 
Many of the privacy frameworks discussed in Part III below rely on a notice 
and choice model to protect consumers.208 Yet, in this area consumers are 
unlikely to receive sufficient notice. 
B. Data Ownership vs. Rights in the Data 
The question of who owns the data or who has rights in the data gener-
ated by IoT devices is a vexing one.209 One could contend that consumers, 
and not IoT companies, are the true owners of consumer data particularly 
because consumers generate the data by using IoT devices, mobile applica-
tions, and websites.210 
Commentators have adopted contrasting positions on questions of data 
ownership, rights in data and the legal regimes that should govern related 
issues. Indeed, “[t]he idea that personal information is property has been 
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widely debated.”211 Some scholars argue that personal data should be 
viewed as property.212 One commentator posits that “privacy as property has 
taken hold in the courts.”213 On the other hand, some case law suggests and 
several privacy law scholars contend that individuals do not have a property 
interest in their personal information.214 At least one court has been reluc-
tant to extend the holding in such cases to all claims involving consumer 
data.215 Courts appear to be unwilling to find that “it is categorically impos-
sible for [consumers] to allege some property interest that [is] compromised 
                                                                                                                           
 211 Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer 
Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335, 373 (2013). 
 212 E.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324–25 (1967) (“[P]ersonal information, 
thought of as the right of decision over one’s private personality, should be defined as a property 
right, with all the restraints on interference by public or private authorities and due-process guar-
antees that our law of property has been so skillful in devising.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Architec-
ture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63–65 (1999) (“A property regime gives the 
holder of the property right the power to hold out—until the buyer is willing to pay what the seller 
demands.”). 
 213 Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1121 (2016). 
 214 Order Granting Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Article III Standing with 
Leave to Amend, In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963, at 
*14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (stating that to “assert a [California Unfair Competition Law] 
claim, a private plaintiff needs to have ‘suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a 
result of the unfair competition’ [and] [n]umerous courts have held that a plaintiff’s ‘personal 
information’ does not constitute money or property under” California’s Unfair Competition Law) 
(internal modifications omitted); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1030 (N.D. Cal 
2012) (“[T]he weight of authority holds that a plaintiff’s ‘personal information’ does not consti-
tute property.”); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 
2011), aff’d in part, 572 Fed. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “personal information does 
not constitute property for purposes of” a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law); Ruiz 
v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126–27 (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 380 Fed. Appx. 689 (9th Cir. 
2010) (finding that plaintiff did not present “any authority to support the contention that unauthor-
ized release of personal information constitutes a loss of property”); Moore v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487 (Cal. 1990) (holding no property interest exists in genetic data); 
Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 813 (“Even if the law were to put aside its usual focus on 
property interests under section 363 and hold that a customer has an ‘interest’ in her own infor-
mation, it is unlikely also to hold that the customer has an interest in the aggregate list constituting 
the ‘property’ that the trustee seeks to sell.”); John M. Newman, Anti-Trust in Zero-Price Mar-
kets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49, 55 (2016) (“[C]ourts have been uniformly reluctant to 
treat personal information as property for general legal purposes.”); Samuelson, supra note 209, at 
1132 (“[H]owever intuitively powerful the notion of property rights in one’s data may be, it is 
clear that in the United States the existence of some legally protectable interests in personal data in 
certain circumstances is not equivalent to a legal rule that a person has a property interest in one’s 
personal data.”). 
 215 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 811 (N.D. Cal 2011) (distinguishing the 
holdings in In Re Facebook Privacy Litigation and In Re Iphone Application Litigation, and stat-
ing “the [c]ourt finds the reasoning in this line of cases inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ misappropriation 
claim, which, as previously discussed, is of an entirely different nature than a privacy tort claim. 
Plaintiffs here do not assert that their personal information has inherent economic value and that 
the mere disclosure of such data constitutes a loss of money or property”). In Fraley, the plaintiffs 
contended that Facebook “unlawfully misappropriated [their] names, photographs, likenesses, and 
identities for use in paid advertisements without obtaining [their] consent.” Id. at 790. 
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by [a company’s] alleged practices” with respect to their information.216 
Yet, some courts have also suggested that personal information has no value 
for which consumers can expect compensation.217 Whether this perplexing 
view will continue in the emerging personal data economy (“PDE”) setting 
in which various companies purport to provide platforms that allow indi-
viduals to monetize (and be directly compensated for) consumer-generated 
data and “take ownership of their information,” remains to be seen.218 In 
fact, in In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation—
a class action alleging inappropriate collection of consumer data—the Third 
Circuit suggested that the plaintiffs needed to allege that they intended to 
monetize their data or “store[] their information with a future sale in 
mind.”219 The burgeoning PDE provides consumers with opportunities to 
sell, aggregate, store, and mine their personal information.220 Lastly, other 
scholars contend that a property approach to personal data facilitates the 
                                                                                                                           
 216 LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., No. SACV 10-1256-GW(JCGx), 2011 WL 1661532, at 
*4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011). In LaCourt, the court indicated that it was willing to “recognize the 
viability in the abstract of such concepts as ‘opportunity costs,’ ‘value-for-value exchanges,’ [and] 
‘consumer choice’ . . . .” Id.; see also Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (discussing the LaCourt 
court’s recognition of these concepts and suggesting that the court’s decision In re iPhone Appli-
cation Litigation acknowledged same). 
 217 In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“[T]here is absolutely no support for the proposition that the personal information of an individu-
al JetBlue passenger had any value for which that passenger could have expected to be compen-
sated.”); Stayart v. Google Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“[P]laintiff alleges 
no facts which suggest that her name has any commercial value . . . .”); Thomas B. Norton, The 
Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and a New Critique of the Notice and Choice Privacy 
Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 194 (2016) (“Courts have 
also held that personally identifiable information is not considered property and thus has no com-
pensable value, despite concrete evidence to the contrary.”). 
 218 MOBILE ECOSYSTEM FORUM, UNDERSTANDING THE PERSONAL DATA ECONOMY: THE 
EMERGENCE OF A NEW DATA VALUE-EXCHANGE 3, https://mobileecosystemforum.com//wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Understanding-the-Personal-Data-Economy-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.
cc/CW3S-T4NT]; Elvy, supra note 92, at 1393–1400 (discussing personal data economy models). 
In Fraley, the court reasoned that the In re iPhone Application Litigation and Low decisions 
“found that the plaintiffs were unable to articulate how they were economically injured by the use 
of their own information to advertise to themselves and unable to articulate how the collection of 
demographic information was an economic loss to them.” Fraley, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 798–99. In 
the personal data economy setting, consumers may be able to more easily establish economic 
value and loss of their information. 
 219 806 F.3d 125, 149 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Cali-
fornia Unfair Competition Law and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims and reasoning that 
“the plaintiffs [did] not allege that they [participated in the ‘market for internet history infor-
mation’ or] incurred costs, lost opportunities to sell, or lost the value of their data as a result of 
their data having been collected by others”). 
 220 Elvy, supra note 92, at 1393–1400 (discussing personal data economy models). 
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commodification of consumer data, while some commentators advocate for 
a contractual approach.221 
Despite this scholarly debate, companies are currently commodifying 
consumer data as it has significant value for such entities and various legal 
frameworks may impact a company’s rights in consumer related data. Further, 
although one may posit that consumers own or have rights in the data they 
generate, consumers frequently consent to the use of their information by IoT 
companies. Recall that Nest’s privacy policy provides that by using the com-
pany’s IoT products, consumers will be deemed to have consented to data 
collection, storage, and processing not only by Nest but also by the compa-
ny’s third-party service providers.222 The policy also notes that consumer data 
may be “collected, stored and processed” on servers (and by parties) located 
in the “United States or in other countries.”223 Thus, consumers are potential-
ly consenting to the international transfer of their data. Through this consent, 
consumers could be said to grant or authorize IoT companies to obtain rights 
in the data they generate, including the right to process, aggregate, anony-
mize, and transform the data. These rights can include a grant of a royalty-
free license to use consumer data, the provisions of which may be contained 
in a company’s privacy policy or terms of service.224 Thus, through privacy 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
591, 592 (1994) (calling for a contractual approach to privacy that “give[s] individuals the power 
to choose privacy or not without requiring privacy for everybody or nobody,” and that allows 
companies to offer deals to consumers to prevent them from opting out of data collection and 
transfers); Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 77–
108 (2011) (critiquing “data propertization” arguments in the healthcare context); Jessica Litman, 
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1301 (2000) (contending that 
a “property rights approach” to protecting data privacy in which individuals “own information 
about themselves . . . would tend to encourage the market in personal data rather than constrain[] 
it”). Some scholars have suggested that First Amendment concerns can be avoided by grounding 
privacy rights and regulation in contract law. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Priva-
cy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1204 (2005) [hereinafter Richards, First 
Amendment] (contending that “the regime of contract law grants policymakers a wide variety of 
regulatory tools, including the power to supply both default and mandatory terms to” regulate 
consumer privacy while simultaneously avoiding First Amendment challenges); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop Peo-
ple from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000) (“While privacy protection 
secured by contract is constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily 
defensible under existing free speech law.”). Richards suggests that a state could adopt legislation 
prohibiting the waiver of consumer privacy rights and such legislation would be evaluated “under 
the rational basis review reserved for economic regulation generally.” Richards, First Amendment, 
supra, at 1204. However, several of the federal and state statutes evaluated in this Article continue 
to rely on consumer consent and the notice and choice model. 
 222 Nest Product Privacy Policy, supra note 85. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Facebook Statement of Rights, supra note 133; Terms of Service, NEST, https://nest.com/
legal/terms-of-service/ [https://perma.cc/84HD-RWB2] (“You hereby grant us with a nonexclu-
sive, worldwide, royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, sublicenseable and transferable right to ac-
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policies, IoT companies are arguably obtaining rights or interests in consumer 
generated data, and as one scholar notes “although privacy policies are prin-
cipally creatures of contract, there are nascent elements of property that per-
vade the relationship.”225 
The “rights in data” versus “ownership of data” issue is an important 
distinction under Article 9. Customer databases and lists could be viewed as 
belonging to companies and subject to assignment.226 Recall that to create 
an enforceable security interest against the debtor, the lender must ensure 
that the debtor has “rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in 
the collateral.”227 In First National Bank v. Temple, the court stated “all or 
some of [an] owner’s rights can be transferred by way of a sale, lease or 
license [and] [a] person with transferable rights can grant an enforceable 
security interest in those rights.”228 In order for an IoT company to grant a 
security interest in its customer list or database, which contains biometric, 
health-related, or other types of highly sensitive data, full ownership of and 
title to the data by the company is likely not required.229 However, if an IoT 
company has only limited rights in the data, the lender’s security interest 
will normally attach only to those rights.230 If a debtor has the power to 
                                                                                                                           
cess, display, or otherwise use your User Submissions,” such as “text, graphics, articles, photo-
graphs, video, images, and illustrations,” and “all related intellectual property rights . . . .”). 
 225 Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy 
Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801, 1818 (2003) (calling for the adoption of 
“muddy property rules” to regulate consumer data and contending that “if privacy norms for e-
commerce transactions are to be enforced in bankruptcy, they need to be protected by property 
rights”). 
 226 CHARLENE BROWNLEE & BLAZE D. WALESKI, PRIVACY LAW § 7.08 (2017) (“It is fairly 
common practice for a business to consider and treat customer lists and the personal information 
collected from consumers as the property of the business.”); Lipson, supra note 173, at 1082–83 
(“[C]ustomer databases have become an important asset for both ‘bricks and mortar’ and Internet 
businesses, which increasingly capture valuable information about consumers . . . .”); Nguyen, 
Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 854. 
 227 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). A debtor is defined 
as “(A) a person having an interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, 
whether or not the person is an obligor; (B) a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangi-
bles, or promissory notes; or (C) a consignee.” Id. § 9-102(a)(28). 
 228 642 N.W.2d 197, 204 (S.D. 2002). 
 229 State Bank of Young Am. v. Vidmar Iron Works, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. 1980) 
(noting that the UCC “does not require that collateral be owned by the debtor”); Border State 
Bank of Greenbush v. Bagley Livestock Exch., Inc., 690 N.W.2d 326, 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(noting that “[r]ights in the collateral, as the term is used in Article 9, include full ownership and 
limited rights that fall short of full ownership”); Greenbush State Bank v. Stephens, 463 N.W.2d 
303, 306 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that “‘ownership’ under the UCC can be shared, with each 
party possessing its own bundle of interests”); RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 96 (“Arti-
cle 9 does tell us that ‘title’ to the property is not particularly relevant.”). See generally Heather 
Hughes, Counterintuitive Thoughts on Legal Scholarship and Secured Transactions, 55 BUFF. L. 
REV. 863, 878–81 (2007) (discussing debtor’s rights in collateral under Article 9). 
 230 U.C.C. § 9-203(b) cmt. 6 (“A debtor’s limited rights in collateral, short of full ownership, 
are sufficient for a security interest to attach. However, in accordance with basic personal property 
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convey “another person’s rights [in the collateral] only to a class of trans-
ferees that excludes secured parties,” it is unlikely that a security interest 
can effectively encumber the collateral.231 
An IoT company’s use of a third-party technology service provider 
may muddle the question of rights in the collateral. As discussed earlier, IoT 
privacy policies may authorize IoT companies to share consumer data with 
third-party vendors and service providers. Depending on the terms of the 
service agreement, companies that provide data storage and analytics ser-
vices could claim an interest in the data that they process on behalf of IoT 
companies. 
If an IoT company elects to monetize its customer database by for in-
stance licensing it to a third party or enters into an agreement with a third-
party service vendor that processes the data, this third party could be 
viewed as having rights in the customer database or the data product de-
rived from the database or list. To the extent that the third-party provider 
has rights in the customer database, list, or derived data product, and a se-
cured party (lender) qualifies as a person to whom such rights can be trans-
ferred, the third-party provider could use the database or data product as 
collateral to obtain financing from the secured party. Consumer data (or the 
data product derived from such data) may then be at risk for foreclosure by 
another lender in addition to the lender of the IoT company that manufac-
tures and sells the device to consumers. Consumers will likely be unaware 
of any such secondary assignment of rights in their data. IoT companies 
could attempt to avoid this problem by clearly limiting the ability of third-
party service providers to encumber customer databases, lists, or data prod-
ucts derived from those sources in their agreements with such entities. 
However, various provisions in Article 9 address the impact of anti-
assignment restrictions and, when applicable, these code sections may ne-
gate contractual terms that would impair the “creation, attachment or per-
fection of a security interest” in certain collateral. 232 Thus, in some instanc-
es “even if the source of [a] prohibition on transfer is . . . a contractual 
promise . . a debtor will generally still have the ability to grant” a security 
interest in the collateral under Article 9.233 
Statutory liens in favor of service providers highlight another potential 
problem for IoT companies in this area and provide an additional avenue for 
                                                                                                                           
conveyancing principles, the baseline rule is that a security interest attaches only to whatever 
rights a debtor may have, broad or limited as those rights may be.”). The comments section also 
notes that “certain exceptions to the baseline rule [mentioned above may] enable a debtor to trans-
fer, and a security interest to attach to, greater rights than the debtor has.” Id. 
 231 Id. (describing as an example the concept of entrustment under section 2-403(2)). 
 232 Id. § 9-408. 
 233 RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 96. 
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the transfer and disclosure of consumer IoT data. A state statute may grant 
service providers a lien on personal property for services or materials ren-
dered in “making, repairing, improving or enhancing the value of” personal 
property.234 Technology providers can be hired by companies to mine, man-
age, store and improve their IoT data by transforming raw data into readable 
or usable data.235 These technology companies may have a lien arising un-
der state law on the company’s customer data (or derived product) for un-
paid services and materials. If service providers remain unpaid and all state 
statutory requirements are satisfied, they may be able to foreclose on the 
data which could result in consumer data being transferred and disclosed to 
third parties.236 In Chemical Bank v. Communications Data Services, Inc., 
the court concluded that a service provider that was hired by the debtor to 
compile, update, maintain and transform raw data, enhanced the value of 
the data for the benefit of the debtor and therefore had an enforceable lien 
pursuant to the applicable state statute.237 
Additionally, companies have been sued for allowing service providers 
and other third parties to have access to consumer data. For instance, in Yer-
shov v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., a consumer class ac-
tion, the plaintiff contended that Gannett violated the Video Privacy Protec-
tion Act (“VPPA”) by collecting and sharing with Adobe, Gannett’s data 
analysis service provider, the location and video viewing data of application 
users, among other things.238 The court held that the consumer had “plausi-
bly plead[ed] a case that the VPPA’s prohibition on disclosure applie[d]” to 
the transaction.239 Whether consumers will ultimately be successful in such 
cases in the IoT setting is questionable. Consumers in Yershov were not re-
                                                                                                                           
 234 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 577.1 (West 2017). 
 235 See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Commc’ns Data Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (S.D. Iowa 
1991). 
 236 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 577.2 (“Said lien may be foreclosed in the manner provided in 
the uniform commercial code . . . .”). 
 237 Chem. Bank, 765 F. Supp. at 1405 (denying secured creditor’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the artisan lien holder from foreclosing by sale on the debtor’s data that was 
subject to the secured creditor’s security interest on the debtor’s general intangibles). But see In re 
S.M. Acquisition Co., 296 B.R. 452, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003). In In re S.M. Acquisition Co., 
the court reasoned that: 
Chemical Bank represented a break with the common law rules governing possesso-
ry liens . . . . [because] a common law artisan’s lien attaches to specific chattels un-
der a bailment, and cannot be extended into the indefinite future. The court in Chem-
ical Bank failed to discuss the common law artisan’s lien and thereby violated the 
rule of construction that requires courts to consider the common law when constru-
ing the meaning of a statute. 
Id. 
 238 820 F.3d 482, 484 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 239 Id. at 489. 
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quired to consent to the disclosure of their data to third parties prior to using 
the mobile application.240 As noted, IoT companies are increasingly includ-
ing provisions in their privacy policies which provide that consumers will 
be deemed to have consented to third parties accessing their data simply by 
using an IoT device.241 Even if IoT companies required consumers to give 
explicit consent to the disclosure of their data to third parties for monetiza-
tion or service provider purposes, health-related and biometric data are 
highly sensitive and potentially personally identifiable. The extent to which 
such data are disclosed and transferred should not depend primarily on the 
terms of the company’s privacy policy, which are generally provided on a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis. 
Lastly, intellectual property law may also be relevant in evaluating 
rights related to customer databases or lists. IoT companies may assert that 
they have various intellectual property rights in the consumer data generat-
ed from the use of IoT devices and related websites and mobile applica-
tions.242 If the customer database contains “a modest quantum of originali-
ty” and is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” it may receive cop-
yright protection.243 One scholar suggests that “[m]ost commentators be-
lieve that there is no copyright protection for consumer databases.”244 If, 
however, IoT companies contract with technology providers to transform 
and manipulate raw data into useable data to obtain insights into business 
                                                                                                                           
 240 Id. at 484 (“[T]he App does not seek or obtain the user’s consent to disclose anything 
about the user to third parties.”). 
 241 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 242 Ferguson, supra note 196, at 872 (“[I]nformation about my heartbeat recorded in a Fitbit is 
my personal data, but it is also being shared with the company that sold me the device. It is my 
heartbeat information, but a company’s intellectual property.”). 
 243 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (stating that “copyright protection subsists . . . in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 355 (1991) (“The two fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] 
originality and fixation in tangible form [and finding that originality means] only that the work 
was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.”); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08, Lexis 
(database updated Nov. 2017) (“[A] very modest quantum of originality will suffice [to support a 
copyright].”); Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 579 (“The arrangement of the database is 
entitled to copyright protection only if the arrangement is original and fixed in a tangible medi-
um.”). As to the tangible medium requirement, one scholar suggests the work “must be sufficient-
ly stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for ‘more than a 
transitory’ period.” Lipson, supra note 173, at 1075. 
 244 Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 579; see also 3-31 ASSET BASED FINANCING: A 
TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE § 31.06, Lexis (database updated Sept. 2017) (“Computer programs and 
computer databases are copyrightable. However, there is controversy about the extent of copy-
rightability of computer programs.”); Lipson, supra note 173, at 1081–82 (“Databases are general-
ly not subject to copyright, as lacking the ‘originality’ required by Feist.”); Paez & Marca, supra 
note 209, at 65 (“[B]ecause data collected by IoT sensors is often compiled automatically through 
a standard set of selection criteria rather than any human involvement, it could be difficult to es-
tablish a valid copyright in many IoT-related data compilations.”). 
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practices or make predictions about consumer preferences, activities or be-
haviors the compilation of the data could be viewed as original.245 
Trade secret law may also provide protections for the customer data-
base of IoT companies when the database is kept confidential.246 Courts 
have found that “customer databases, customer lists, and detailed infor-
mation are trade secrets.”247 Intellectual property rights can be assigned un-
der Article 9 and are viewed as general intangibles.248 Thus, even if a cus-
tomer database qualifies for trade secret or copyright protection, the intel-
lectual property rights associated with the customer database may be used 
as collateral for secured financing transactions under Article 9, although in 
some instances perfection requirements may be governed by federal rules 
depending on the type of intellectual property at issue.249 As such, the con-
                                                                                                                           
 245 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 
1994) (finding that the “selection and arrangement of data in [a valuation book] displayed amply 
sufficient originality to pass the low threshold requirement to earn copyright protection” because it 
contained more than “pre-existing facts” and instead included predictions “based not only on a multi-
tude of data sources, but also on professional judgment and expertise” unlike the “telephone numbers 
in Fiest”); Paven Malhotra, How Big Data and IP Intersect: Big Data Is Big Business—But Who 
Owns It?, INTELL. PROP. (Fall 2016), http://www.kvn.com/Templates/media/files/Articles/How%20
Big%20Data%20and%20IP%20Intersect_Malhotra.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2XH-FZY3] (“[C]opy-
rights are also available for data compilations . . . . Under the framework of copyright, the compi-
lation of data into a format that reflects the judgment and efforts of a corporation may be copy-
rightable. Importantly, though, the individual pieces of data that form the compilation are not—a 
significant shortcoming of copyright law.”). 
 246 Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The Emerging Law 
of Commercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 BUS. LAW. 213, 243 (2000) (“The 
common law trade secret doctrine can provide an alternative source of protection for databases. 
The doctrine generally protects valuable, confidential business information from misappropriation 
where the holder takes reasonable measures to maintain its secrecy.”); Lipson, supra note 173, at 
1081 (“A common form of trade secret will be the customer list.”); Malhotra, supra note 245 
(“[M]any states and the federal government define trade secrets as information and compilations 
of information that are not generally known, that confer a competitive advantage, and that have 
been the subject of efforts to maintain their confidentiality . . . . Because trade secret laws protect 
not only the compilation of data but also the underlying data itself, it offers companies a potent 
tool.”); Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 578 (“Under trade secret law, the consumer 
database is entitled to trade secret protection if the consumer database is not publicly available 
information and is kept in secrecy.”). 
 247 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 118 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (finding 
that “customer lists, pricing information, [and] sales strategies” were trade secrets under state 
law); Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 578. 
 248 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) cmt. 5(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) 
(“‘General intangible’ is the residual category of personal property, including things in action, that 
is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are various categories of intellec-
tual property . . . .”). 
 249 RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 251 (“A federal filing is necessary to perfect a 
security interest in a registered copyright [but federal filings] are not needed to perfect a security 
interest in patents.”); CLARA RUYAN MARTIN & DAVID B. OSHINKSY, INTERNET LAW AND 
PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA: 2017 UPDATE § 16.31 (Suzanne L. Weakly ed., Continuing Education 
of the Bar of California 2017) (“Because there are no federal laws governing trade secrets, the 
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cerns discussed in this Article regarding the transfer and disclosure of con-
sumer data under Article 9 remain present although a company may have 
intellectual property rights in consumer data. 
C. Bankruptcy Implications 
Once the debtor files for bankruptcy, attempts by secured parties to en-
force their Article 9 rights as to collateral are normally enjoined.250 In bank-
ruptcy proceedings, secured creditors are typically in a better position than 
unsecured creditors.251 During bankruptcy, a secured party will attempt to 
prevent avoidance of its security interest. The secured party may file a claim 
in connection with the bankruptcy proceeding252 and may be involved in 
approving the debtor’s plan to compensate creditors, depending on the type 
of bankruptcy sought by the debtor.253 
                                                                                                                           
UCC requirements for perfection of security interests are not preempted. To perfect a security 
interest in a trade secret, a lender must file a UCC1 financing statement with the applicable 
state.”); Lipson, supra note 173, at 1081 (“Since trade secrets are creatures of state law, security 
interests in trade secrets should be governed by state law, including state contract and commercial 
law (i.e., the UCC).”); Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 579–80. Nguyen states that: 
[i]f a consumer database is entitled to copyright protection and is registered by the 
Copyright Office, perfection of the database occurs under the federal regime, not ar-
ticle 9. . . . [But,] [i]f a consumer database is not protected under copyright law and 
not registered by the Copyright Office, the security interest in the consumer database 
is perfected by filing a financing statement with the Office of the Secretary of State. 
The same method of perfection is applied if the consumer database is protected un-
der trade secret law. 
Id. 
 250 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (discussing automatic stays); CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW 
OF BANKRUPTCY 136 (4th ed. 2016) (“[U]pon the filing of a bankruptcy petition an ‘automatic 
stay’ is effectuated” and “[a]ll collection efforts on pre-bankruptcy debts are halted immediately 
and automatically.”). But see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (discussing relief from an automatic stay); TABB, 
supra, at 285 (“[A] creditor may ask the bankruptcy court for earlier relief from the automatic stay 
upon proof of one of the grounds specified in § 362(d).”). 
 251 RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 131 (“[T]he bankruptcy process favors secured 
claims . . . .”); TABB, supra note 250, at 724 (“Holders of secured claims are preferred over unse-
cured creditors in a bankruptcy distribution.”); see 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (discussing credit bidding); 
TABB, supra note 250, at 446 (“If property of the estate is being sold, a creditor who has a lien on 
that property is entitled to ‘credit bid’ at the sale.”); Marshall Tracht, Can a Secured Creditor Be 
Denied the Right to Credit Bid When the Creditor’s Collateral Is Sold Pursuant to a Chapter 11 
Plan of Reorganization?, ABA PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES, Apr. 16, 2012, at 248, 248–49 
(discussing secured creditors’ right to credit bid). 
 252 11 U.S.C.§§ 501–502; TABB, supra note 250, at 726 (“To participate in the bankruptcy 
case as an ‘allowed secured claim,’ the holder of the secured claim must have its claim ‘allowed’ 
under § 501 and § 502” but “[n]ote, however, that a secured creditor does not necessarily forfeit 
its rights in the collateral if it chooses to forgo filing a proof of claim, instead opting to stand aloof 
from the bankruptcy case.”). 
 253 11 U.S.C.§ 1126; TABB, supra note 250, at 1097 (discussing reorganization plans and 
noting that in such cases “[c]reditors and interest holders are dealt with in a plan by classes” and 
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Customer databases and lists can be part of the debtor’s estate in bank-
ruptcy.254 After bankruptcy proceedings are initiated, an IoT company in 
possession of the collateral may be able to continue using its customer data-
base and lists in the “ordinary course of business.”255 In theory, this could 
mean that disclosures, transfers, and uses of consumer data authorized by 
the debtor’s privacy policy may continue even after the bankruptcy petition 
is filed, to the extent that such activities are within “the ordinary course of 
business.”256 
Since the customer database, which may include IoT biometric, health-
related, and other types of highly sensitive consumer data, is part of the bank-
ruptcy estate, it may be transferred to third parties.257 If rights in the database 
                                                                                                                           
“[a]ll impaired classes will vote on whether to accept the plan[] . . . after receiving a court-
approved disclosure statement,” but “[c]lasses that are not impaired[] . . . are deemed to accept the 
plan”). 
 254 Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 789 (“[B]ankruptcy cases decided under the federal 
Bankruptcy Code . . . include “customer lists” in the debtor’s estate, which is itself comprised of 
property.”); see also In re Levitz Ins. Agency, 152 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (sug-
gesting that customer lists are general intangibles). 
 255 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)–(c) (noting that “notice and a hearing” are needed for uses, sales and 
leases “outside of the ordinary course of business”); RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 133 
(“After a bankruptcy petition is filed, the debtor is entitled to use property subject to a security 
interest without court approval if such use is in the ordinary course of business . . . .”); TABB, 
supra note 250, at 443–44 (“Section 363 governs the use, sale, or lease of property of the estate by 
the trustee (or debtor in possession),” and if the use, sale or lease “is not in the ordinary course, 
then the trustee may use, sell, or lease the property only ‘after notice and a hearing.’”). To the 
extent that the activity is within the “ordinary course of business,” a notice and hearing is unnec-
essary with the exception of “‘cash collateral,’ which the trustee may use, sell, or lease only in 
accordance with the strict requirements of § 363(c)(2)–(4).” TABB, supra note 250, at 444. 
 256 See TABB, supra note 250, at 445 (discussing the tests established by courts to determine 
whether an activity is within the “ordinary course of business” and concluding that “[d]efining the 
‘ordinary course of business,’ then, appears to turn largely on the question of whether the transac-
tion is one as to which creditors presumably would want prior notice and the opportunity to be 
heard”). 
 257 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (“[u]se, sale, or lease of property”); id. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (sale 
of assets per plan); id. § 1123(b)(4) (“sale of all or substantially all of property” pursuant to a 
plan); id. § 1129 (“confirmation of plan”); FELTON E. PARRISH & JAMES E. MORGAN, SALES OF 
ASSETS UNDER SECTION 363, COLLIER GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11: KEY TOPICS AND SELECTED IN-
DUSTRIES 3-4 (2016) (“[S]ales of assets under section 363 can range from the sale of office furni-
ture by a chapter 7 trustee to a sale of substantially all assets of a chapter 11 debtor.”); TABB, 
supra note 250, at 448 (“In cases under chapter 11 . . . the plan proponent has the alternative of 
providing in the plan for the sale of all or part of the property of the estate.”); Scott D. Cousins, 
Chapter 11 Asset Sales, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 835, 845 (2002) (“Section 1123(b)(4) contemplates 
confirmation of a liquidating plan, whereby the debtor sells all of the property under a confirmed 
plan of reorganization.”); Morris A. Karam, The Chrysler Bankruptcy and the Future of 363(b) 
Transactions, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 395, 403 (2011) (“The significance of a 363(b) transac-
tion emerges when comparing it to analogous provisions in § 1123 of the Code. Section 1123 
allows for the ‘transfer of all or any part of the property of the estate,’ the ‘sale of all or any part of 
the property of the estate, either subject to or free from any lien,’ and ‘provide[s] for the sale of all 
or substantially all of the property of the estate . . . . But where a § 363(b) transaction only requires 
a ‘notice and a hearing’ under the bankruptcy judge, transactions under § 1123 are subject to a 
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are assigned, it may be sold to a third party without negating the lender’s se-
curity interest in the database, or alternatively, the sale of the consumer data-
base may extinguish the lender’s security interest under certain circumstanc-
es.258 
If a customer database or list is transferred in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
a consumer’s data will be disclosed to the data buyer. A company’s database 
may include both personally identifiable information about consumers and 
anonymized data, both of which could be transferred to a purchaser. Even if 
the customer database transferred to a buyer during bankruptcy contains 
only anonymized aggregated data, recall that various studies indicate that 
anonymized data can be re-identified.259 The robustness of anonymization 
depends in part on the procedures used by the debtor to anonymize the data 
prior to disclosure and transfer. In theory, as part of the transfer to the data 
buyer, anonymization methods may also be disclosed to enable re-
identification. Consumers may have little control over how they are subse-
quently treated by data buyers once their data is acquired and used for data 
analytics and other purposes after bankruptcy. This includes the potential 
danger of exclusion. Thus, once a data transfer occurs through the bank-
ruptcy process, the harms discussed previously may arise.260 Today, one 
need only look to the Sports Authority, RadioShack, and Toysmart bank-
ruptcies to find recent examples of the attempted sale of consumer data in 
                                                                                                                           
constellation of requirements prior to their approval.”); Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 790 
(“[A]ny asset that has value constitutes property of the estate. This may account for the courts’ 
custom of treating customer lists as property of the estate; such lists have value that the trustee can 
realize through a sale and distribute to the estate’s creditors.”); Yaad Rotem & Omer Dekel, The 
Bankruptcy Auction as a Game—Designing an Optimal Auction in Bankruptcy, 32 REV. LITIG. 
330, 331 (2013) (“A Section 363(b) sale is allowed not only for trustees in Chapter 7 liquidations, 
but also as an out-of-plan maneuver for debtors-in-possession . . . during a Chapter 11 proceed-
ing.”); Jack L. Smith & Erin L. Connor, Sales Free and Clear—Will the Expansion Continue?, 
BANKR. STRATEGIST, Jan. 2004, at 1, 1 (“The alternative to Section 363 sales in Chapter 11 is the 
sale of assets as part of a Chapter 11 plan, as recognized by 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(D) . . . and 
1141(c) . . . .”). 
 258 11 U.S.C.§ 363(e) (“[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property 
used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or 
without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide 
adequate protection of such interest.”); id. § 363(f) (allowing assets to be transferred free and clear 
as long as at least one of the listed conditions are met); RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 
213 (“Often the trustee will sell the collateral subject to the secured party’s lien, in which case the 
secured party will have to deal with the buyer when seeking to enforce its rights. However, the 
trustee is also authorized to sell the collateral free and clear of liens provided the trustee adequate-
ly protects the interest of the secured party.”); Arthur J. Spector & Debi Evans Galler, Section 363 
Sale Subject to Lien May Trigger Due-on-Sale Clause, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2013, at 34, 34 
(noting that a section 363 sale “is often ‘free and clear’ of all liens, claims and encumbrances, but 
on occasion, the sale will be subject to an existing lien”). 
 259 See supra notes 119–123, 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 260 See supra notes 131–162 and accompanying text. 
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bankruptcy proceedings.261 In the IoT setting, the recent bankruptcy and 
sale of FiLIP illustrates the potential for valuable IoT consumer data to be 
transferred during bankruptcy.262 
III. PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS 
Various privacy frameworks have been established to protect consumer 
data and privacy with limited success. These regimes frequently rely exces-
sively on a notice and choice model and the terms of a company’s privacy 
policy to determine the level of protection given to consumers. In some in-
stances, these frameworks may not cover IoT companies or transactions. 
Overreliance on the notice and choice model and the language in privacy 
policies, allows a company to be the primary party that decides when and 
how consumer data will be used, transferred, and disclosed once the mirage 
of notice and choice is satisfied. Therefore, legal regimes that depend heavi-
ly on a notice and choice model are insufficient at protecting the interests of 
the consumer in the IoT setting. 
A. BAPCPA 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 (“BAPCPA”) made considerable modifications to the Bankruptcy 
Code.263 The act was adopted to address, among other things, consumer pri-
vacy concerns raised by the Toysmart bankruptcy and other high-profile 
bankruptcy cases in which consumer data was offered for sale.264 
The BAPCPA provides that the sale or lease of “personally identifia-
ble” consumer data is restricted if such a transfer would violate the debtor’s 
privacy policy that was previously provided in connection “with offering a 
product or service.”265 Health-related and biometric data generated from 
consumer use of IoT devices may qualify as personally identifiable data 
                                                                                                                           
 261 See supra note 35, 40 and accompanying text (Sports Authority); infra note 291 and ac-
companying text (RadioShack); infra notes 312–321 and accompanying text (Toysmart). 
 262 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 263 Lynne F. Riley, BAPCPA at Ten: Enhanced Domestic Creditor Protections and Enforce-
ment Rights, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 267, 267 (2016) (contending that the BAPCPA “generated the 
most sweeping changes to the Bankruptcy Code in over twenty-five years”). 
 264 Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 544 (2005); Nathalie Martin & Ocean Tama y 
Sweet, Mind Games: Rethinking BAPCPA’s Debtor Education Provisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517, 
518–19 (2007) (noting that the BAPCPA was also intended to increase financial education); Lucy 
L. Thomson, Personal Data for Sale in Bankruptcy: A Retrospective on the Consumer Privacy 
Ombudsman, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2015, at 32, 32 (suggesting that fears related to the trans-
fer of child and health data was also the “impetus” for the BAPCPA); see infra notes 312–321 and 
accompanying text. 
 265 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
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under the BAPCPA because the data could potentially lead to the identifica-
tion of a specific consumer and may be associated with other types of iden-
tifiable information, such as names and physical and electronic addresses.266 
Furthermore, as noted above, IoT companies frequently provide privacy 
policies as part of the sale of IoT devices and the provision of related IoT 
services and mobile applications.267 
If the debtor’s privacy policy in effect at the commencement of a bank-
ruptcy action prohibits “the transfer of personally identifiable data” to unaf-
filiated parties, the transfer of the data to a third party is permissible only if 
the “sale or lease is consistent with” the debtor’s existing privacy policy or 
“after the appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman” and court ap-
proval of the transfer (along with compliance with other applicable statutory 
requirements).268 The CPO can be heard at a hearing and is authorized to 
provide information and recommendations to aid the court in determining 
whether to approve the sale or lease.269 
In making the determination to approve or deny the transfer of data to 
a third party, a court must consider whether the transfer would violate non-
bankruptcy law.270 For instance, the court and CPO may consider the impli-
cations of the transfer of the customer database under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTCA”), the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”), and “state consumer protection laws.”271 
In some cases, CPOs have played an important role in ensuring that 
consumer data are protected. For instance, CPOs have recommended that 
data purchasers use effective security measures to protect consumer data 
and be in the same business as the debtor to ensure that consumer data are 
used for the same purposes as originally contemplated by the debtor and the 
                                                                                                                           
 266 See id. § 101(41A) (“The term ‘personally identifiable information’ means—(A) if provid-
ed by an individual to the debtor in connection with obtaining a product or a service from the 
debtor primarily for personal, family, or household purposes—(i) the first name (or initial) and last 
name of such individual, whether given at birth or time of adoption, or resulting from a lawful 
change of name; (ii) the geographical address of a physical place of residence of such individual; 
(iii) an electronic address (including an e-mail address) of such individual; (iv) a telephone num-
ber dedicated to contacting such individual at such physical place of residence; (v) a social securi-
ty account number issued to such individual; or (vi) the account number of a credit card issued to 
such individual; or (B) if identified in connection with 1 or more of the items of information speci-
fied in subparagraph (A)—(i) a birth date, the number of a certificate of birth or adoption, or a 
place of birth; or (ii) any other information concerning an identified individual that, if disclosed, 
will result in contacting or identifying such individual physically or electronically.”). 
 267 See supra notes 77–129 and accompanying text. 
 268 11 U.S.C. § 363(b); see also Luis Salazar, Privacy and Bankruptcy Law: Part II: Specific 
Code Provisions, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 2007, at 58, 59. 
 269 11 U.S.C. § 332. 
 270 Id. § 363(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 271 Report of the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman at 17, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-
10197 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 16, 2015) [hereinafter RadioShack CPO Report]. 
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consumer.272 In the RadioShack bankruptcy, the parties agreed that the 
debtor would not transfer consumer birth dates, credit card, and debit card 
numbers.273 In the 2016 bankruptcy of QSL, the CPO recommended that the 
company delete sensitive data (such as the ethnicity, sex, and age of their 
customers and children) prior to the transfer to the purchaser.274 
There are several areas in which the application of the BAPCPA falls 
short of protecting consumer data. First, if the IoT data does not constitute 
personally identifiable information, then CPO protection and other applica-
ble statutory requirements may not be triggered.275 To the extent that anon-
ymized consumer data can easily be de-anonymized or re-identified, one 
could contend that such data should qualify as personally identifiable data, 
particularly if the data clearly fits into one of the enumerated “personally 
identifiable information” categories.276 Despite this, IoT companies may be 
able to successfully contend that anonymized data does not constitute per-
sonally identifiable information because the de-identified data are unlikely 
to lead to the identification of a specific consumer and may not fall into one 
of the enumerated categories. 
Second, if the debtor did not provide consumers with a privacy policy 
or if the sale of the data is in accordance with the debtor’s privacy policy, a 
CPO is unlikely to be appointed.277 Recall that IoT privacy policies routine-
                                                                                                                           
 272 Id. at 5, 19; see also Thomson, supra note 264, at 33 (noting that courts have required a 
buyer of personally identifiable data to be in “materially the same line of business as the debtor” 
and that “the buyer agrees to use the personally identifiable consumer records for the same pur-
pose(s) as they were used previously and agrees to comply with the debtor’s privacy policy”). 
 273 Notice of Agreement Regarding Sale of Certain Personally Identifiable Information at 6, 
In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 2015); State AGs Demand 
Changes to Bankrupt RadioShack’s Use of Customer Data, HOGAN LOVELLS CHRON. DATA 
PROT. (July 22, 2015), https://www.hldataprotection.com/2015/07/articles/consumer-privacy/state-
ags-demand-changes-to-bankrupt-radio-shacks-use-of-customer-data/ [https://perma.cc/J8AJ-G68P] 
(“RadioShack struck a deal with the Attorneys General, ultimately agreeing to destroy the majori-
ty of its customer data . . . . The data to be destroyed included credit and debit card information, 
Social Security numbers, telephone numbers, and dates of birth.”). 
 274 Consumer Privacy Ombudsman Report to the Court at 2–3, 9, In re QSL of Medina, Inc., 
No. 15-52727 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2016). 
 275 In re Graceway Pharm., LLC, No. 11-13036 (PJW), 2011 WL 6296791, at *4 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding that “[t]he Debtors have, to the extent necessary, satisfied the re-
quirements of Bankruptcy Code section 363(b)(1) because no personally identifiable information 
will be transferred,” and “[a]ccordingly, appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman pursuant 
to Bankruptcy Code sections 363(b)(1) or 332 is not required with respect to the relief requested in 
the Motion”). 
 276 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 277 See, e.g., In re Korea Tech. Indus. Am., Inc., No. 11-32259, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5220, at 
*19 (Bankr. D. Utah Nov. 15, 2011) (“[T]he Sale of the Purchased Assets is consistent with the 
Debtors’ policy concerning the transfer of personally identifiable information and no consumer 
privacy ombudsman is necessary as set forth in section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.”); In re 
TriDimension Energy, L.P., No. 10-33565-SGJ, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4838, at *18–19 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2010) (finding that because the “[d]ebtors ha[d] never disclosed a policy to an 
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ly authorize companies to transfer consumer data in the event of a bank-
ruptcy.278 Thus, if an IoT company files for bankruptcy, and consumer bio-
metric and other highly sensitive data are part of the company’s database, 
and the sale is permissible under the privacy policy in effect at the time of 
the commencement of the bankruptcy action (for instance if the privacy pol-
icy permits the transfer of personally identifiable data to unaffiliated enti-
ties), the data may be sold without CPO input. 
The language in the debtor’s privacy policy controls the level of scru-
tiny that will be given to the sale of consumer data in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. For example, in In re Boscov’s Inc., the court declined to appoint a 
CPO, and it appears that no restrictions were placed on the sale of the con-
sumer data.279 The debtor’s privacy policy notified customers that their per-
sonal information could be transferred to third parties in connection with a 
business transition.280 
In contrast, recall that prior to the Pay by Touch bankruptcy, in which 
the biometric data of consumers were at risk of being sold, the company’s 
privacy policy provided that personally identifiable information would not 
be transferred or shared with unaffiliated parties without consumer con-
sent.281 A CPO was appointed to provide guidance to the court on the sale of 
consumer data, including biometric information.282 If Pay by Touch’s priva-
cy policy had explicitly permitted the sale of biometric information without 
consumer consent, it is certainly possible that a CPO would not have been 
appointed. 
                                                                                                                           
individual prohibiting the transfer of personally identifiable information [to unaffiliated parties] 
. . . . there is no requirement that the sale of the Properties . . . be consistent with any privacy poli-
cy or that a consumer privacy ombudsman be appointed in connection with same under Bankrupt-
cy Code § 363(b)(1)”). 
 278 See supra note 80–90 and accompanying text. 
 279 Order Granting Motion of Debtors for an Order (A) Approving Bidding Procedures for the 
Sale of Substantially [sic] of Their Assets, (B) Approving the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof, 
(C) Scheduling an Auction and Sale Hearing and (D) Approving Breakup Fee at 7, In re Boscov’s 
Inc., No. 08-11637 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Boscov Order] (“The Sale of the Assets 
is consistent with section 363(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor’s privacy policy, and 
no consumer privacy ombudsman is necessary in connection with the Sale.”); S. Jason Teele et al., 
The Impact of Privacy on FDIC Resolution Plans, LAW360 (Nov. 17, 2011, 1:00 PM), https://www.
law360.com/articles/286179/print?section=banking [https://perma.cc/JB3B-N9KA] (Boscov’s priva-
cy policy stated that “in the event that some or all of the business assets of Boscov’s are sold or trans-
ferred, Boscov’s may transfer the corresponding information about our customers. In light of the 
language . . . in Boscov’s privacy notice, the bankruptcy court approved the sale without appointing a 
consumer privacy ombudsman or imposing other restrictions on the personal information”) (original 
brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 280 Boscov Order, supra note 279, at 3–8; Teele, supra note 279. 
 281 Pay by Touch CPO Report, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 282 Id. at 1. 
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In connection with the FiLIP bankruptcy, the company’s privacy policy 
included the standard carve-out authorizing data transfers upon the sale of 
the company.283 As part of the court-approved asset purchase agreement, 
consumers’ names, addresses, “relations/friends as configured in [the] sys-
tem,” device data, “network data, SIM card information [and] message da-
ta” were transferred to the purchaser.284 Additionally, prior to its bankruptcy, 
FiLIP’s privacy policy indicated that the company also collected the 
birthdates, “other personal information of customers as well as that of the 
child who” used the device, and the physical location of the device.285 
These data were likely also transferred to the purchaser. A CPO does not 
appear to have been appointed, as the court determined that the sale of the 
assets to the purchaser was “consistent with the [d]ebtor’s privacy poli-
cy.”286 
As independent third parties with bankruptcy and privacy expertise, 
CPOs can play an instrumental role in helping courts to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of a transfer of consumer data to unaffiliated parties.287 For 
instance, in the first reported case involving the appointment of a CPO, the 
CPO generated a fifty-one-page “report that both reviewed applicable pri-
vacy law and analyzed the debtor’s privacy policy provisions and the im-
pact of the proposed sale.”288 CPOs have also worked with state attorneys 
general, and requested and obtained official responses from the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) regarding their concerns about the sale of con-
sumer data, and appear to have taken these concerns into consideration 
when making recommendations.289 
When there are potential ambiguities in the privacy policy language 
regarding the transfer or disclosure of consumer data, one could easily ar-
                                                                                                                           
 283 FiLIP Privacy Policy, supra note 82. 
 284 FiLIP Sale Exhibit A, supra note 31, at 41. 
 285 FiLIP Privacy Policy, supra note 82. 
 286 FiLIP Sale Order, supra note 31, at 5. 
 287 See 11 U.S.C. § 332(b) (2012) (noting that the information CPOs provide to the court can 
include the “presentation of (1) the debtor’s privacy policy, (2) the potential losses or gains of 
privacy to consumers if such sale or such lease is approved by the court, (3) the potential costs or 
benefits to consumers if such sale or such lease is approved by the court and (4) the potential al-
ternatives that would mitigate potential privacy losses or potential costs to consumers”). 
 288 Salazar, supra note 268, at 59. 
 289 See RadioShack CPO Report, supra note 271, at 6 (“In formulating the recommendations 
contained in this Report, the Ombudsman has worked extensively with . . . the FTC, and the Of-
fice of the Texas Attorney General, acting on behalf of various state Attorneys General.”); Letter 
from David C. Vladeck, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Michael St. 
Patrick Baxter and Yaron Dori, Esqs., Covington & Burling LLP (Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter 
FTC Borders Letter] (on file with the FTC) (“This letter responds to your request, in your role as 
Consumer Privacy Ombudsman (‘CPO’), that we provide a written description of our concerns 
regarding the possible sale as part of a bankruptcy proceeding of certain consumer personal infor-
mation currently in the possession of Borders Group, Inc. (‘Borders’).”). 
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gue that the transfer of the data violates the privacy policy and therefore a 
CPO is required. For example, at the commencement of Borders’ bankrupt-
cy, the company’s privacy policy provided in part that “circumstances may 
arise where for strategic or other business reasons, Borders decides to sell, 
buy, merge or otherwise reorganize its own or other businesses.”290 The 
FTC contended that a sale of the company’s data would violate the privacy 
policy and that the provisions of the policy authorized the company to “con-
tinue to operate as a going concern, but did not authorize a dissolution of 
the company with piecemeal sales of company assets during bankruptcy.”291 
Similarly, in the 2017 bankruptcy case of Gander Mountain Company, the 
parties disagreed about “the extent of the protections afforded to the Debt-
ors’ customers by the privacy policy.”292 The language in the privacy policy 
was ambiguous, and the CPO determined that the privacy policy was in-
tended to protect users’ data given the “[d]ebtors’ commitment to affording 
‘choice’ to customers with respect to the use and sharing of their personal 
information.”293 Companies may draft IoT privacy policies to avoid the am-
biguities found in the Gander and Borders privacy policies.294 
Recall that CPO protection and related statutory requirements are only 
triggered when the debtor provides a policy to an individual that can be in-
terpreted as prohibiting the transfer of personally identifiable information 
and that privacy policy is in effect at the time the bankruptcy proceeding 
commences. Except for possible FTC scrutiny, nothing prevents a company 
from revising its privacy policy to authorize the sale of customer data and 
obtaining consumer consent to the same immediately before bankruptcy or 
when it begins experiencing financial hardships. If a company clearly in-
forms consumers of changes to its privacy policy (such as taking additional 
steps to notify consumers rather than simply posting a revised policy on a 
                                                                                                                           
 290 FTC Borders Letter, supra note 289. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Gander CPO Report, supra note 82, at 7. 
 293 Id. 
 294 See, e.g., Amazon Privacy Policy, supra note 88 (“Business Transfers: . . . we might sell or 
buy stores, subsidiaries, or business units. In such transactions, customer information generally is 
one of the transferred business assets but remains subject to the promises made in any pre-existing 
Privacy Notice (unless, of course, the customer consents otherwise). Also, in the unlikely event 
that Amazon.com, Inc., or substantially all of its assets are acquired, customer information will of 
course be one of the transferred assets.”); Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 109 (“If we are in-
volved in a merger, acquisition, or sale of assets, we will continue to take measures to protect the 
confidentiality of personal information and give affected users notice before transferring any per-
sonal information to a new entity.”); Nest Product Privacy Policy, supra note 85 (“Upon the sale 
or transfer of the company and/or all or part of its assets, your personal information may be among 
the items sold or transferred. We will request a purchaser to treat our data under the privacy state-
ment in place at the time of its collection.”). 
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website), and obtains consumer consent, the changes to the privacy policy 
may be valid.295 
Third, between 2005 and 2015, bankruptcy courts considered the ap-
pointment of CPOs in “approximately 400 federal bankruptcy cases,” but of 
these cases only one hundred CPO appointments were made.296 Even if the 
potential transfer of consumer data conflicts with the terms of a debtor’s 
privacy policy, some courts have been unwilling to appoint a CPO.297 These 
courts have reasoned that if the data buyer agrees to be the “debtor’s suc-
cessor-in-interest” as to the customer data, and consents to using the cus-
tomer data pursuant to the debtor’s existing privacy policy, a CPO is unnec-
essary.298 In the FiLIP bankruptcy the court noted that the ultimate purchas-
er had agreed to adopt the debtor’s privacy policy.299 This rationale places 
too much reliance on the debtor’s existing privacy policy at the time the 
bankruptcy commences. In focusing on whether the purchaser agrees to 
comply with the debtor’s privacy policy, courts may not sufficiently consid-
er whether the transfer is potentially restricted under non-bankruptcy law.300 
Of course, the analysis of applicable non-bankruptcy law in CPO reports 
typically involves statutes, such as the FTCA, COPPA, and state consumer 
protection acts.301 As will be discussed below, because the FTC’s interpreta-
tion of the FTCA to some extent relies on the provisions of the debtor’s pri-
vacy policy, and some state consumer protection statutes may contain lan-
guage similar to the FTCA, there may be some limitations on the effective-
ness of non-bankruptcy law in adequately protecting consumers.302 Addi-
                                                                                                                           
 295 See In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 450 (2004) (stating that the company 
“did not notify consumers of material changes to its information practices,” but only “posted a 
revised privacy policy on its Web site without any indication that the policy had materially 
changed or what aspects of the policy had changed,” making “the representation[s] [in the policy] 
. . . false or misleading”). 
 296 Thomson, supra note 264, at 32. 
 297 Id. at 33. 
 298 In re Escada (USA) Inc., No. 09-15008 (SMB), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4362, at *11 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2010); In re Reader’s Digest Ass’n, No. 09-23529 (RDD), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 
5682, at *17, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010) (reasoning that the buyer “agreed to adopt” the 
debtor’s privacy policy and to “provide notice” to specified individuals and therefore a CPO was 
not needed). 
 299 FiLIP Sale Order, supra note 31, at 5. 
 300 Thomson, supra note 264, at 33. 
 301 RadioShack CPO Report, supra note 271, at 17. 
 302 Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1305, 1351–52, 1354 (2001) (describing state consumer protection statutes as “little FTC 
acts” and contending that “states bas[ing] their interpretations on the FTC Act plays out in a num-
ber of ways,” but acknowledging that there is variation in the language of each state statute); see 
infra notes 312–333 and accompanying text. Commentators have suggested, however, that state 
consumer protection statutes may give more protection to consumers in certain instances, particu-
larly because some statutes permit a private cause of action. Spencer Weber Waller et al., Con-
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tionally, by declining to appoint a CPO, courts may fail to effectively evalu-
ate the “implementation of an acceptable consent process and data-
disposition plan.”303 
Fourth, the appointment of a CPO does not always mean that consum-
er data will be sufficiently protected. CPOs may recommend that the buyer 
of consumer data comply with the debtor’s existing privacy policy as a con-
dition of the sale.304 This may be why the courts discussed above fail to ap-
point CPOs when the purchaser agrees to be bound by prior privacy poli-
cies. This recommendation appears to originate from the FTC’s proposed 
Toysmart settlement agreement discussed below in Part II.B.305 However, 
this recommendation fails to address potential deficiencies in the underlying 
privacy policy that may allow the disclosure of the consumer data for mone-
tization or assignment purposes. CPOs recommend, and courts typically 
require, that the purchaser of the debtor’s database obtain consumer consent 
to change the terms of the debtor’s existing privacy policy.306 Amendments 
to the existing debtor privacy policy by the buyer of the debtor’s assets may 
be beneficial to consumers when the buyer imposes consumer-friendly re-
strictions on the monetization or assignment of the data. However, unless 
the court orders otherwise, nothing prevents the buyer of the debtor’s con-
sumer data from amending the privacy policy after conclusion of the bank-
ruptcy to either claw back provisions restricting the disclosure of consumer 
data to third parties or include additional provisions that permit disclosure 
of data. If “affirmative consumer consent” to privacy policy amendments 
are obtained, these changes are likely permissible even if they are detri-
mental to consumer interests.307 Given studies that suggest that consumers 
do not read or understand contract terms and that companies exert signifi-
cant influence on consumers’ perceptions of acceptable data practices, rely-
ing solely on consumer consent to justify amendments to privacy policies 
may not sufficiently protect consumers. 
Additionally, rather than requiring consumers to affirmatively opt-in to 
having their data transferred to a buyer, in some instances CPOs have sug-
gested, and courts have permitted, consumer data to be transferred to a buy-
                                                                                                                           
sumer Protection in the United States: An Overview 20 (Jan. 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 303 Thomson, supra note 264, at 33. 
 304 RadioShack CPO Report, supra note 271, at 3–5. 
 305 See infra notes 312–321 and accompanying text. 
 306 RadioShack CPO Report, supra note 271, at 5 (recommending that the successful bidder 
obtain consumer consent for material amendments to the privacy policy); Thomson, supra note 
264, at 33. 
 307 RadioShack CPO Report, supra note 271, at 223. 
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er unless consumers opt-out.308 Consumers may also have only a short win-
dow of time to opt-out of having their data transferred to the buyer of the 
debtor’s assets after receiving any required notice.309 Adopting an “opt-out” 
approach to the buyer’s subsequent amendments to the debtor’s privacy pol-
icy also presents similar problems for consumers.310 
Lastly, the most important limitation of the BAPCPA is that it only ap-
plies when the debtor is in bankruptcy (in limited settings).311 Thus, the ad-
ditional safeguards that may be available under the BAPCPA, such as the 
appointment of a CPO, are not applicable when a secured party attempts to 
exercise its rights under Article 9 to foreclose on a customer database out-
side of the bankruptcy context. 
B. The FTCA & FTC Intervention 
The FTC has taken an active role in bankruptcy proceedings involving 
consumer data. In connection with the Toysmart bankruptcy, the FTC con-
tended that the company’s proposed sale of consumer data was inconsistent 
with its privacy policy and therefore violated the FTCA.312 The FTC’s pro-
posed settlement with Toysmart authorized the transfer of consumer data 
under certain conditions, including the requirement that the data buyer be 
“an entity that is in a related market.”313 Thus, in connection with the 
                                                                                                                           
 308 Id. at 6 (CPOs “have recommended, and Bankruptcy Courts have approved, the sale of 
[personally identifiable information (“PII”)] in contravention of a debtor’s existing privacy policy; 
provided that: . . . (iii) consumers are afforded notice of the proposed sale and given an opportuni-
ty to opt-out of the proposed transfer of PII”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The End of the (Virtual) 
World, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 90–91 (2009) (contending that “[i]n practice, the recommenda-
tions of the ombudsman tend toward three primary suggestions—that the sale be to a ‘qualified 
buyer’ who is in the industry of the debtor; that the buyer will serve as successor-in-interest to the 
debtor’s security and privacy policies; and that the customers be provided an opportunity to opt in 
or (more commonly) opt out of the proposed transfer”). 
 309 RadioShack CPO Report, supra note 271, at 3–4 (“The Successful Bidder agrees to notify 
customers of the Sale by: . . . [e]mailing, within sixty (60) days of the Closing, the subset of cus-
tomers whose email addresses are being acquired by the Successful Bidder. Such email should 
clearly and conspicuously advise such customers that: . . . their email addresses will be transferred 
to the Successful Bidder unless an opt-out request is received within seven (7) days . . . .”). 
 310 See Thomson, supra note 264, at 33 (noting that CPOs and courts have recommended that 
data buyers provide consumers with opt-out notice prior to implementing changes to the debtor’s 
privacy policy). 
 311 Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Signifi-
cant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603, 627 (2005) (noting that Bankruptcy Code “§ 332 requires appointment of a 
consumer privacy ombudsman only in the context of sales or leases under § 363(b)(1)”). 
 312 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 2–3, FTC v. 
Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00CV11341RGS (D. Mass. July 7, 2000), 2000 WL 34575569 [herein-
after Toysmart Complaint]. 
 313 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website, 
Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations, (Jul. 21, 2001), https://www.ftc.gov/
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Toysmart bankruptcy, the FTC set forth specific limitations for buyers of 
consumer data in the bankruptcy setting. The FTC reaffirmed these condi-
tions in the RadioShack bankruptcy.314 As mentioned earlier, these condi-
tions have been used by CPOs and bankruptcy courts in subsequent pro-
ceedings involving the transfer of consumer data.315 However, in many in-
stances, some companies have attempted to carve out the application of 
some of these conditions by specifically providing in their privacy policies 
that a consumer’s data may be sold to a third party that is not “in the same 
line of business” as the company in a piecemeal manner.316 
The FTCA proscribes “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or af-
fecting commerce.”317 The FTC has highlighted three elements that are cen-
tral to deception cases.318 Amongst these elements is the requirement that 
                                                                                                                           
news-events/press-releases/2000/07/ftc-announces-settlement-bankrupt-website-toysmartcom-
regarding [https://perma.cc/4U6J-D6CG]; Citron, supra note 39, at 783 (discussing state attorneys 
general objections to the proposed settlement agreement and contending that “[t]he settlement was 
never approved, and consumers’ data was destroyed”); Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 794 
(discussing the proposed Toysmart settlement and contending that ultimately “Toysmart withdrew 
the database from the sale . . . . [and] Disney later agreed to buy and destroy the list, ending the 
case.”). 
 314 FTC Press Release, supra note 313; see Letter from Jessica L. Rich, Dir., Bureau Consumer 
Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Elise Frejka, Consumer Privacy Ombudsman for In re RadioShack 
Corporation, No. 15-10197 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. May 16, 2015) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/643291/150518radioshackletter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CA34-DL7D]) (“Toysmart is instructive on this point. There, the Commission 
entered into a settlement with the company allowing the transfer of customer information under 
certain limited circumstances: 1) the buyer had to agree not to sell customer information as a 
standalone asset, but instead to sell it as part of a larger group of assets, including trademarks and 
online content; 2) the buyer had to be an entity that concentrated its business in the family com-
merce market, involving the areas of education, toys, learning, home and/or instruction (i.e., the 
same line of business that Toysmart had been in); 3) the buyer had to agree to treat the personal 
information in accordance with the terms of Toysmart’s privacy policy; and 4) the buyer had to 
agree to seek affirmative consent before making any changes to the policy that affected infor-
mation gathered under the Toysmart policy.”). 
 315 See, e.g., Gander CPO Report, supra note 82; RadioShack CPO Report, supra note 271. 
 316 Privacy Policy, A.O. SMITH CORP., https://www.aosmith.com/Privacy-Policy/ [https://
perma.cc/PSX2-DTUN] (“If we or any part of our group is sold, or some of its assets transferred to a 
third party, your personal information, as an asset, may also be transferred to the acquirer, even if 
they are not in the same line of business as us. Our customer database could be sold separately from 
the rest of the business, in whole or in a number of parts . . . . However, use of your personal infor-
mation will remain subject to this Privacy Policy. Similarly, your personal information may be 
passed on to a successor in interest in the unlikely event of a liquidation, bankruptcy or administra-
tion.”); Privacy, MARRIOTT VACATION CLUB, https://www.marriottvacationclubme.com/en/privacy.
shtml [https://perma.cc/88VN-MQXG] (“[Y]our personal information may be passed on to a succes-
sor in interest in the event of a reorganization, reconstruction, liquidation, bankruptcy or administra-
tion. It may be that any buyer or successor buys all or only part of our business. It may also be the 
case that they are not in the same line of business as us.”). 
 317 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 318 Letter from James C. Miller, III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Honorable John D. 
Dingell, Chairman, Comm. Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), 
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“there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mis-
lead the consumer.”319 Scholars have observed that “[m]uch of the FTC’s 
privacy jurisprudence is based upon a deception theory of broken promis-
es.”320 With respect to privacy policies, a company’s failure to provide con-
sumers with sufficient notice of its data collection practices, as well as the 
company’s failure to live up to privacy related promises, may be deemed to 
be deceptive, as illustrated by the allegations in the FTC’s complaint against 
Toysmart.321 
The FTC’s approach to its deception authority evidences its approval of 
the notice and choice principle. The FTC has also supported the use of the 
notice and choice principle in the IoT setting.322 The agency has played an 
instrumental role in safeguarding consumer privacy and it is important to 
acknowledge that the FTC is not limited to exercising only its deception au-
thority. However, to the extent that the agency’s deception enforcement ac-
tions rely on the sufficiency of notice to consumers of the terms of a compa-
ny’s privacy policy, as well as representations made in privacy policies, FTC 
action in this area suffers from the same problems seen in BAPCPA determi-
nations.323 It may be difficult to provide notice of a company’s terms and 
conditions and privacy policy to consumers in the IoT setting because many 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9VD6-8R9Z] (Those three elements are: (1) “a representation, omission or prac-
tice that is likely to mislead the consumer,” (2) “a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstanc-
es,” and (3) “the representation, omission, or practice must be a ‘material’ one.”). 
 319 Id. 
 320 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 93, at 628. Commentators have also noted that “[t]he FTC 
has developed a theory of deception that not only includes broken promises of privacy and securi-
ty, but also a general theory of deception in obtaining personal information and deception due to 
insufficient notice of privacy-invasive activities.” Id.; see also Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting 
Chair, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Fed. Commc’ns Bar Ass’n Luncheon: Painting the Priva-
cy Landscape: Informational Injury in FTC Privacy and Data Security Cases (Sept. 19, 2017) (on 
file with the FTC) (“We bring many of our privacy and data security cases under our deception 
authority . . . . In such cases, the complaint alleges that a company misled consumers through 
material claims about a product or services’s [sic] privacy or security features.”). 
 321 Toysmart Complaint, supra note 312, at 2–3 (“[D]efendant Toysmart . . . represented that 
it would ‘never’ disclose, sell, or offer for sale customers’ or registered members’ personal infor-
mation to third parties . . . . [but the company] has disclosed, sold, or offered for sale its customer 
lists and profiles . . . . [and] [t]herefore, the representation . . . was, and is, a deceptive practice.”); 
see Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2235 (2015) (“When companies . . . failed to live up to [promises 
voluntarily made in their privacy policies], the FTC claimed that this was a deceptive trade prac-
tice.”). 
 322 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD (2015) [hereinafter FTC IOT REPORT], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/
150127iotrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YVR-ZVJJ] (the “staff believes that providing notice and 
choice remains important” in the IoT setting). 
 323 See supra notes 275–311 and accompanying text. 
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IoT devices lack an interface. Further, relying on the adequacy of the notice 
provided, the promises made by companies in their privacy policies, and con-
sumer consent to validate data collection practices and determine the level of 
protection that should be given to consumer information is problematic for 
several reasons (some of which have been previously noted). 
Privacy scholars have frequently critiqued the effectiveness of the no-
tice and choice model.324 Notice and choice presumes that consumers will 
seek out the terms of privacy policies, pay attention to companies’ notices, 
read and understand privacy policies, and consistently make rational choic-
es about the costs and benefits of disclosing their data. The results of one 
study on consumers and privacy policies, indicate that consumers “per-
ceive[] the privacy notice as offering greater protections than the actual pri-
vacy notice.”325 
Scholars suggest that the FTC has indicated that it will attempt to fo-
cus more on consumer expectations and the nature of consumers’ entire 
dealings with a company rather than primarily on the language contained in 
a company’s privacy policy or promises made by the company to consum-
ers.326 However, a focus on the expectations of the reasonable consumer 
may be insufficient as the privacy and security expectations of the average 
consumer may be low even if consumers are unhappy about the collection, 
transfer, and disclosure of their data.327 Companies’ use of social “shaming 
and blaming” techniques may engender low consumer privacy expecta-
                                                                                                                           
 324 See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUM-
ER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 341, 341 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) 
(contending that the Fair Information Practice Principles “have increasingly been reduced to nar-
row, legalistic principles (e.g., notice, choice, access, security, and enforcement)” that have “prov-
en unsuccessful in practice”); Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical 
Investigation into How Complying with a Privacy Notice Is Related to Meeting Privacy Expecta-
tions Online, 34 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 210, 211 (2015) [hereinafter Martin, Tabula Rasa] 
(critiquing the effectiveness of the privacy notice and choice model and calling on “public policy 
makers and firms” to “avoid unnecessary and unintentional privacy violations caused by an over-
reliance on privacy notices.”); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544, 564 (2008) (critiquing the effec-
tiveness of the notice and choice model and discussing lack of consumer understanding of privacy 
policies); Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, DÆDALUS, Fall 2011, at 
32, 34–35 (“[T]here is considerable agreement that transparency-and-choice has failed . . . . I am 
not convinced that notice-and-consent, however refined, will result in better privacy online as long 
as it remains a procedural mechanism divorced from the particularities of relevant online activi-
ty.”). 
 325 Martin, Tabula Rasa, supra note 324, at 210. 
 326 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 93, at 667–72. 
 327 CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 123 
(2016) (noting that in deception cases “the interpretation of that act or practice is considered from 
the perspective of a reasonable consumer”); Elvy, supra note 92, at 1434. 
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tions.328 Indeed, the increasing frequency with which IoT devices are de-
signed to collect and use biometric and health-related data in the IoT setting 
may also negatively influence the privacy expectations of some consumers 
with respect to these types of data. Scholars have noted that the FTC “has 
not followed the empirical evidence [regarding consumers’ failure to read or 
understand privacy policies and ‘how consumers form their expectations’] 
to the fullest extent.”329 Furthermore, if a company’s privacy policy pro-
vides that biometric and health-related data can be sold or disclosed to third 
parties, it may be difficult to contend that a reasonable consumer has a 
“preexisting expectation” that the data that they provide to a company will 
not be provided to third parties. If a company has such a policy in place, 
and its privacy design and settings are not misleading, there is a strong ar-
gument that the sale of consumer data to third parties is in accordance with 
consumers’ expectations about how their information will be collected and 
used. 
Additionally, the acting chair of the FTC has noted that although “sub-
stantial injury isn’t a prong of the deception legal analysis, which focuses 
instead on materiality . . . regardless of the legal authority being used, the 
[FTC], as a matter of good governance, should always consider consumer 
injury in determining what cases to pursue.”330 Narrow definitions of con-
sumer injury that focus on traditional injuries, such as financial, health or 
safety harms, may not sufficiently account for intangible harms suffered by 
consumers as a result of “privacy and data security missteps.”331 
Even if a company has implemented effective security measures to 
prevent cybersecurity threats, the collection and subsequent assignment and 
potential disclosure to third parties via a sale or license of consumer IoT 
data may be a significant privacy intrusion, particularly when health-related 
and biometric data are involved. There is no meaningful choice provided to 
consumers regarding the collection of their data because privacy policies 
are provided on a “take it or leave it” basis via disclosures on a company’s 
                                                                                                                           
 328 Kim & Telman, supra note 94, at 736 (“Internet-based companies also use shaming and 
blaming to shape public opinion and normalize dubious practices.”). 
 329 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 93, at 667–68 (contending that the FTC’s deception authori-
ty should evolve to evaluate “the effect of particular practices on consumers with flawed assump-
tions and cognitive biases”). 
 330 Ohlhausen, supra note 320. 
 331 Allison Grande, Biz Groups Push FTC to Avoid ‘Theoretical’ Privacy Harms, LAW360 
(Nov. 1, 2017, 9:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/980724/biz-groups-push-ftc-to-avoid-
theoretical-privacy-harms [https://perma.cc/74AE-LU2P] (contending that the Acting Chair of the 
FTC has “repeatedly stress[ed] in recent remarks that her focus would be on concrete financial 
injury, health and safety injury, and broken privacy and data security promises”). But see Ohlhau-
sen, supra note 320 (suggesting that other types of consumer injuries may be relevant under the 
FTC’s authority, including “unwarranted intrusion injury” and “reputational injury”). 
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website.332 Over-reliance on consumer consent and notice of privacy prac-
tices, as well as on the express and implied promises in a company’s priva-
cy policy (or omissions made by the company) constrains efforts to protect 
consumer privacy. 
Given the expected value and importance of IoT data, it is always in a 
company’s best interest to include language in its privacy policy and other 
materials that authorize the transfer of customer data. One could contend 
that companies may be reticent to do so because they may fear alarming 
consumers. However, as discussed in Part I.B, companies continue to in-
clude such provisions in their privacy policies. In fact, some companies, 
such as Amazon, revised their privacy policies in the wake of the Toysmart 
bankruptcy to ensure that they could sell consumer data.333 Companies are 
using the excessive reliance on notice, consumer consent, and express or 
implied promises made by a company in its privacy policy or other materi-
als, to their advantage. 
C. Biometric Data Statutes 
While the general data breach and privacy law statutes of some states 
may apply to biometric data, Illinois, Texas, and Washington have adopted 
statutes that broadly, exclusively, and clearly address companies’ collection 
and use of biometric data.334 Efforts to adopt similar legislation in other 
states and to expand existing statutes in favor of consumers have been sig-
                                                                                                                           
 332 See supra notes 77–129 and accompanying text. 
 333 Daniel Solove, Going Bankrupt with Your Personal Data, TEACHPRIVACY: PRIVACY & 
SEC. BLOG (July 6, 2015), https://www.teachprivacy.com/going-bankrupt-with-your-personal-data 
[https://perma.cc/38N8-UECQ] (“The Toysmart case led Amazon.com to change its privacy poli-
cy” and include explicit language allowing for the sale of “customer information.”). 
 334 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 (West 2018); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 
(West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010 (West 2017); Roberg-Perez, supra note 12, at 
61–64 (discussing proposed biometric data legislation in Alaska, Montana, Connecticut and New 
Hampshire and adopted legislation in Wisconsin and Massachusetts that require notification of 
data breaches). Wisconsin’s “unauthorized acquisition of personal information” statute includes 
biometric data in the definition of personal information. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2017). 
Other state statutes may also regulate limited aspects of biometric data collection in certain in-
stances. For instance, a California statute addresses “recordings of spoken word collected through 
the operation of a voice recognition feature by the manufacturer of a connected television for the 
purpose of improving the voice recognition feature.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22948.20(B) 
(West 2017) (restricting the use of voice recordings collected from a “connected television” for 
advertisement purposes). Roberg-Perez contends that in addition to state statutes, federal laws, 
such as the “Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) [which] prohibits discrimination 
in insurance and employment based on genetic information,” and the “Federal Privacy Act 
[which] restricts access to—and disclosure of—any individual biometric data that is contained 
within federal records,” could also regulate the collection and use of biometric data “depending on 
the nature of the biometric data, and the context in which the data is collected, used and stored 
. . . .” Roberg-Perez, supra note 12, at 63. 
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nificantly curtailed by companies’ lobbying efforts.335 Washington’s 2017 
biometric data statute was enacted only after being significantly weak-
ened.336 Companies may be subject to fewer restrictions regarding the col-
lection, sale and use of biometric data in states that do not have legislation 
unambiguously addressing this issue. 
The Texas statute proscribes the collection of biometric identifiers for 
“commercial purpose[s]” unless a consumer is provided with prior notice 
and consents to the capture of biometric information.337 Monetizations 
(such as sales and leases) and disclosures of biometric identifiers are per-
missible in limited circumstances.338 These instances include if the consum-
er consents to the disclosure “for identification purposes in the event of . . . 
disappearance or death,” the biometric identifiers are disclosed in connec-
tion with a financial transaction requested or approved by the consumer, or 
if the disclosure is “required or permitted” by state or federal statutes or 
made to law enforcement agencies pursuant to a warrant.339 The statute also 
obligates companies to exercise reasonable care in connection with their use 
of biometric data and generally requires the destruction of the data within 
one year of collection.340 
The Washington statute requires companies to either provide notice and 
obtain consent, or implement mechanisms to prohibit later commercial uses 
prior to collecting and storing a “biometric identifier in a database for a com-
mercial purpose.”341 Notably, the Washington statute specifically excludes 
from the definition of biometric identifiers “physical or digital photograph[s], 
video[s] or audio recording[s] or data generated therefrom.”342 The Washing-
ton statute adopts a “business-friendly” position by excluding digital photo-
graphs and audio recordings that can be transformed into biometric identifi-
                                                                                                                           
 335 FACEBOOK BIOMETRIC DATA, supra note 137, at 7–8 (discussing Facebook’s, Google’s 
and Verizon’s successful “hidden lobbying” efforts to block the adoption and expansion of bio-
metric data statutes in various states). 
 336 Id. (noting the limitations of the Washington statute). 
 337 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b). Biometric identifiers are defined as “a retina 
or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry.” Id. § 503.001(a). 
 338 Id. § 503.001(c). 
 339 Id. § 503.001(c)(1). 
 340 Id. § 503.001(c)(2)–(3). 
 341 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010 (West 2017) (defining commercial purpose “[as] a 
purpose in furtherance of the sale or disclosure to a third party of a biometric identifier for the 
purpose of marketing of goods or services when such goods or services are unrelated to the initial 
transaction in which a person first gains possession of an individual’s biometric identifier,” but not 
including “a security or law enforcement purpose”). The granting of a security interest in a cus-
tomer database containing biometric data, may not qualify as a commercial purpose and to the 
extent that the statute’s requirements are limited to “commercial purposes,” they may not be ap-
plicable to secured transactions. See id. 
 342 Id. 
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ers, such as face and voice prints, that could be used to identify consumers.343 
In contrast, under the Illinois statute (discussed below), consumers have sued 
several companies including Google, Shutterfly, and Facebook for collecting 
biometric data gleaned from digital pictures.344 With respect to the sale, lease, 
and disclosure of biometric identifiers, the Washington statute permits these 
activities if “consent has been obtained from the individual”345 or “an enu-
merated exception” applies.346 There are several enumerated exceptions, in-
cluding “complying with a court order.”347 Another exception is obtaining an 
unaffiliated party’s contractual promise to refrain from subsequent disclosures 
of the data and enrolling the data in a “database for a commercial purpose 
inconsistent with the notice and consent” rules described in the statute.348 To 
the extent that companies use a consumer’s biometric identifier for “a secu-
rity purpose,” they need not provide notice or obtain consent.349 The statute 
requires companies using biometric identifiers for commercial purposes to 
exercise “reasonable care” in securing the data.350 Retention limits are also 
imposed on companies using biometric identifiers.351 Additionally, the statute 
                                                                                                                           
 343 Allison Grande, Wash. Expands Biometric Privacy Quilt with More Limited Law, LAW360 
(July 21, 2017, 7:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/934030/print?section=consumerprotection 
[https://perma.cc/E3GD-A3C8] (contending that “Washington deviates sharply from Illinois by 
omitting hotly contested provisions that businesses argue expose them to heightened legal liabil-
ity, notably the right of consumers to sue and for companies to be held accountable for the collec-
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 344 Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149604, at *13–14 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) (denying Shutterfly’s motion to dismiss and reasoning that “advances in 
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Supp. 3d 1088, 1095, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (denying Google’s motion to dismiss, rejecting 
Google’s argument that by excluding photographs from the definition of biometric data the Illinois 
statute covers only facial scans “done in person” and reasoning that the statute does not “support 
this interpretation” as it does not address “how the biometric measurements must be obtained”); 
Gullen v. Facebook.com, Inc., No. 15 C 7681, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6958, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
21, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim of violations of the Illinois statute based on biometric data 
collected from digital photographs for lack of jurisdiction); Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. 
Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and reasoning that 
given the Illinois statute’s definitions of “biometric identifier” and “biometric information,” plain-
tiff “plausibly stated a claim” by alleging that “defendants are using his personal face pattern to 
recognize and identify [him] in photographs posted to Websites,” among other things). 
 345 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020(3) (West 2017). 
 346 Kay & McHugh, supra note 27; see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020(3)(a)–(f). 
 347 Kay & McHugh, supra note 27. 
 348 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020(3)(c). 
 349 Id. § 19.375.020(7). 
 350 Id. § 19.375.020(4)(a). 
 351 Id. § 19.375.020(4) (“A person who knowingly possesses a biometric identifier of an indi-
vidual that has been enrolled for a commercial purpose: . . . (b) [m]ay retain the biometric identifi-
er no longer than is reasonably necessary to: (i) [c]omply with a court order, statute, or public 
records retention schedule specified under federal, state, or local law; (ii) [p]rotect against or pre-
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prohibits companies that have obtained biometric identifiers from using or 
disclosing “it in a manner that is materially inconsistent with the terms under 
which the biometric identifier was originally provided without obtaining con-
sent for the new terms of use or disclosure.”352 
The Illinois statute prohibits sales and leases of biometric data, and ob-
ligates private entities that collect biometric data to provide a “written poli-
cy” detailing a data retention and destruction schedule.353 Unlike the Texas 
and Washington statutes, which impose only general requirements of notice 
and consent,354 the Illinois statute contains specific conditions that must be 
                                                                                                                           
vent actual or potential fraud, criminal activity, claims, security threats, or liability; and (iii) 
[p]rovide the services for which the biometric identifier was enrolled.”). 
 352 Id. § 19.375.020(5). 
 353 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(a)–(b) (West 2018) (“(a) A private entity in possession 
of biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy, made available to 
the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric 
identifiers and biometric information[,] . . . . [and] (c) [n]o private entity in possession of a bio-
metric identifier or biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise profit from a per-
son’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information.”). Biometric identifier is de-
fined as “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry,” and bio-
metric information includes “any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, 
or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” Id. 14/10. 
In some instances, even if a company has failed to comply with the disclosure and retention re-
quirements of the Illinois statute, standing issues may prove challenging to consumer claims. In 
2017, in Vigil v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that by failing to “pro-
vide a retention schedule” or data destruction information for their biometric data and obtain their 
consent in writing, the company violated the requirements of the Illinois statute. 235 F. Supp. 3d 
499, 506–07 (S.D.N.Y 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, Santana v. Take-Two Interactive 
Software, Inc., No. 17-303, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2017). The district 
court labeled the plaintiffs’ allegations as mere “technical violations” of the Illinois statute. Id. at 
515. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the company’s practices “result-
ed in any imminent risk that the data protection goal of the [Illinois statute] would be frustrated” 
and, “[c]onsequently, more extensive notice and consent could not have altered the standing equa-
tion because there ha[d] been no material risk of harm to a concrete . . . interest [under the Illinois 
statute] that more extensive notice and consent would have avoided.” Id. at 513. But see Monroy, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149604, at *23 n.5 (finding that plaintiff “alleged a sufficient injury-in-
fact for Article III purposes” because unlike the plaintiffs in Vigil who “voluntarily provided their 
biometric data,” the plaintiff was not aware that his biometric data was collected by Shutterfly, 
which is a sufficient allegation of “invasion of privacy” and is more than a mere “procedural or 
technical violation” of the Illinois statute). The court’s rationale in Monroy suggests that whether 
the consumers voluntarily provided their biometric data or consented to the collection of their data 
can influence the standing analysis. This is particularly concerning in light of the limitations of 
relying on consumer consent to justify data collection and use practices as discussed in Part I.B of 
this Article. 
 354 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b) (West 2017) (“(b) A person may not capture 
a biometric identifier of an individual for a commercial purpose unless the person: (1) informs the 
individual before capturing the biometric identifier; and (2) receives the individual’s consent to 
capture the biometric identifier.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020 (West 2017) (“(1) A 
person may not enroll a biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose, without first 
providing notice, obtaining consent, or providing a mechanism to prevent the subsequent use of a 
biometric identifier for a commercial purpose. (2) Notice is a disclosure, that is not considered 
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satisfied for effective consumer consent to biometric data collection.355 For 
instance, under the Illinois statute not only must an individual consent prior 
to collection, but the individual must be informed “in writing of the specific 
purpose” for which the data are being “collected, stored and used,” and “a 
written release executed by” the consumer must be obtained.356 If these re-
quirements are not satisfied, a company may not “collect, capture, purchase, 
receive through trade, or otherwise obtain” the data.357 In contrast to the 
Texas and Washington statutes, the Illinois statute gives aggrieved consum-
ers a right of action for statutory violations.358 
All three statutes address the monetization of biometric data. However, 
the statutes do not explicitly reference the creation of security interests in 
biometric data, databases containing such data, or the transfer of biometric 
data during bankruptcy proceedings or Article 9 foreclosure sales. Arguably, 
language in the statutes restricting the transfer, acquisition, and use of bio-
metric data could also apply to impact sales of the data (or databases con-
taining the data) to a third party in bankruptcy, to the extent that state law 
influences “property rights in bankruptcy” proceedings.359 This may create 
tensions with “bankruptcy law’s goal of maximizing the size of the estate 
available for distribution to creditors.”360 Bankruptcy case law suggests that 
“[w]hile state law creates the [property] right, federal law determines 
                                                                                                                           
affirmative consent, that is given through a procedure reasonably designed to be readily available 
to affected individuals. The exact notice and type of consent required to achieve compliance with 
subsection (1) of this section is context-dependent.”). 
 355 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15. 
 356 Id. 14/15(b). 
 357 Id. 14/15. 
 358 See id. 14/20 (“Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action 
. . . against an offending party.”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d) (“The attorney 
general may bring an action to recover the civil penalty.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.030 
(“This chapter may be enforced solely by the attorney general . . . .”). 
 359 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (“In the absence of any controlling federal 
law, ‘property’ and ‘interests in property’ are creatures of state law.”) (internal modifications 
omitted); In re Costas, 555 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 
U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (“The Code does not define ‘property’ or ‘an interest . . . in property.’ Rather, 
‘Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s es-
tate to state law . . . .’”); In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that although 
the Bankruptcy Code “defines property of the estate, we must look to state law to determine if a 
property right exists and to stake out its dimensions”); In re Terwilliger’s Catering Plus, Inc., 911 
F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 
1985)) (“While the nature and extent of the debtor’s interest are determined by state law once that 
determination is made, federal bankruptcy law dictates to what extent that interest is property of 
the estate.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Juliet M. Moringiello, A Tale of Two Codes: Ex-
amining § 522(F) of the Bankruptcy Code, § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Proper Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 863, 864 (2001) (contending the 
“[Bankruptcy] Code begs an answer to the question of whether state law or federal law defines 
property rights in bankruptcy”). 
 360 Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 789–90. 
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whether it is ‘property’ for purposes of the federal bankruptcy laws . . . .”361 
However, if a CPO is appointed in accordance with the BAPCPA in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding involving the potential transfer of biometric data, the 
CPO could evaluate whether the data transfer would violate the provisions 
of an applicable state biometric data statute. The issue of security interests 
is murkier. 
Article 9 also applies to transactions involving a “sale of accounts, 
chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes,” but not to a direct 
sale of general intangibles that are not payment intangibles.362 Of course, to 
the extent that a security interest is granted in a general intangible, Article 9 
will normally apply to the transaction.363 It is unclear whether the initial 
granting of a security interest in biometric data (or a database containing 
such data) qualifies as a commercial purpose, lease, or sale under these state 
biometric data statutes. However, a foreclosure of such collateral pursuant 
to Article 9 may effectuate a sale under these statutes even if the initial as-
signment does not. 
Recall that the Illinois statute prohibits the collection and “purchase” 
of biometric data unless specific consent requirements are satisfied.364 The 
term “purchase” is not defined in the definitions section of the statute, but 
under the UCC, the term “purchase” includes a security interest.365 To the 
extent that the term “purchase,” as used in the Illinois statute, includes the 
granting of a security interest, the statute’s restrictions would also apply to 
secured credit transactions. 
One could argue that language in the Illinois statute preventing a busi-
ness from “otherwise obtain[ing] a person’s or a customer’s biometric” data 
unless certain requirements are satisfied366 should also be interpreted to re-
                                                                                                                           
 361 In re Burgess, 234 B.R. 793, 797 (D. Nev. 1999). 
 362 U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) 
(“‘Payment Intangible’ is a subset of the definition of ‘general intangible.’ The sale of a payment 
intangible is subject to this Article.”); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-408 cmt. 4 (McKinney 2017) (“The 
only sales of general intangibles that create security interests are sales of payment intangibles.”); 
DAVID S. WILLENZIK, LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES: SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 11.26, Westlaw 
(database updated Dec. 2012) (“While UCC Article 9 applies to true sales of accounts, La UCC 
§ 9-102(1)(b), Article 9 does not apply to true sales or transfers of general intangibles.”). 
 363 U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 2 (“This result allows the creation, attachment, and perfection of a 
security interest in a general intangible, such as an agreement for the nonexclusive license of soft-
ware . . . .”); In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 766, 769–70 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(“[P]atent rights, tradename, customer lists, books and records and [the] right to manufacture or 
sell emergency beacons and related electronic equipment are general intangibles [under Article 
9].”); 2-29 COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE § 29.03, Lexis (database updated June 
2017) (describing “computer data and programming” as general intangibles). 
 364 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 (West 2018). 
 365 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29) (stating that the term “‘[p]urchase’ means taking by . . . security 
interest,” among other things). 
 366 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15. 
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fer to transactions involving security interests in data. The disclosure of bi-
ometric data to the secured party during due diligence, or subsequently as 
part of the secured party’s inspection or audit of the collateral, may also be 
subject to the statute’s requirements.367 Companies in need of financing 
may ultimately find new ways to permit lenders to verify the source and 
value of their customer databases without disclosing biometric data prior to 
obtaining consumer consent. Additionally, language in all three statutes re-
garding retention (and possible destruction) of biometric data after a speci-
fied period may severely impact the value of such data for secured credit 
purposes. The language in the Illinois statute expressly prohibiting the sale 
and lease of biometric data may also lead biometric databases to be viewed 
as less attractive assets for secured financing purposes. 
As previously mentioned, subject to one exception, the Texas statute 
authorizes the sale, lease, and disclosure of biometric data if a state or fed-
eral statute requires or permits the disclosure.368 In contrast, the Illinois 
statute does not authorize sales or leases, but permits disclosures of bio-
metric data in certain instances, such as when “State or federal law or a mu-
nicipal ordinance” requires the disclosure to be made.369 The Washington 
statute permits transfers and disclosures of biometric data if “required or 
expressly authorized” by statute.370 
Debtors are not required by Article 9 to enter into a secured transaction, 
and so any resulting disclosure or transfer of consumer biometric information 
is arguably not required by a state’s version of the UCC for purposes of the 
                                                                                                                           
 367 Id. 14/15(d) (“No private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or biometric infor-
mation may disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate a person’s or a customer’s biometric 
identifier or biometric information unless: (1) the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric 
information or the subject’s legally authorized representative consents to the disclosure or redis-
closure; (2) the disclosure or redisclosure completes a financial transaction requested or authorized 
by the subject of the biometric identifier or the biometric information or the subject’s legally au-
thorized representative; (3) the disclosure or redisclosure is required by State or federal law or 
municipal ordinance; or (4) the disclosure is required pursuant to a valid warrant or subpoena 
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.”). 
 368 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b)–(c) (West 2017) (“(b) A person who possess-
es a biometric identifier of an individual that is captured for a commercial purpose: (1) may not 
sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person unless: . . . [(c)(1)](C) 
the disclosure is required or permitted by a federal statute or by a state statute other than Chapter 
552, Government Code . . . .”). 
 369 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(d) (“No private entity in possession of a biometric 
identifier or biometric information may disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate a person’s 
or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information unless: . . . (3) the disclosure or re-
disclosure is required by State or federal law or municipal ordinance . . . .”). 
 370 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020(3) (West 2017) (“Unless consent has been obtained 
from the individual, a person who has enrolled an individual’s biometric identifier may not sell, 
lease, or otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person for a commercial purpose 
unless the disclosure: . . . (d) [i]s required or expressly authorized by a federal or state statute, or 
court order . . . .”). 
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Washington and Illinois statutes. On the other hand, once a security interest is 
created, Article 9 grants certain rights to secured parties, and arguably these 
provisions may authorize the disclosure and transfer of the debtor’s collateral, 
including customer databases containing biometric data. Because the Illinois 
statute contains an exception only for the disclosure (not the sale or lease) of 
biometric data under certain circumstances, such as when the consumer con-
sents, the ability of secured parties to foreclose on collateral involving bio-
metric data may also be restricted.371 In contrast, under the Texas statute, one 
could contend that Article 9 (as enacted by the state) is a statute that permits 
secured parties to receive an interest in and possibly obtain and dispose of the 
debtor’s collateral, and therefore the sale by, or disclosure of biometric data 
to, secured parties in accordance with Article 9 is permissible. This rationale 
could also be used to justify the sale of such data under the Bankruptcy Code. 
A secured party may not always want to sell or lease the collateral to 
third parties but could be interested in using the collateral in its own busi-
ness as permitted under Article 9. The language of the Texas statute may not 
deter secured parties from taking security interests in customer databases 
containing biometric data when the secured party is in the same line of 
business as the debtor or would like to operate the debtor’s business. In In-
formation Exchange Systems, Inc. v. First Bank National Ass’n, after de-
fault, an unaffiliated party that obtained its rights in the debtor’s collateral 
via assignment from the original lender, “strictly foreclosed the security 
interest[]” in the debtor’s collateral and then used the debtor’s assets to con-
duct its business operations.372 
Recall that the Illinois statute provides that to the extent that a compa-
ny is in possession of biometric data, it may not “sell, lease, trade, or other-
wise profit from” the data.373 Thus, unlike the Washington and Texas stat-
utes which authorize such activities when notice and consent is met, among 
other things, the Illinois statute’s prohibition on such activities may provide 
more protection to consumers. As noted above, with the exception of a sale 
that effectuates a foreclosure, collateral is not otherwise sold or leased when 
a traditional security interest is created.374 Arguably, a company obtains no 
“profit” from encumbering its collateral even though value is given as part 
of the transaction. It is unclear whether the language “otherwise profit 
from” was also intended to cover value transferred to the debtor as part of a 
secured financing transaction under Article 9. 
                                                                                                                           
 371 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15 (West 2018). 
 372 Info. Exch. Sys., Inc. v. First Bank Nat’l Ass’n, Nos. CIV. 4-91-902, CIV. 4-92-224, 1992 
WL 494607, at *1 (D. Minn. July 23, 1992), aff’d, 994 F.2d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 1993); see also 
Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 589–90 (discussing the Information Exchange case). 
 373 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(c). 
 374 See supra note 362–365 and accompanying text. 
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The statutes’ disclosure provisions may also apply to a company’s use 
of third-party service providers for data analytics, processing, and monitor-
ing purposes. Arguably, the language “otherwise profit from” in the Illinois 
statute could be interpreted as prohibiting the use of data analytics when 
biometric data are involved. Companies can profit from data analytics in 
many ways. Data analytics allows companies to gain insights into customer 
behavior, “[b]oost [j]ob [s]atisfaction” and “[i]mprove [s]ervice” to custom-
ers.375 However, other provisions of the Illinois statute suggest that if a con-
sumer consents to the disclosure of their biometric data to third-party ser-
vice providers, the disclosure may be permissible. 
In short, these biometric data statutes may authorize the disclosure or 
transfer of consumer data when consumer consent is received. The limitations 
of notice and choice are problematic, as discussed in earlier parts of this Arti-
cle, including because companies could ultimately influence consumers’ per-
ceptions about acceptable disclosures and uses of biometric data, and may 
exert pressure to normalize dubious biometric data disclosure and transfer 
practices.376 As a result, various aspects of these statutes suffer from similar 
defects found in other frameworks that also rely on a notice and choice model 
as the primary method of consumer protection. The statutory restrictions on 
the use of biometric data may also rely on the express terms of a company’s 
privacy policy as a means of safeguarding consumers, as evidenced by the 
Washington statute’s prohibition on subsequent materially inconsistent uses 
and disclosures in the absence of consumer authorization.377 If the terms ini-
tially provided by the company in connection with the collection of the data 
are drafted broadly to authorize various uses by the company, subsequent uses 
of the data (even for dubious purposes) may be permissible. Even terms that 
were narrowly drafted initially could be revised to authorize later disclosures 
and uses as long as consumer consent is received. Lastly, the status of security 
interests under these statutes is not entirely clear. 
D. HIPAA 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)378 
protects healthcare information when the data are collected by a health care 
                                                                                                                           
 375 Paul Rubens, 6 Ways to Profit from Data Analytics, ENTERPRISE APPS TODAY (Mar. 10, 
2016), http://www.enterpriseappstoday.com/business-intelligence/6-ways-to-profit-from-data-
analytics.html [https://perma.cc/7PSQ-XXKN]. 
 376 See supra notes 263–333 and accompanying text. 
 377 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020(5) (West 2017). 
 378 This section does not address state laws that may also impact health-related data but rather 
focuses on HIPAA, as such an assessment is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, as one 
scholar has noted, “state laws are varied and inconsistent, often providing piecemeal protection for 
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provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse, or the business associ-
ates of these entities.379 Organizations covered by HIPAA are required to 
comply with regulations regarding protected “health information.”380 
The collection and use of health-related data generated by IoT devices 
may not be governed by HIPAA.381 Many IoT companies do not qualify as 
“covered entities” because they are unlikely to provide “medical or health 
                                                                                                                           
some types of data but not others and these protections maybe scattered among multiple laws.” 
HOFFMAN, supra note 197, at 135. 
 379 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-8 (2012) (statutory authority); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3) (2017) 
(defining a “covered entity” as a “health plan,” “health care clearinghouse,” “health care provider 
who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered 
by this subchapter,” or “business associate of another covered entity”); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–.534 
(privacy rule); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–.318 (security rule); HOFFMAN, supra note 197, at 73 
(HIPAA “regulations define ‘covered entities’ as including health plans, health-care clearing 
houses, healthcare providers . . . and their business associates. Consequently, doctors, hospitals, 
pharmacists, health insurers, and HMOs must comply with the HIPAA privacy standards but not 
all parties possessing identifiable health data are covered.”); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, 
In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Infor-
mation, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 336 (2007) (The HIPAA “Security Rule is part of the larger HIPAA 
Privacy Rule established in the HIPAA privacy regulations promulgated pursuant to HIPAA’s 
statutory authority”); Stacey A. Tovino, Silence Is Golden . . . Except in Healthcare Philanthropy, 
48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1157, 1162 (2014) (“The original HIPAA statute clarified . . . that any priva-
cy regulations adopted by HHS must be made applicable only to three classes of individuals and 
institutions: (1) health plans; (2) health care clearinghouses; and (3) health care providers who 
transmit health information in electronic form in connection with certain standard transactions 
. . . .”). 
 380 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining health information as information that “[i]s created or 
received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, 
school or university, or health care clearinghouse . . . [that] relates to the . . . health or condition of 
an individual . . .”). The term “individually identifiable health information” is defined “as a subset 
of health information” and “protected health information” is defined as “individually identifiable 
health information.” Id. 
 381 FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 322, at 52 (noting that frequently “health apps are collecting 
[private patient information, such as their medical history,] through consumer-facing products, to 
which HIPAA protections do not apply”); Jillisa Bronfman, Weathering the Nest: Privacy Impli-
cations of Home Monitoring for the Aging American Population, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 192, 
201–02 (2016) (contending that “if the entity gathering health data is not a covered provider like a 
hospital or medical care provider, there is no protection from HIPAA”); Elizabeth A. Brown, The 
Fitbit Fault Line: Two Proposals to Protect Health and Fitness Data at Work, 16 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 24 (2016) (“When a Fitbit or iPhone app tells an employer how 
much an employee has exercised, what her heart rate is, or how high her blood sugar levels are, 
those data do not fall within the scope of HIPAA protection.”); Nissenbaum & Patterson, supra 
note 16, at 92 (“[H]ealth-self tracking information does not usually fall under the purview of 
HIPAA because the law is limited to discrete healthcare relationships, rather than health infor-
mation.”); Elizabeth Snell, How Do HIPAA Regulations Apply to Wearable Devices?, 
HEALTHITSECURITY (Mar. 23, 2017), http://healthitsecurity.com/news/how-do-hipaa-regulations-
apply-to-wearable-devices [https://perma.cc/5JMG-3RJB] (“[W]here a company that offers a weara-
ble, or a mobile app that collects health information, where that arrangement is just directly be-
tween the device maker and the individual. Or it’s between the app maker and the individual, and 
there’s no covered entity or business associate involved. Then there’s no application of HIPAA 
. . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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services,” health insurance plans, or process health care information in con-
nection with the sale of IoT devices and the provision of related services 
and software to consumers.382 The use of health-related data shared by con-
sumers who use IoT devices is likely to be governed mainly by the entities’ 
privacy policy. 
IoT companies also may not qualify as business associates under HIPAA 
regulation because they are unlikely to be hired to perform activities or ser-
vices, such as “claim processing, administration [and] data analysis,” in con-
nection with “protected health information” on behalf of HIPAA covered enti-
ties.383 If IoT companies begin to integrate their services and devices with the 
offerings of HIPAA covered entities and handle “protected health infor-
mation” on behalf of such entities, there would be a stronger argument for 
HIPAA compliance.384 
HIPAA regulation does not always restrict the use of health infor-
mation, and it permits covered entities to use and transfer certain health re-
lated information after receiving individual authorization.385 One scholar 
                                                                                                                           
 382 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining health care provider, health care clearing house, and 
insurance plan); see also FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 322, at 52; Nissenbaum & Patterson, supra 
note 16, at 92 (although under HIPAA “physicians or insurance plans are subject to restrictions 
regarding storage and distribution of their patients’ or customers’ health self-tracking data, com-
mercial actors and others who hold the same data are not”); MICHELLE DE MOOY, CTR. FOR DE-
MOCRACY & TECH, SHELTON YUEN, FITBIT, INC., TOWARD PRIVACY AWARE RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN WEARABLE HEALTH 8 (May 2016), https://cdt.org/files/2017/07/2016-05-17-
Fitbit-FNL1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG2B-96WQ] (“Some wearables involved in health and well-
ness collect and use sensitive personal health information, but because the data generated by them 
is [sic] created at the direction of the user, it is mostly outside of the disclosure restrictions and 
requirements found in [HIPAA] . . . .”). 
 383 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining business associate); id. § 164.502 (providing rules ap-
plicable to business associates); J. Frazee et al., mHealth and Unregulated Data: Is this Farewell 
to Patient Privacy?, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 385, 392 (2016) (contending that mobile health 
applications “that are consumer oriented manage user-generated information that is not HIPAA 
protected, such as the calories in one’s meal or the amount of steps one has taken on a given day,” 
and “[a]s long as [the mobile health] app does not deal in [protected health information] or com-
municate with a covered entity or business associate it is not subject to HIPAA”). 
 384 Press Release, Fitbit, Fitbit Extends Corporate Wellness Offering with HIPAA Compliant 
Capabilities (Sept. 16, 2015), https://investor.fitbit.com/press/press-releases/press-release-details/
2015/Fitbit-Extends-Corporate-Wellness-Offering-with-HIPAA-Compliant-Capabilities/default.
aspx [https://perma.cc/XD9E-R3P9] (describing Fitbit’s support of HIPAA compliance to enable 
“Fitbit Wellness to more effectively integrate with HIPAA-covered entities, including corporate 
wellness partners, health plans and self-insured employers”). 
 385 HOFFMAN, supra note 197, at 132 (“The HIPAA Privacy Rule generally prohibits disclo-
sure of individually identifiable health information without patient authorization, unless the infor-
mation is transmitted for purposes of treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.”); Beverly 
Cohen, Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell: Using HIPAA to Restrict Marketing Uses of Pa-
tients’ Private Medical Information, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1165, 1170 (2012) (suggest-
ing that individual authorization is needed prior to de-identifying protected health information 
when the purpose is for marketing and that “HIPAA’s primary marketing restriction is that when-
ever a covered entity uses or discloses protected health information for marketing purposes, the 
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notes that under HIPAA, “[a] covered entity must obtain consent to share 
[protected health information] if the entity sells the information for either 
direct or indirect compensation, or marketing.”386 Thus, the HIPAA regime 
also adopts a notice and consent model that allows covered entities, in some 
instances, to transfer consumer health-related data when consent is re-
ceived.387 Additionally, the HIPAA privacy rule “does not prohibit covered 
entities from disclosing deidentified data to third parties . . . .”388 Recall that 
de-identified data can be re-identified through the use of “powerful re-
identification algorithms.”389 Other scholars have noted that under HIPAA, 
“a patient’s right to restrict sharing of her data is quite limited.”390 
To the extent that HIPAA regulation permits disclosures and transfers 
to unaffiliated parties for non-research or non-healthcare purposes, and re-
lies excessively on a notice and consent model to regulate data disclosures, 
the HIPAA regime also suffers from similar limitations found in other pri-
vacy frameworks. Most concerning is the likely exclusion of IoT companies 
and much of the health-related data obtained from consumers’ use of IoT 
devices and services from HIPAA’s limited protections. In such instances, 
                                                                                                                           
individual must expressly authorize the use or disclosure”); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 4 (revised May 2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/
files/privacysummary.pdf?language=es [https://perma.cc/FPK4-XV3V] (“A covered entity may 
not use or disclose protected health information, except either: (1) as the Privacy Rule permits or 
requires; or (2) as the individual who is the subject of the information (or the individual’s personal 
representative) authorizes in writing.”). 
 386 Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Analytics in Health Care, 53 
AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 283 (2016); see 42 U.S.C. § 17935(d) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (“Prohibition 
on sale of electronic health records or protected health information” in the absence of individual 
consent subject to some exceptions); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (providing rules for use and disclosure 
of data by covered entities); 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (imposing consent requirements for the sale of 
protected health information and providing rules for the use and disclosure of health information 
for marketing purposes); see also Christopher R. Smith, Somebody’s Watching Me: Protecting 
Patient Privacy in Prescription Health Information, 36 VT. L. REV. 931, 950 (2012) (“[C]overed 
entities and business associates are prohibited from selling protected health information without 
patient authorization, except under certain circumstances.”). 
 387 Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History 19 (Apr. 10, 2017) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (contending that the “U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services relied upon FIPs in issuing a privacy rule under . . . [HIPAA],” and describing 
the origins and impact of FIPs on the U.S. privacy regime). “Notice/Awareness” and 
“Choice/Consent” are two of five “core principles” embodied in FIPs. Id. 
 388 HOFFMAN, supra note 197, at 132. 
 389 Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Myths and Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable 
Information,” COMM. ACM, June 2010, at 24, 25–26 (discussing the safe harbor provisions of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule and contending that “[t]he emergence of powerful re-identification algo-
rithms demonstrates not just a flaw in a specific anonymization technique(s), but the fundamental 
inadequacy of the entire privacy protection paradigm based on ‘de-identifying’ the data”); see 
supra notes 119–123, 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 390 Hiller, supra note 386, at 283. 
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protection of consumer IoT health-related data is primarily left to a compa-
ny’s privacy policy, unless another source of law regulates this information. 
IV. PATHS FORWARD 
The limitations of existing privacy frameworks that rely excessively on 
a notice and choice model and the terms of a company’s privacy policy, 
combined with the exponential growth and proliferation of new types of 
highly sensitive IoT consumer data, necessitate new discussions and solu-
tions on how best to ensure the protection of consumer privacy and data in 
the IoT setting. 
Admittedly, there may be numerous frameworks in need of revision in 
order to adequately safeguard consumers in the IoT setting. Commercial 
law is a productive place to begin this endeavor given the potential value of 
IoT data as a source of financing, the numerous bankruptcy proceedings 
involving consumer data, and the provisions of privacy policies that fre-
quently permit the disclosure of consumer data in commercial transactions. 
The statutory solutions proposed in this Part are not meant to suggest 
that Article 9 or the Bankruptcy Code alone can protect consumers from all 
harms associated with data transfers and disclosures or other issues related 
to privacy and data security. A comprehensive shift in the way companies 
view consumer data and design consumer products that collect data is also 
necessary. Consideration must also be given to monetizations of consumer 
IoT data that occur outside of the Article 9 and bankruptcy context, such as 
direct sales of consumer related data. Furthermore, simultaneous use of var-
ious “data protection models” that regulate the initial collection and subse-
quent distribution and transfer of consumer data as well as other types of 
permissible data uses, are needed in the IoT setting to sufficiently protect 
consumer interests.391 Lastly, consideration should also be given to whether 
                                                                                                                           
 391 See Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH 
MATRIX 65, 66 (2014) (discussing “health privacy exceptionalism” and noting that “while upstream 
data protection models limit data collection, downstream models primarily limit data distribution 
after collection”); Revised Statement of Commissioner Brill, in Which Chairman Leibowitz and 
Commissioners Rosch and Ramirez Join, In the Matter of SettlementOne Credit Corporation, In the 
Matter of ACRAnet, Inc., In the Matter of Fajilan and Associates, FTC File Nos. 082-3208, 098-
3088, 092-3089 (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/
110819settlementonestatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7WA-H9JN] (describing the “first cases in 
which the [FTC] has held resellers responsible for downstream data protection failures”). The Su-
preme Court’s anticipated decision in United States v. Carpenter may also impact privacy expecta-
tions and views about the collection and disclosure of data in certain settings. 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 
2016) (holding that “the government’s collection of business records containing cell-site [location] 
data was not a search under the Fourth Amendment”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017); Allison 
Grande, Privacy Fights to Watch at the Supreme Court, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2017, 11:59 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/969610/privacy-fights-to-watch-at-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/
3U5Z-67ZA] (discussing the implications of the Carpenter case). 
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amendments to HIPAA are necessary to address concerns regarding health-
related data collected by IoT devices. 
The remainder of this Part offers various proposals to engender move-
ment away from an overreliance on the notice and choice model and the 
terms of privacy policies and decrease the various moments of data disclo-
sures authorized by privacy policies and the financial frameworks of Article 
9 and the Bankruptcy Code. Reducing moments of data transfers and dis-
closures may alleviate and prevent some of the significant privacy viola-
tions and harms that can occur from the disclosure of highly-sensitive IoT 
consumer data via Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. 
A. Transfer & Assignment Restrictions 
As other scholars have argued, because of the “highly personal nature” 
of certain types of consumer data, some categories of personal information 
may be adequately protected only if the data are rendered inalienable.392 
Consumers may be unable to appreciate the dangers involved with the po-
tential assignment or sale of biometric and health-related data. Given the 
lack of consumer understanding of the risks associated with the disclosure 
of their data it is not surprising that “[t]he market for the sale of personal 
information is often inefficient . . . .”393 Consumers may not understand the 
applicable legal rules that permit disclosure of their data. Companies should 
not be permitted to exploit consumer ignorance about the value of their data. 
While some privacy policies may contain contractual restraints—for 
instance by limiting the parties to whom data can be transferred—privacy 
policies cannot be solely relied upon to protect consumer interests. Statuto-
ry restraints on the transfer of rights in consumer data assets will likely be 
necessary. 
The transfer and assignment restrictions proposed below do not pro-
hibit consumers from providing biometric or health-related data to compa-
nies, but rather focus on restricting companies’ subsequent assignment of 
rights in and transfer of such data pursuant to Article 9 and the Bankruptcy 
Code with the goal of “reducing their value and disincentivizing collec-
tion.”394 However, as noted earlier, restrictions on the initial data collection 
by companies and other types of consumer data uses, as well as the imposi-
tion of specific obligations on companies with respect to consumer data, 
may also be necessary to adequately protect consumer interests. Additional-
                                                                                                                           
 392 Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 847. 
 393 Id. 
 394 See Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data Protec-
tion, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 143, 152 (2017) [hereinafter Terry, Regulatory Dis-
ruption]. 
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ly, these restraints should not negatively impact the use of such data for re-
search or healthcare purposes. 
As other privacy scholars have noted, regulation aimed at protecting 
consumer privacy should consider “who is gathering the information, who 
is analyzing it, who is disseminating it and to whom [as well as] the nature 
of the information.”395 The transfer restrictions discussed in the remainder 
of this section focus on biometric and health-related data given their highly 
sensitive nature and the dangers associated with companies’ disclosure and 
transfer of same.396 Biometric data are generally immutable and, in this 
                                                                                                                           
 395 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV 119, 154 (2004). 
See generally Helen Nissenbaum, “Respect for Context”: Fulfilling The Promise of the White 
House Report, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 152, 161 (Marc 
Rotenberg et al., eds., 2015) (discussing contextual integrity and suggesting that “information 
flows [should] be characterized in terms of information types, actors, and transmission principles 
and evaluated in terms of the balance of interests and impacts on values and contextual aims”); 
Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 389, at 25 (critiquing the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s reliance on 
the term “personally identifiable information” and anonymization) (“The natural approach to pri-
vacy protection is to consider both the data and its proposed use(s) and to ask: What risk does an 
individual face if her data is used in a particular way? Unfortunately, existing privacy technologies 
such as k-anonymity focus instead on the data alone”). 
 396 One potential critique of imposing transfer and assignment restrictions is that such limita-
tions implicate First Amendment concerns given the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc. in 2011. 564 U.S. 552, 552–59 (2011) (holding that a Vermont statute that restricted 
specific entities’ ability to sell or use “prescriber-identifying information” for “marketing or pro-
moting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber consents . . . . impose[d] content- and speaker-
based burdens on protected expression [and was] subject to heightened judicial scrutiny”); see 
also Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 71 (2014) (contending that part of the 
Sorrell “opinion suggested that the restriction on transfers of data between willing givers and 
receivers was automatically a restriction of speech”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: 
Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 856 (2012) (suggesting that 
“hints” left by the Sorrell court may negatively impact the validity of rules aimed at protecting 
privacy). Although the impact of the holding in Sorrell is unclear and privacy scholars continue to 
debate its holding, restrictions on data usage and transfers may be constitutional even after Sorrell. 
See Bambauer, supra, at 64 (“Although the First Amendment creates a barrier to the enforcement 
of new and existing information laws, that barrier is not insurmountable.”). Furthermore, one 
scholar notes that “[a]lthough the Court [in Sorrell] hinted that the sale of a database might be 
speech, the Court stopped short of that sweeping conclusion because the regulation’s discrimina-
tion against marketers was a content- and viewpoint-based restriction.” Neil Richards, Why Data 
Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1506, 1521–24 (2015) 
(contending that the Sorrell decision does not upset the well-established understanding that “gen-
eral commercial regulation of the huge data trade [is] not censorship”). The Vermont statute at 
issue failed to “regulate enough” speech as it “discriminated against particular kinds of protected 
speech (in-person advertising) and particular kinds of protected speakers (advertisers but not their 
opponents).” Id. at 1501, 1506; see Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 580 (stating that “the State has left unbur-
dened those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views”). Furthermore, rather than 
directly regulating the disclosure of consumer data, the Vermont statute in Sorrell appears to have 
been aimed at decreasing drug prices and protecting doctors’ prescribing information to curb the 
impact of data brokers on doctors’ prescription decisions. Richards, supra, at 1518. Post-Sorrell, 
some federal courts have declined to adopt an expansive view of the case’s holding, and at least 
one court has upheld a statute restricting the transfer and disclosure of consumer information. See, 
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way, share some characteristics with other parts of the body that our society 
has determined should not be sold.397 Other types of traditional data that are 
not alterable by consumers could also be viewed as immutable. As more 
disruptive technological developments arise, proactive diligence in thinking 
through the scope of rights in IoT data will be needed. There may ultimately 
come a time when certain types of data and information about an individual 
becomes indistinguishable from personhood. 
As IoT technology evolves, additional restraints on transfers may be 
necessary for other types of highly sensitive IoT data as well, such as in-
formation about consumers that is embarrassing, intimate, or that may nega-
tively impact a person’s reputation.398 Consider that self-driving cars can 
                                                                                                                           
e.g., Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 427, 435, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (apply-
ing Sorrell and rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a Michigan statute that prohibited indi-
viduals “engaged in the business of selling at retail, renting, or lending books or other written 
materials, sound recordings, or video recordings” from “disclos[ing] to any person, other than the 
customer, information” that could identify consumers); King v. General Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. 
Supp. 2d 303, 308–09 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to 1681(c) of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act and reasoning that “the Sorrell Court did not take issue with Vermont’s 
law merely because it imposed a content- and speaker-based restriction on commercial speech, but 
because its restriction could not be justified on neutral grounds . . . [and post-Sorrell,] the typical 
commercial speech inquiry under intermediate scrutiny of [the Central Hudson test] remains valid 
law”). The Boelter court reasoned that the Michigan statute at issue “indiscriminately” restricted 
“the group of individuals most likely to reveal consumer identifying information,” in contrast to 
the Vermont statute at issue in Sorrell, that was “targeted at certain speakers who were but a mi-
nority of those able to acquire or use the protected information.” Boelter, 192 F. Supp. at 450. The 
Boelter decision suggests that even post-Sorrell, courts may be willing to uphold legislation aimed 
at protecting consumer privacy. Id. at 446 (stating that “Michigan [should] be afforded greater 
leeway in regulating the dissemination of consumer data”). Moreover, the Sorrell court acknowl-
edged that “content-based restrictions on [commercial speech] are sometimes permissible,” and 
that “the government’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms’ ex-
plains ‘why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncom-
mercial speech.’” Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 579. Like the Michigan statute in Boelter, the restrictions 
proposed in this Article are aimed at protecting the privacy of consumers. See Boelter, 192 F. 
Supp. 3d at 435. Given the “volume, velocity and variety of data” generated by the IoT, there is a 
substantial governmental interest in protecting the privacy of consumers in the IoT setting. See 
supra notes 11–13, 49 and accompanying text. A reasonable fit likely exists between regulation 
that prohibits and restricts the dissemination of highly sensitive consumer data and advances the 
substantial interest of protecting consumer privacy (consumer protection). Lastly, to the extent that 
the restrictions proposed in this Article can be viewed as prohibiting consumers from granting 
companies rights in their data for purposes of assignments and sales in the bankruptcy and Article 
9 contexts or “waiving their privacy rights” in connection with such transactions, one could con-
tend that any such adopted legislation is grounded in contract law and therefore avoids First 
Amendment concerns. Richards, First Amendment, supra note 221, at 1204 (“Instances of contrac-
tual commercial regulation are well outside the scope of the First Amendment.”). 
 397 Cf. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for 
any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable 
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”). 
 398 Additionally, one could posit that to the extent that IoT data are an asset under financial 
frameworks, companies that provide IoT products should not be permitted to reap all of the profits 
or benefits generated from such data to the exclusion of consumers. Continuing that line of argu-
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identify how many people are inside a vehicle and “what they are doing.”399 
This information could also be viewed as highly sensitive and in need of 
protection. 
To give effect to restrictions that would limit the disclosures and trans-
fers authorized by privacy policies and financial frameworks, separate state 
statutes and amendments to Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code could be 
adopted. 
1. Separate State Statutes 
State statutes, to the extent that they do not already, could require ex-
plicit consumer consent for the creation of security interests in health-
related or biometric data (or databases storing such data). Alternatively, 
state statutes could specifically prohibit companies’ assignment of rights in, 
or a transfer of, biometric and health-related data or databases containing 
these data regardless of receipt of consumer consent.400 The latter solution 
is preferable in light of earlier discussions regarding the limits of consumer 
consent and could broadly apply to various types of monetizations.401 
Section 9-201 provides that agreements that are governed by Article 9 
can also be subject to laws that provide distinct rules for consumers (e.g. con-
sumer protection statutes) and any such laws control in the event of a conflict 
with Article 9.402 The state statutes proposed above restricting the transfer and 
                                                                                                                           
ment, the provision of IoT services and goods should not be the point at which a monopoly on the 
data is conferred to companies. One could also contend that when a consumer is a high-value data 
generator, consumers should be able to monetize their own data in some instances. Companies, 
such as Datacoup, are in the business of providing financial compensation directly to consumers 
who provide their data. See generally Elvy, supra note 92 (discussing personal data economy 
companies, such as Datacoup). Although this Article does not contend that biometric data or other 
types of IoT consumer data should never be collected, there are potential concerns with permitting 
certain types of IoT data to be freely transferred and monetized by companies. The transfer or 
disclosure of such data by consumers also presents similar concerns. Id. (discussing concerns 
associated with personal data economy models). 
 399 Devin Coldewey, In-Car Cameras Let Autonomous Vehicles Track Passengers as Well as 
Pedestrians, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 1, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/01/in-car-cameras-let-
autonomous-vehicles-track-passengers-as-well-as-pedestrians/ [https://perma.cc/PUK4-Z83X]; Ed-
ward Niedermeyer, Your Tesla Is Watching You—Whether or Not You’re Watching the Road, 
QUARTZ (Aug. 17, 2016), https://qz.com/759896/your-tesla-is-watching-you-whether-or-not-youre-
watching-the-road/ [https://perma.cc/A9QE-56SZ]. 
 400 A federal statute addressing this issue may be preferable. 
 401 See supra notes 94–129 and accompanying text. 
 402 See U.C.C. § 9-201(b)–(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); In re Howard v. 
AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., 597 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Article 9 of the UCC states that 
transactions governed by it are subject to statutes that establish ‘a different rule for consumers,’ 
. . . which in Illinois includes the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act.”); In re Visnicky, 
401 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2009) (“‘[T]he most important provisions in Article 9 are found in 
Rev. UCC 9-201, which defers to any consumer protection legislation of the enacting state in 
conflict with the UCC.’”); Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)Use of State Law in Bankruptcy: The 
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assignment of rights in consumer generated data could be viewed as consum-
er protection legislation, and one could contend that Article 9’s provisions 
must defer to any such legislation in accordance with section 9-201. Howev-
er, consumers are unlikely to be directly involved in a transaction between the 
debtor company and the secured lender even though consumer generated data 
may be at issue.403 Further, given the provisions of Article 9, which will be 
discussed in detail below, that negate statutory and contractual attempts to 
restrict the creation of a security interest in certain types of collateral, revi-
sions to Article 9 may still be necessary even if separate state statutes are 
adopted. Such revisions to Article 9 could promote consistency across all re-
lated state statutes, including Article 9, clarify whether Article 9’s anti-
assignment provisions supersede the assignment and transfer restrictions con-
tained in any such state statutes, and to the extent that 9-201 is applicable, 
avoid disputes about whether the state statute conflicts with Article 9.404 
2. Article 9 Amendments 
Article 9 could be amended to include assignment restrictions on con-
sumer data. It could provide that even if a consumer consented to a privacy 
policy that contained provisions permitting the transfer or disclosure of such 
data as part of a secured financing transaction subject to Article 9, the se-
cured party and other unaffiliated entities are prevented from obtaining the 
biometric or health-related data. By focusing on biometric and health-
related data, the proposed Article 9 amendments discussed below attempt to 
                                                                                                                           
Hanging Paragraph Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 963, 979 & n.76 (“Although the UCC includes 
some sections that may appear to be protective of consumers, it expressly yields to consumer pro-
tection statutes.”). By its language, section 9-201(b)’s provisions are also subject to state variation 
and can include specific references to state consumer protection statutes as well as “any other 
statute or regulation that regulates the rates, charges, agreements, and practices for loans, credit 
sales, or other extensions of credit.” U.C.C. § 9-201(b). 
 403 See RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 145–46 (“[A] secured party enforcing its secu-
rity interest against a consumer must also comply with whatever consumer-protection laws might 
be applicable.”). But see Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of Dequeen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 
637 (Tex. 2010) (rejecting an argument that a state statute provides a separate rule for consumers 
because a consumer was involved in the transaction and reasoning that “the UCC does not address 
individual transactions undertaken by consumers,” but instead “addresses rules of law, statutes, 
and regulations that apply broadly”). 
 404 Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 325 S.W.3d at 637–39 (finding that the state lottery statute at issue 
applied to all individuals and was “not a statute or rule of law that establishe[d] a different rule for 
consumers within the meaning of 9-201(b)” and that section 9-406’s anti-assignment provisions 
invalidated the anti-assignment provisions of the lottery statute); see U.C.C. § 9-201(c) (“Failure 
to comply with a statute or regulation described in subsection (b) has only the effect the statute or 
regulation specifies.”); RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 146 (“In the rare instance when the 
rules on enforcement in Article 9 conflict with some other applicable rule of law (such that com-
pliance with both laws is not possible), the creditor might need to file a declaratory action to seek 
a court determination of which set of requirements is paramount.”). 
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strike a balance between protecting consumer privacy and permitting com-
panies to use other types of IoT data for asset based financing transactions. 
One approach to amending Article 9 would be to have individual states 
make non-uniform amendments, which may then lead to amendments of the 
official text of Article 9. To impose comprehensive assignment restrictions, 
Article 9 would need to be amended to limit the creation and enforceability 
of a security interest in biometric and health-related data, the customer da-
tabase and rights to the customer database containing biometric and health-
related data. This could occur in several ways. 
The scope provisions of section 9-109(d)405 could be amended to ex-
clude assignments in biometric and health-related data (and databases con-
taining such information) when the proposed debtor is a company. To the 
extent that such an amendment is made, consideration must also be given to 
whether excluding the transaction from Article 9 simply results in another 
source of law governing liens in consumer data.406 Additionally, even if 
separate state statutes restricting transfers and assignments (as described 
above) are adopted, section 9-109(c)407 could also be revised to provide that 
Article 9 does not apply to the extent that state statutes regarding consumer 
data restrict the assignment and disclosure of consumer data by companies. 
Rather than simply referencing state statutes that provide “a different rule 
for consumers” section 9-201 could also explicitly reference state data pro-
tection and privacy statutes and clearly provide that Article 9 must always 
defer to any state statute that restricts an assignment or transfer of rights in 
biometric or health-related data.408 
The widespread use and collection of biometric and health-related data 
along with the development of cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoins, evidence 
the significant role of emerging technologies.409 These developments war-
                                                                                                                           
 405 See U.C.C. § 9-109(d) (describing transactions to which Article 9 “does not apply”). 
 406 See RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 51 (“There are some types of transactions that 
create a security interest in personal property but which are not governed by Article 9 . . . . This 
does not mean that the property involved in such transactions cannot be used as security for an 
obligation; it means merely that the law governing such liens is found elsewhere.”). 
 407 U.C.C. § 9-109(c). 
  408 Id. § 9-201(b)–(c). 
 409 See Chelsea Deppert, Bitcoin and Bankruptcy: Putting the Bits Together, 32 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 123, 137 (2015) (discussing bitcoins as general intangibles under Article 9); 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV., Spring 
2016, at 1, 1 (contending that “[i]f held directly by the owner, bitcoin constitutes a ‘general intan-
gible’” and because “general intangibles are non-negotiable . . . . [t]his could greatly impinge on 
bitcoin’s liquidity and, therefore, its utility as a payment system”); George K. Fogg, The UCC and 
Bitcoins: Solution to Existing Fatal Flaw, BLOOMBERG: BNA (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.bna.
com/ucc-bitcoins-solution-n17179924871/ [https://perma.cc/FRZ4-8JQ9] (describing bitcoins as 
general intangibles rather than “‘money’ as defined by the UCC”). See generally Stephen McJohn 
& Ian McJohn, The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and Blockchain Transactions, 47 UCC L.J. 187 
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rant changes in the definition of general intangibles in Article 9 and a new 
category of collateral, or at the very least, discourse about the transfer and 
assignment of rights in the new types of IoT-generated consumer data. The 
definition of “general intangible” in section 9-102(a)(42)410 can be revised 
to exclude consumer data held by companies. 
As previously noted, a separate and new definition of this type of asset 
could be included in section 9-102. Consumer data could be defined as all 
information or data concerning consumers and intellectual property rights 
associated with such data regardless of what medium is used to store or ob-
tain the information. Alternatively, the definition of consumer data could be 
limited to cover only biometric and health-related data and associated 
rights. Such a limited definition offers a way to preserve the value of IoT 
data as a source of financing for companies while simultaneously protecting 
consumers’ privacy by preventing an Article 9 assignment by companies of 
their most sensitive data (biometric and health-related data). Consumer data 
could also be generally defined as data that could reasonably lead to the 
identification of a consumer, and companies could be required to de-
identify or anonymize consumer data before using it for secured credit pur-
poses. However, as previously mentioned, anonymized data can be de-
anonymized.411 Thus, a definition that relies primarily on anonymization is 
not the best approach. 
Section 9-203, which provides rules regarding the attachment of a se-
curity interest, could be amended to provide that if a security interest is 
granted in general intangibles consisting of consumer data or intellectual 
property rights associated with such data, the security interest would not 
extend to health-related or biometric data held by non-consumer persons.412 
Admittedly, this proposal may create tensions between Article 9 and intel-
lectual property law. As state law, the UCC does not apply to the extent that 
it is preempted.413 The dangers associated with the disclosure of these types 
of IoT data justify potential restrictions on the transfer of intellectual prop-
erty rights related to the data, to the extent that such data or a database con-
taining the data qualifies for intellectual property protection as discussed in 
Part II.B.414 
                                                                                                                           
(2017) (questioning “whether Article 9 should be made more flexible in order to account for 
bitcoin financing and blockchain transactions”). 
 410 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (defining gen-
eral intangible). 
 411 See supra notes 119–123, 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 412 See U.C.C. § 9-203 (describing the requirements for the attachment of a security interest). 
 413 Id. at § 9-109(c)(1) (“This article does not apply to the extent that: (1) a statute, regulation, 
or treaty of the United States preempts this article.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This 
Constitution, and the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
 414 See supra notes 242–249 and accompanying text. 
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One could contend that perhaps consumers should be viewed as giving 
only a license (rather than “ownership”) to a company to use their data for 
purposes of allowing the consumer to enjoy all aspects of IoT products and 
services. Such a license could expire upon the decommissioning of the ser-
vice or device, or when the consumer elects to terminate their relationship 
with the company. Companies could also simply be viewed as stewards or 
custodians of consumer IoT data.415 However, as noted in Part II.B, under 
Article 9 a company need not own collateral in order to transfer rights in the 
personal property.416 
The provisions of Article 9 authorizing the secured party to accept the 
collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the debtor’s obligations, sell the 
collateral, or seek judicial intervention to obtain the collateral, could be re-
vised to provide that in no event will these enforcement rights extend to 
biometric or health-related data, those portions of the customer database 
containing health-related or biometric data, or intellectual property rights 
related to such data. Article 9 could also be amended to obligate the debtor 
to use effective procedures to destroy the health-related and biometric data 
prior to transferring the database to the secured party in the event of default. 
To give effect to these proposals, a comprehensive revision of many of the 
provisions in Part 6 of Article 9 would be needed. These provisions may 
include, but are not limited to, sections 9-601 (establishing secured parties’ 
“rights after default”), 9-602 (“waiver and variance of rights and duties”), 
9-610 (“disposition of collateral after default”), 9-617 (“rights of transferee 
of collateral”), and 9-620 (“acceptance of collateral in full or partial satis-
faction of obligation”).417 
Additionally, debtors could be required to ensure that consumer data 
are not disclosed to the secured party during audits of the collateral, or dur-
ing the due diligence process. 
Recall that Article 9 also contains various rules that attempt to limit the 
effect of contractual and legal anti-assignment provisions.418 For instance, 
section 9-408(a) and (c) generally provide that if a provision in a contract 
that relates to a general intangible “prohibits, restricts, or requires the con-
sent of . . . the account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of or creation, 
attachment or perfection of a security interest,”419 or if a “rule of law, stat-
ute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of . . . [an] 
                                                                                                                           
 415 See generally DE MOOY & YUEN, supra note 382 (discussing “data stewardship” and 
wearable devices). 
 416 See supra notes 242–249 and accompanying text. 
 417 See U.C.C. §§ 9-601, 9-602, 9-610, 9-617, 9-620 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2017). 
 418 See generally id. §§ 9-406 to -409. 
 419 Id. § 9-408(a). 
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account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security in-
terest,”420 such contract terms or legal rules are “ineffective to the extent 
that [they] would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security 
interest” or would qualify as an event of default.421 The official comments 
to section 9-408 suggest that subsections 9-408(a) and (c) are intended to 
increase debtors’ abilities to acquire financing.422 Additionally, even though 
9-408(a) invalidates contract provisions that would “prohibit, restrict or re-
quire consent to an assignment,” it does not render ineffective all contract 
terms that may impact assignment, such as non-disclosure provisions.423 
Section 9-408(d) then goes on to insulate “the account debtor on a 
general intangible” from the impact of the creation of a security interest by 
restricting the ability of the secured party to enforce its interest.424 The 
comments provide that section 9-408(d) is intended to protect the account 
debtor “from adverse effects arising from the security interest” and “[i]t 
leaves the account debtor’s or obligated person’s rights and obligations un-
affected in all material respects if a restriction rendered ineffective by sub-
section (a) or (c) would be effective under law other than Article 9.”425 
The official comments to 9-408 then offer the example of an anti-
assignment provision in a software licensing agreement that restricts the 
                                                                                                                           
 420 Id. § 9-408(c). 
 421 Id. § 9-408(a), (c); Neil B. Cohen & William H. Henning, Freedom of Contract vs. Free 
Alienability: An Old Struggle Emerges in a New Context, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 353, 371 (2010) 
(“Although section 9-408(c) overrides legal transfer restrictions . . . it does so only to the extent 
necessary to permit the creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest.”); Lipson, supra 
note 173, at 1127 (“Rev. § 9-408(a) and (c) permit a security interest to attach notwithstanding 
contractual or legal provisions to the contrary.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to 
Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 127 (2003) (“Un-
der Revised Article 9, all legal and contractual restrictions on the assignment of . . . general intan-
gibles are rendered invalid at least to the extent that such restrictions hinder a debtor’s ability to 
grant a security interest in the right.”). 
 422 U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“This enhances the 
ability of certain debtors to obtain credit.”). 
 423 Id. § 9-408 cmt. 6. Some scholars suggest that some states have made non-uniform 
amendments to the anti-assignment provisions of Article 9 to make them inapplicable in certain 
instances. Cohen & Henning, supra note 421, at 370 (“[A] few states, notably Delaware, adopted 
nonuniform provisions excluding assignments of interests in partnerships and LLCs from the 
scope of sections 9-406 and 9-408.”). 
 424 U.C.C. § 9-408(d); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Revised Article 9 and Intellectual Prop-
erty Asset Financing, 53 ME. L. REV. 287, 353 (2001) (“[S]ection 9-408[d] sets out six express 
limits on its rule and what the creditor can do with the interest it can create despite contrary con-
tract or legal terms. These include that the interest created in the licensee’s interest: is not enforce-
able against the licensor; does not impose duties or obligations on the licensor; does not require 
that the licensor render any performance to the lender; does not entitle the lender to use or assign 
the licensee’s rights; does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access to 
any trade secrets or confidential material; and does not entitle the secured party to enforce the 
security interest.”). 
 425 U.C.C § 9-408 cmt. 2. 
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licensee’s ability to assign any of its software related rights and authorizes 
the licensor to terminate the contract if an assignment is attempted.426 Under 
section 9-408, the anti-assignment provision is “ineffective to prevent the 
creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest or entitle the li-
censor to terminate the license agreement.”427 Thus, the licensee could grant 
a lender a security interest in its rights under the agreement. However, pur-
suant to section 9-408(d), the lender cannot enforce its interest without the 
licensor’s agreement, but the licensor is not obligated to acknowledge the 
interest of the lender in the collateral.428 
Reading these rules together, what section 9-408(a) and (c) give to se-
cured parties, section 9-408(d) seemingly takes away. The value of the secu-
rity interest to the secured party decreases significantly under the operation 
of 9-408(d).429 However, as one commentator has suggested, “the protec-
tions of 9-408(d) [may] be illusory.”430 The official comments to section 9-
408 indicate that a “secured party may ascribe value to the collateral,” even 
though it may not enforce its security interest without the account debtor’s 
consent.431 This is likely to occur when the secured lender believes either 
that it may acquire the agreement at some later date or if it believes that the 
collateral may generate other proceeds.432 
Given these rules that may negate the effectiveness of contractual 
agreements (for instance a privacy policy provision that requires consumer 
consent to the creation of a security interest), and legal rules or statutes that 
limit the creation of security interests, one could contend that these provi-
sions should also be amended to clearly provide that in no event will such 
provisions apply to statutes or rules aimed at protecting consumer data, and 
when consumer data are at issue such provisions will defer to the other sec-
tions of Article 9, such as the proposed amendments to 9-109, 9-203 and 
Part 6 of Article 9 as discussed above.433 Such an amendment may be nec-
                                                                                                                           
 426 Id. 
 427 Id. 
 428 Id. 
 429 Cohen & Henning, supra note 421, at 367. 
 430 D. Fenton Adams, Sales of Personal Property as Secured Transactions Under Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 100 (2008) (suggesting that 
despite section 9-408(d) limitations on secured parties “there may be further advantages for the 
secured party in the event that the assignor goes into bankruptcy”); Lipson, supra note 173, at 
1127 (describing the potential use and impact of “hell or high-water clauses” in software licensing 
agreements which “require the licensee to satisfy its obligations under the contract, notwithstand-
ing its claims or defenses”). 
 431 U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 8 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 432 Id. 
 433 See supra notes 405–407 and accompanying text (proposing amendments to section 9-
109); supra note 412 and accompanying text (proposing amendments to section 9-203); supra 
note 417 and accompanying text (proposing amendments to Part 6 of Article 9). 
2018] Commodifying Consumer Data in the IoT Era 511 
essary if consumer data are not carved out of the definition of general in-
tangibles. 
Prior to the implementation of any amendments to the anti-assignment 
provisions, careful consideration must be given to the following concerns. 
Section 9-408’s anti-assignment provisions seemingly apply to agreements 
between debtors and account debtors with respect to “certain general intan-
gibles.”434 It is not entirely clear whether a consumer would qualify as an 
account debtor under Article 9 in a transaction in which the consumer simp-
ly provides data that can be collected and used by a company.435 To the ex-
tent that consumers do not qualify as account debtors then amendments to 
the anti-assignment provisions may be unnecessary. Additionally, scholars 
have contended that “whether Article 9 will override another statute that 
restricts assignment is somewhat questionable” given conflicting case law 
on this issue.436 In light of this lack of clarity, careful attention must be paid 
to the interaction between contractual provisions, state statutes restricting 
the transfer or assignment of rights in consumer data, and the anti-
assignment provisions of Article 9. These ambiguities must be resolved to 
ensure that consumers’ interests are adequately protected. 
3. Bankruptcy Code Amendments 
A similar approach could also be taken under the Bankruptcy Code. If 
a company files for bankruptcy and its assets include consumer health-
related or biometric data, the company could be prohibited from transfer-
ring and disclosing this data. The Bankruptcy Code could expressly require 
the debtor to destroy the biometric and health-related data before the sale or 
transfer of the customer database to a third party, while retaining CPOs’ 
abilities to provide recommendations with respect to other types of consum-
er data.437 Various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would need to be re-
                                                                                                                           
 434 U.C.C. § 9-408; id. § 9-408 cmt. 4 (“Subsection (a) does not render ineffective any term, 
and subsection (c) does not render ineffective any law, statute or regulation, that restricts outright 
sales of general intangibles other than payment intangibles. They deal only with restrictions on 
security interests.”); id. § 9-408(a) cmt. 6 (“Subsections (a) and (c) affect two classes of persons. 
These subsections affect account debtors on generable intangibles and healthcare insurance re-
ceivables and persons obligated on promissory notes.”); Draft for Public Comment, Permanent 
Editorial Bd., U.C.C., Application of UCC Sections 9-406 and 9-408 to Transfers of Interests in 
Unincorporated Business Organizations (Feb. 1, 2012) (on file with Gonzaga University) (stating 
that “[b]oth § 9-406 and § 9-408 express their overrides with regard to certain transfer restrictions 
for the benefit of the ‘account debtor’”). 
 435 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) (defining “account debtor” as a “person obligated on an account, 
chattel paper, or general intangible . . . .”). 
 436 RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 167, at 187 (discussing conflicting case law evaluating 
state statutes restricting the assignment of state lottery winnings). 
 437 It should be noted that the Bankruptcy Code also contains various provisions applicable to 
healthcare records and a “health care business” that files for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 333 (2012) 
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vised to restrict the transfer of such data and give effect to the proposal dis-
cussed in this Article. In implementing such amendments, consideration 
must be given to bankruptcy law’s reliance on state law, the current provi-
sions of the BAPCPA discussed in Part III.A (sections 332 and 363), and the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (i) defining the debtor’s estate and “per-
sonally identifiable information,” and (ii) limiting attempts to prevent prop-
erty from becoming part of the debtor’s estate.438 
4. Criticisms of Transfer & Assignment Restrictions 
a. Shift from Financing to Selling 
If transfer and assignment constraints are imposed in the Article 9 con-
text, companies may avoid using their data assets (which may include bio-
metric and health-related data) for Article 9 transactions and instead resort to 
directly selling consumer-related data to third parties to obtain funding. Thus, 
transfer and assignment restrictions could amplify companies’ use of other 
data monetization methods, thereby rendering any such restrictions ineffec-
tive. As previously mentioned, this Article does not suggest that Article 9 as-
signment restrictions will remedy all concerns associated with data monetiza-
tions. Instead, it argues that the moments of data disclosures permitted under 
Article 9 could be decreased through the imposition of specific restrictions. 
Further, this Article calls for the simultaneous use of different data protection 
models to protect consumers in various settings. Concerns associated with 
other types of monetizations, such as direct sales of consumer data, could be 
remedied by adopting restrictions in the non-Article 9 context. For instance, 
recall that the Illinois biometric data statute forbids companies from selling 
biometric data. Similar legislation could be adopted in other states. 
                                                                                                                           
(“[a]ppointment of patient care ombudsman”); id. § 351 (“disposal of patient records”); id. 
§ 101(27A) (generally defining “health care business[es]” as entities that mainly provide health 
care related services, such as “the diagnosis or treatment of injury, deformity, or disease”). It is 
unlikely that IoT companies will qualify as “health care businesses” under the Code. IoT health-
related data may not meet the definition of “patient records,” which also relies on the collection of 
data by a “health care business.” Id. § 101(40A)–(40B) (“The term ‘patient’ means any individual 
who obtains or receives services from a health care business” and “[t]he term ‘patient records’ 
means any record relating to a patient, including a written document or a record recorded in a 
magnetic, optical, or other form of electronic medium.”). 
 438 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41A) (defining “personally identifiable information”); id. § 541 (2012 
& Supp. II 2014) (defining debtor’s estate); id. § 541(c) (limiting the effect of contractual agree-
ments and non-bankruptcy law that attempt to prevent property from becoming part of the debtor’s 
estate); John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolution of Wealth, 
Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 206 (2004) (“[T]he Code ignores anti-
alienation provisions and requires the court to bring the affected interest into the bankruptcy estate 
for application in satisfaction of creditor claims.”); Miller & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 789 
(noting that the “Code leaves the definition of ‘property’ to other state or federal law”); supra 
notes 263–311 and accompanying text. 
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b. Practical Concerns 
Another critique of the restriction on transfers and assignments ap-
proach is that it may be difficult for IoT companies to separate biometric 
and health-related data from other personally identifiable or non-identifiable 
consumer information. To ameliorate this concern, companies could con-
sistently encrypt biometric and health-related data, store these data apart 
from other types of consumer data in separate databases and servers upon 
collection, and develop new ways to ensure that the data are kept secure. 
c. Innovation and Costs 
Other criticisms include that transfer and assignment restrictions may 
have a negative impact on innovation, do serious harm to the viability of IoT 
companies that specialize in producing devices that collect IoT data, and in-
crease the price of IoT products. Following this line of reasoning, certain IoT 
companies may produce IoT devices that collect and rely mainly on health-
related or biometric data. Thus, preventing these companies from using such 
data for secured transactions purposes or in bankruptcy proceedings will have 
a significant impact on their ability to obtain financing or transfer substantial-
ly all of their assets if they experience financial difficulties. 
One response to these critiques is that customer databases can still be 
valuable assets to companies without the inclusion of biometric or health-
related data. For instance, RadioShack sold its customer database and other 
assets for $26.2 million even though significant pieces of consumer infor-
mation were not transferred as part of the sale.439 Thus, requiring the re-
moval of health-related or biometric data prior to the sale or disclosure of 
other types of consumer data does not completely eradicate the value of the 
asset. 
One could also contend that allowing biometric and health-related data 
to be sold to third parties as part of an Article 9 or bankruptcy sale or other 
business transition is beneficial to consumers, particularly when data are 
transferred to a third party that will continue to operate the debtor’s busi-
ness or is in the same line of business as the debtor. In such an instance, the 
transfer of the data may allow the device to continue to function and pre-
vent service interruptions that may impact the consumer. However, to the 
extent that this information is transferred to a third party during bankruptcy 
or to a secured party in the same line of business, these companies should 
                                                                                                                           
 439 See Hiltzik, supra note 34 (discussing how RadioShack’s “hoard of customers’ personally 
identifiable information” was sold for $26.2 million); Isidore, supra note 33 (“RadioShack struck 
a deal with a coalition of 38 state attorneys general to destroy most of RadioShack’s consumer 
data, and stipulated that no credit or debit card account numbers, social security numbers, dates of 
birth or even phone numbers would be transferred.”). 
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be prohibited from further monetizing and assigning the data and should 
only be permitted to use the data to the extent necessary for the device to 
function and to meet consumer needs. 
Moreover, even if transfer restrictions may impact the price and opera-
tions of IoT devices and services, the potential dangers of continually dis-
closing and transferring highly sensitive consumer data from party to party, 
server to server, and network to network justify the imposition of transfer 
and assignment constraints. Consider that in 2015 the U.S. Office of Per-
sonnel Management (“OPM”) announced that the fingerprint data of ap-
proximately 5.6 million individuals were stolen when the agency’s systems 
were hacked.440 Given the generally immutable nature of fingerprints, indi-
viduals impacted by the breach “may find themselves grappling with the 
fallout for years.”441 Consumers may ultimately have to forego some of the 
convenience obtained from the use of IoT devices and services in order for 
their privacy concerns to be effectively addressed. If the OPM cannot keep 
the fingerprint scans of millions of citizens secure, should IoT companies, 
including small start-ups, be permitted to freely collect, transfer, and use 
biometric data simply because consumers were provided with notice of the 
terms of a privacy policy and given an artificial choice? Databases and 
servers that are rich with highly sensitive data, including biometric and 
health-related data, are attractive targets for foreign and domestic hackers. 
Companies’ unrestricted collection, disclosure, or use of biometric or health 
related data may also implicate national security concerns as evidenced by 
recent reports of a health-tracking mobile application that “exposed the lo-
cation of [secret] military bases.”442 Consumers may be better served if 
companies are discouraged from routinely collecting or disclosing biomet-
rics and health-related data in connection with IoT devices and services, and 
limitations are placed on companies’ ability to transfer, use, and disclose 
such data. 
                                                                                                                           
 440 Andrea Peterson, OPM Says 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in Cyberattack, Five Times as 
Many as Previously Thought, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now-says-more-than-five-million-fingerprints-compromised-
in-breaches/ [https://perma.cc/NY3M-Q988]. 
 441 Id. 
 442 Ryan B. Browne, The App That Exposed the Location of Military Bases with a Heat Map 
Is Reviewing Its Features, CNBC (Jan. 30, 2018, 6:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/30/
strava-reviewing-features-after-military-bases-were-found-on-heat-map.html [https://perma.cc/
5ZBR-BSW3]; Matt Burgess, Strava’s Data Lets Anyone See the Names (and Heart Rates) of 
People Exercising on Military Bases, WIRED (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/
strava-military-bases-area-51-map-afghanistan-gchq-military [https://perma.cc/E8PN-U325] (dis-
cussing the Strava app’s disclosure of user’s heart rates and military base locations). 
2018] Commodifying Consumer Data in the IoT Era 515 
d. Competition Concerns 
Restricting the flow of data to third parties may also implicate concerns 
related to competition. One commentator suggests that control of consumer 
data rests with a “handful of dominant players” and “with little competition to 
worry about, they are likely to keep collecting more and more data; effective-
ly creating a status quo or glass ceiling that cannot be breached.”443 The 
Economist magazine also notes that data “titans,” such as Apple, Google, and 
Facebook, dominate the big data industry.444 This market domination may 
create insurmountable hurdles for small businesses and start-ups whose busi-
ness models rely on the collection of consumer data.445 Following that line of 
reasoning, one could contend that prohibitions on the disclosure and sale of 
consumer data to third parties exacerbates this problem. 
One response to this critique is that although large companies may 
have vast quantities of consumer data and significant influence, the privacy 
and security concerns posed by data collection and disclosure in the IoT 
setting outweigh these matters, or at the very least, justify restrictions on the 
sale and assignment of certain types of consumer data. Additionally, over 
the last few years there has been a consistent stream of new start-up compa-
nies entering the IoT market despite the dominant role of large Internet 
companies. This suggests that assignment and transfer restrictions may not 
necessarily prevent start-up companies from successfully entering the IoT 
market. A detailed evaluation of the long-term viability of such new compa-
nies in light of the perceived dominance of large “data titans” must await 
further consideration. 
e. Alternative Notice and Choice Methods 
Despite many privacy law scholars’ notable criticisms of the notice and 
choice model, at least one scholar has suggested that “emerging strategies 
of ‘visceral’ notice [that] leverage a consumer’s very experience of a prod-
uct or service to warn or inform . . . [are] worthy of further study before we 
give in to calls to abandon notice as a regulatory strategy in privacy and 
                                                                                                                           
 443 Kees Jan Kuilwijk, Big Data, the Internet of Things and Competition Law, LINKEDIN 
(June 7, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/big-data-internet-things-competition-law-kees-
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elsewhere.”446 Thus, one could contend that rather than imposing explicit 
transfer and assignment restrictions, alternative and improved notice tech-
niques, such as concise privacy policies, privacy icons, and “notice that 
rel[ies] on consumer experience rather than entirely on words or symbols,” 
could sufficiently protect consumers.447 
A potential response to this critique is that consumers may continue to 
ignore privacy notices regardless of their length or form. Several studies sug-
gest that the use of shorter policies, tables, or icons to provide privacy notices 
do not significantly avoid the pitfalls of traditional privacy policies.448 Addi-
tionally, although in some settings there may be some advantages to using 
visceral privacy notices when compared to standard privacy policies, there 
are limits to the effectiveness of visceral notice.449 For instance, visceral no-
                                                                                                                           
 446 M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
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 447 Id. at 1047; FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURE: BUILDING TRUST 
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37, 38 (Ian Goldberg & Mikhail Atallah eds., 2009) (a study finding inadequacies in various priva-
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veyed information by icons and colors did not improve comprehension”); Lauren E. Willis, Why 
Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 127 (2014) (discussing the ineffectiveness 
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ly-used icon leads to an explanation of how to opt out of receiving behavioral advertising, but 
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know what the icon means, and even fewer have clicked on it”); Joshua Gluck et al., How Short Is 
Too Short? Implications of Length and Framing on the Effectives of Privacy Notices, USENIX 
ASS’N 321 (2016), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2016/soups2016-paper-
gluck.pdf [https://perma.cc/V683-WF67] (finding that although “short-form privacy notices can 
inform users about privacy practices . . . removing expected privacy practices from notices some-
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tion: Learning the Lessons from Behaviour-Aware Regulation, 43 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 69, 
111 (2015) (discussing studies on visceral notices and contending that “a relevant finding of these 
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tice (as well as other traditional forms of privacy notice) may not eliminate 
the negative consumer consequences associated with use of “big data,” such 
as discrimination.450 Moreover, as one scholar has noted, 
privacy warnings are more difficult to translate into visceral terms 
because the consequences are much more abstract . . . [and] im-
proved notice, whether simplified or more visceral . . . neglect a 
fundamental dilemma of notice: making it simple and easy to un-
derstand conflicts with fully informing people about the conse-
quences of giving up data, which are quite complex if explained 
in sufficient detail to be meaningful.451 
Thus, in the privacy setting, visceral notice is unlikely to be “a panacea to 
protect privacy.”452 As a result, alternative and complementary consumer 
protection methods, such as transfer and assignment restrictions, are still 
needed. To be clear, this Article does not contend that companies should no 
longer provide consumers with any form of privacy notice. Rather, it high-
lights the limits of depending excessively on the notice and choice model 
and privacy policies to safeguard consumers, and ultimately argues for the 
implementation of solutions to ameliorate the impact of, and correct, this 
overreliance. 
Lastly, one could posit that IoT voice controlled “two-way” speaker de-
vices, such as the Amazon Echo, could provide consumers with key summar-
ies of privacy policies and conditions of use. However, it is unclear whether 
                                                                                                                           
studies is that a visceral notice represented by an informal interface (‘informal condition’) to be em-
ployed, for instance, in children’s websites, prove to reduce privacy concerns, but also to increase 
data disclosure by users, making the informal design problematic for data protection and privacy 
policy”); Barbara Sandfuchs & Andereas Kapsner, Coercing Online Privacy, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 185, 200 n.65 (2016) (describing Calo’s visceral notice approach as “a nudge rather 
than a notice”); Yang Wang et al., A Field Trial of Privacy Nudges for Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2367 passim (2014), 
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1341&context=heinzworks [https://perma.cc/
FP58-4SVD] (evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of “privacy nudges”); Victoria Groom & 
M. Ryan Calo, Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An Experimental Study (Sept. 25, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding that “visceral notice strategies prove more effective at 
modulating consumer privacy concern than traditional notice in certain instances” but noting con-
cerns with “informal websites”). 
 450 Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, 
Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 5–6 (2017) (con-
tending that although “proposed smart disclosure policies such as ‘visceral notice’ can help con-
sumers make better-informed choices about services powered by data . . . transparency [cannot] 
work on its own to combat troublesome discriminatory uses of Big Data [and therefore] regulatory 
strategies that couple transparency with some substantive protections” are needed). 
 451 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1879, 1885 (2013). 
 452 Monteleone, supra note 449, at 116–17 (contending that visceral notice alone cannot cor-
rect all privacy related problems and advocating for the use of other “coercive measures”). 
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privacy notices provided via an interactive IoT device will truly improve con-
sumer understanding of the implications of consenting to a company’s priva-
cy policy. Further, even if such notice improves some consumers’ understand-
ing of privacy policies it does nothing to impact companies’ subsequent, use, 
disclosure and transfer of consumer data once consumers consent to the poli-
cy. Stated differently, IoT personal assistants could inform consumers that 
their data could be transferred to third parties in the event of bankruptcy or a 
sale of the company or its assets, yet the result for consumers is potentially 
the same: the company continues to be the primary arbiter of how and when 
consumer data is used and disclosed, and once the consumer consents to the 
company’s privacy policy after receiving notice through the IoT device, their 
data can continue to be transferred and disclosed through the financial 
frameworks of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the potential effec-
tiveness of relying solely or primarily on alternative notice and choice tech-
niques to safeguard consumers is questionable. 
B. Require CPOs in Article 9 Foreclosures 
Article 9’s scope, attachment, and other provisions discussed in Part 
IV.A above could remain as they are to alleviate concerns related to the abil-
ity of IoT companies that rely primarily on health-related and biometric data 
to obtain financing.453 Instead, Part 6 of Article 9 could be amended to ex-
plicitly provide that when a customer database containing consumer infor-
mation is subject to a secured party’s security interest, judicial intervention 
is the only method by which the secured party can obtain and dispose of the 
collateral. 
Article 9 could be revised to provide that a CPO must be appointed to 
provide guidance to the court in deciding whether to issue an order requir-
ing the debtor to provide the collateral (customer data) to the secured party. 
CPOs could: (1) consider whether the debtor’s privacy policy permits a sale 
upon an event of default under a security agreement, (2) recommend that 
the secured party be prohibited from selling the data in a piecemeal manner 
to buyers so that the data cannot be disassociated from the business, (3) rec-
ommend that the secured party be permitted to operate the debtor’s business 
as a “going concern,”454 and (4) to the extent that the debtor’s privacy poli-
                                                                                                                           
 453 See supra notes 405–436 and accompanying text. 
 454 This approach could be viewed as fitting within a “downstream data protection model” 
which “[p]rohibits data disclosure by data custodian or limits disclosure to certain persons or for 
certain purposes.” Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 394, at 153; see also PARRISH & 
MORGAN, supra note 257, at 3-6 (discussing the differences between a section 363 Chapter 11 
sale and sales under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and Article 9, and contending that “for 
sellers, the 363 sale process provides a way for substantially all of a chapter 11 debtor’s assets to 
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cy does not adequately protect consumer interests, determine whether the 
party that wants to acquire the data is willing to adopt a more consumer-
friendly privacy and data protection policy that limits disclosures and trans-
fers after data acquisition. 
The major critiques of this approach are that it limits the remedies 
available to secured parties in the event of default, requires parties to go to 
court in the event of default, imposes additional costs associated with hiring 
and appointing a CPO, and may make such assets less attractive to lenders. 
Either the debtor or the secured party must bear the cost of a CPO’s ap-
pointment. Additionally, as with the transfer and assignment restrictions 
discussed in Part IV.A, the consumer protection effect of this approach may 
be negated if parties elect to engage in regulatory arbitrage by structuring a 
transaction as a direct sale of IoT data to avoid the application of Article 9. 
As noted earlier, the adoption of statutes prohibiting such activities may 
alleviate this concern. 
Despite these criticisms, the various data disclosure moments author-
ized by Article 9 support the imposition of restrictions on the transfer and 
disclosure of consumer data in the IoT context. It is clear that companies 
use privacy policies to authorize the monetization of consumer data, and 
that “notice and choice” has largely failed consumers. Thus, as noted earli-
er, more notice and choice (including simplified disclosures) is unlikely to 
be the most effective solution.455 
The expected proliferation and widespread use of new types of IoT da-
ta about consumers, warrants movement away from an overreliance on 
companies’ privacy policies. Further, in contrast to explicit restrictions pro-
hibiting a transfer or assignment of rights in customer data (or databases), 
this solution balances the interests of debtors that would like to use IoT data 
as a source of credit with the concerns of consumers that may arise when 
Article 9’s regime permits data disclosures and transfers upon foreclosure. 
Such a solution may be preferable for companies whose primary or most 
valuable asset is their customer database. As a practical matter, currently a 
                                                                                                                           
be sold as a going concern, as opposed to ceasing the business and liquidating assets pursuant to 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code”). 
 455 In a leading article on the creation of security interests in customer databases prior to the 
rise of the IoT, one scholar offered several valuable proposals to remedy consumer privacy con-
cerns in the non-IoT setting. Nguyen, Collateralizing, supra note 19, at 599–602. These solutions 
include obligating companies to disclose in their privacy policies secured transactions involving 
customer databases as well as provide explanations regarding the implications of assignment; 
requiring clear references on financing statements to customer databases; and amending Article 9 
to require that the security agreement obligates the secured party to comply with the debtor’s ex-
isting privacy policy. Id. These proposals also emphasize reliance on the terms of a company’s 
privacy policy as the primary vehicle of protecting consumers. Further, consumers may not review 
or understand detailed privacy policies. Thus, the imposition of more disclosure requirements may 
not sufficiently protect consumer interests. 
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creditor likely needs judicial intervention to obtain customer lists and cus-
tomer databases that are subject to a security interest and controlled by or in 
the possession of the debtor. Thus, if a court is likely to already be involved 
in connection with the secured party’s exercise of its rights under the securi-
ty agreement, it is advisable to appoint a CPO to aid the court in its deter-
minations when highly-sensitive consumer data may be up for sale. Congress 
has already recognized the dangers associated with the transfer of non-IoT 
consumer data in the bankruptcy context via the adoption of the BAPCPA. 
These concerns are also present in the Article 9 context and are even more 
disquieting given the new types, quality, and quantity of IoT data that are 
now available to companies. Although the appointment of a CPO does not 
mean all concerns related to consumer data transfers and disclosures will be 
automatically remedied, CPOs with expertise in the bankruptcy setting may 
provide valuable guidance to courts during the Article 9 foreclosure pro-
cess. 
C. Require CPOs in All Bankruptcy Transfers 
Another approach to increasing the protection of consumer data in the 
bankruptcy setting is to require the appointment of CPOs whenever con-
sumer data are offered for sale or lease in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, 
even if the sale of consumer data would be permissible under the debtor’s 
existing privacy policy, the consumer has consented to the privacy policy, if 
no privacy policy is provided, or if the data does not qualify as personally 
identifiable information, a CPO would be appointed to provide guidance to 
the court on whether the sale of the data should be approved.456 This would, 
of course, require amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. Given the increas-
ing prevalence of section 363 sales, sections 332 and 363 of the Bankruptcy 
Code (containing the existing CPO and BAPCPA provisions discussed in 
this Article) are the first place to begin.457 The definition of “personally 
identifiable information” could also be expanded to cover any type of con-
sumer data regardless of whether it may lead to identification, or a separate 
and much broader definition of consumer data could be adopted.458 Other 
                                                                                                                           
 456 One could of course contend that consumer advocates are also needed in other types of 
proceedings that deal with assets that affect consumers. Although this may be true, the impact of 
IoT data as discussed in this article and the various ways that it can be disclosed and misused to 
the detriment of consumers in accordance with Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code suggest that 
special attention should be given to IoT data as an asset. 
 457 11 U.S.C. §§ 332, 363 (2012); PARRISH & MORGAN, supra note 257, at 3-6 (“[T]he use of 
363 sales has become common, and many bankruptcy cases are now filed for the sole purpose of 
completing a 363 sale.”); see supra notes 263–311 and accompanying text. 
 458 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41A) (defining personally identifiable information); Narayanan & 
Shmatikov, supra note 389 (critiquing use of the term “personally identifiable information” and 
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provisions of the Code may also need to be amended to give effect to such a 
proposal.459 
Further, in light of privacy policies that attempt to skirt the buyer limi-
tations established by the FTC in Toysmart and discussed in Part II.B above, 
in amending these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code consideration should 
be given to whether these limitations adequately protect consumers and 
whether some or all of these limitations should be expressly included in the 
code.460 
As noted in Part III.A, if the debtor’s privacy policy does not suffi-
ciently protect consumers, this inadequacy will continue even if the buyer 
adopts the debtor’s privacy policy.461 Thus, in deciding if a sale or lease 
should be approved, whether the proposed buyer of the data consents to or 
assumes the debtor’s existing privacy policy or agrees to use the data for 
similar purposes as the debtor should be irrelevant when the privacy policy 
does not adequately protect the data of consumers. Courts and CPOs should 
be willing to acknowledge that in many instances consumers’ interests may 
be better served if health-related and biometric data are not transferred to 
purchasers. Rather than solely seeking to extract as much value as can be 
obtained from the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors, courts must 
actively consider the implications of the transfer of consumer data in bank-
ruptcy proceedings and must be willing to follow CPO recommendations 
that sufficiently protect consumers’ interests. Further, the harms that con-
sumers may suffer from the transfer of their data to third parties in bank-
ruptcy proceedings supersede concerns about increased costs associated 
with CPO appointments. 
The consistent stream of bankruptcy cases since Toysmart involving 
the sale of consumer data coupled with the documented inadequacies of the 
                                                                                                                           
contending that “[t]he versatility and power of re-identification algorithms imply that terms such 
as “personally identifiable” and “quasi-identifier” simply have no technical meaning”). 
 459 The sections of the Bankruptcy Code that authorize a transfer of the debtor’s assets outside 
of the section 363 context may also need to be addressed to the extent that customer data can be 
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 460 See supra notes 312–321 and accompanying text. 
 461 See supra notes 304–307 and accompanying text. 
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BAPCPA discussed in this Article, as well as courts’ reluctance to appoint 
CPOs indicate that amendments to the Bankruptcy Code are needed. 
CONCLUSION 
By using IoT devices and services, consumers may unwittingly trade 
privacy in exchange for convenience and efficiency with dire consequences. 
Consumer IoT data are extremely valuable to IoT companies. The IoT holds 
perils for consumers if it is not effectively regulated. As such, renewed dis-
course and debate about how to effectively protect consumer privacy and 
data in the IoT era, while balancing other important goals of various legal 
frameworks, is needed. 
Bankruptcy law and Article 9 can significantly impact privacy law is-
sues. Currently, privacy policies, Article 9, and the Bankruptcy Code permit 
companies to opaquely disclose and transfer consumer data to third parties. 
Given the exponential growth in the types and volume of data that compa-
nies will collect and retain, Article 9’s secured credit framework and the 
Bankruptcy Code should be revised to effectively address consumer privacy 
concerns. These amendments could take the form of specific assignment 
and transfer restrictions or revisions to enforcement mechanisms. The latter 
solution may alleviate some concerns associated with transfer and assign-
ment restrictions. 
The privacy and security harms posed by the IoT are significant. As a 
result, consumer interests may be more adequately protected when re-
strictions are imposed on the collection, transfer, and assignment of certain 
types of data under commercial frameworks and in other monetization set-
tings. Movement away from an excessive dependency on the notice and 
choice model and the provisions of privacy policies is long overdue. 
